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1. INTRODUCTION 
Managing a company requires taking actions and decisions every day. As 
being a legal entity, an abstract conglomerate of assets, contracts, rights and 
obligations, a company can only act and express intention through its managers.  
Whereas the company’s defined object is the purpose and direction for all 
actions and decisions taken by its managers, every step regarding the execution of 
the company’s object is in the end conducted by a human being, the manager. 
And as such, every action and decision, which is taken by the respective manager 
does not occur in a perfect rational vacuum, but is surrounded by traits, character, 
communication skills and experience of the respective manager.  
Are those actions and decisions really only surrounded by the individual 
features and factors of the manager, who takes them? Or might there be 
connections between management behaviour and the managing individual itself? 
Based on every-day experience, this question appears not to be easily negated.  
Are decisions taken on a fully rational basis or are they influenced by the 
respective individual’s current situation, history and character? Does this also 
count for decisions taken in a professional corporate environment? Can 
professionalism force back subjective traits and characteristics? 
Scientific discurs and academic research is dealing with the question of 
subjective influences to individual decision-making in depth and for a substantial 
amount of decades already.1 Experiments and field research conducted so far has 
revealed a broad variety of findings, most of them supporting assumptions and 
hypotheses around decision-making in fact always being influenced and biased 
by subjective factors from the sphere of the individual, who takes those 
decisions.2   
If there is likely to be an impact of subjective factors to decision-making of 
managers of companies, the question to follow is, what consequences this might 
                                                     
1 Cf. Schlaifer, R. (1959); Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., (1981); von Neumann, J., 
Morgenstern, O. (1947).  
2 Cf. Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1974). 
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entail for the company and the company’s object. Even more so, if decision-
making does not concern the daily business-routine only, but touches on 
untypical, disruptive events in the lifecycle of a company.  
One prominent example for such an extraordinary event is the field of 
Mergers & Acquisitions, which, even though it can be legally conducted in 
numerous variants, does always substantially and, if conducted successfully, 
sustainably impact the company’s business model, organisational structure and 
strategic direction.  
The central aim of this Thesis is to analyse the above mentioned questions 
around subjective influence factors on management decision-making with regard 
to an M&A event of a company – from the perspective of each participant in a 
corporate transaction: Seller, Buyer and Target Company.  
In order to conduct this analysis in a comprehensive and in-depth scientific 
manner and with a clear focus on a defined Research Question, a descriptive 
analysis of the relevant theories will build the fundament of this Thesis. This 
theoretical fundament comprises of both, the legal aspects, which are of relevance 
here, as well as a close analytical review of the theories around individual 
decision-making in the fields of Management strategies and Behavioural 
Economics. Following the theoretical fundament, real-life examples of 
management behaviour in transactional scenarios will be analysed, in order to 
generate assumptions and hypotheses to enhance the answer to the Research 
Question.  
Theoretical focus, as well as the path of analysis used for the empirical data 
will be explained and defended against challenging options, as necessary.  
  
  
 
2. SCOPE OF WORK – FOCUS OF ANALYSIS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
2.1. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Mergers & Acquisitions, meaning company mergers, share and asset 
acquisitions, sales, group restructurings and other types of Corporate 
Transactions, are among the most unique and challenging tasks, which a 
company’s management can have to face. Transactions often include issues, 
questions, necessities and tasks which require thoughtful management and which 
are often far away from the company’s – and its managers’ – day-to-day business.  
Apart from the role of the shareholder(s), the management of each 
participant in a transaction – seller, purchaser as well as the target company – is 
of essential importance for a corporate transaction. Whereas the shareholders 
typically stay in the back, giving only the general direction and final blessing to a 
Corporate Transaction, it is the managers who need to identify, decide and 
execute the individual steps and issues at various different stages throughout the 
transactional process.  
But which motivations and incentives might influence a manager’s 
decisions and actions? And in what regulatory framework is the transaction 
conducted and what does this entail for the management’s rights and freedom to 
take individual decisions and actions? Where is management free to decide and 
where are the next steps and direction, which has to be taken, determined by law 
or by decisions of the company owners?  
Taking a step back into a holistic perspective of human behavior and 
decision-making, whenever a human being takes a decision, there is at least one 
reason for it to do so. Decisions and actions constitute the result of a process of 
consideration and of weighing one alternative against another.  
Even though this procedure might often be conducted automatically or 
without our direct mental awareness, it does exist for every decision and action 
taken. Otherwise, there is no call for action, no urge for changing the status quo. 
Arguments and considerations are the drivers for human behaviour. When being 
confronted with circumstances or situations that enable or force actions, the 
individual is confronted with the basic question: “Why?”. 
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“Why do something? Why do nothing? Why do this and not that? Why 
now? Why me?” – The answer to the “Why?” is the fundament for any action 
taken by the individual. 
As the title “Managing cross-border transactions – legal framework, 
strategies and incentives from the participant’s perspective” indicates, this 
dissertation aims to approach and analyse the scientific dimension of managers’ 
decision-making during corporate transactions. The approach will be two-fold: (1) 
Where does the legal framework allow for an autonomous decision by the 
manager at all? And (2) within those fields of autonomous decision-making, what 
are the factors that influence the manager in his/her process of decision-making?   
This work comprises of a comparison of the management decision-making 
from three different perspectives: (1) the selling company’s management, (2) the 
purchasing company’s management and (3)  the management of the target 
company. 
In order to structurally develop the answer to the research question, which 
is developed and worded in Chapter 2.4, and in order to consider all different 
perspectives described above, this Thesis is divided into three main parts:  
 
(1) analysis of the legal framework (Chapter 3),  
(2) assessment of management strategies, individual motivations and 
management behaviour in the transactional context (Chapter 4), and  
(3) analysis of manager’s individual behaviour and motivations in practice 
(Chapter 5).  
 
Each of these chapters will include the identification of a “Research 
Fragment”, which will define the scope and direction of the analysis. Each chapter 
shall result in a conclusion, in which the particular findings are considered and 
evaluated in the light of the Research Question. The connection of such findings 
will then serve as the fundament for the comparative analysis (Chapter 6) and to 
come to the final conclusion, i.e. the answer to the Research Question (Chapter 7).  
21 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
The overall methodology of the dissertation will be, for the theoretical parts 
in Chapters 3 and 4, a description, comparative assessment and evaluation of the 
relevant legal framework, as well as the existing theories and scientific literature 
of relevance for the answer to the Research Question. Based on the findings made 
during the comparative analysis in the theoretical fundament parts of this thesis, 
a series of five selected real-life case studies will then be the source for empirical 
data to develop thorough assumptions and hypotheses by way of a qualitative 
data analysis, following the models of Mayring and Gläser3.   
Therefore, the abstract aim of this thesis can be described as deductive 
analysis for generation of hypotheses on a specific subject matter, which has to 
the author’s knowledge, not yet been in the focus of scientific analysis and 
research in its specific form and scope.  
By that, this thesis is meant to close an existing gap in scientific research 
and therewith contribute to the further development of sciences located at the 
intersection of European Legal theories and Economics, namingly Management 
Theories and Behavioural Economics.   
  
                                                     
3 Cf. Bortz/Döring (2006), p. 331 et seq.; Mayring, P. (1990); Mayring, P. (1993);  
Mayring, P., Gläser-Zikuda, M. (2005). 
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2.2. INDIVIDUAL SEGMENTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
In order to construct the path from the initial Research Question towards 
the conclusion that aims to answer it, this work will touch and analyse various 
different aspects from both, the theoretical academic world of discussions and 
opinions, as well as from the world of empirical data and its analysis by means of 
methodologies and analytical approaches.  
In order to be able to do so in a structured and transparent way, a series of 
three analytical parts will be introduced and analysed – the Research Fragments.  
 Resarch Fragment 1 will focus on the relevant question with regards to the 
legal framework of Corporate Transactions and managerial decision-making in 
the context of corporate laws and statutorial organisational structures. Thereby, 
the playing field of decision-making and actions to be taken by Managers of 
Companies shall be identified. Areas for such decision-making, as well as legal 
limitations thereto will be assessed and described with the specific view to a 
Managing Director’s role and function within a Corporate Transaction.  
Research Fragment 2 will then, in the light of the findings regarding the 
applicable legal fundament, take a closer look towards theories and models, 
which might be helpful to set a light to the actual process of human decision-
making. Influencing factors for individual decisions, but also the role and 
perspective of a human being in the position of managing a Company and 
thereby being bound into various different relationships and organisational 
aspects, will be described and analysed here.  
Those two elements of theoretical knowledge mining will then set the stage 
for a specific view into the reality of Corporate Transactions and real-life 
management behaviour. Therefore, Research Fragment 3 will be based upon the 
findings made in the two previous fragments of analysis and will then go further 
and lead the path into an analysis of empirical data regarding managerial 
decision-making in Corproate Transactions.  
This three-fold synopsis of a robust and comprehensive theoretical 
fundament and a detailed and analytical view into reality will allow for a reliable  
answer to the Research Question, which is able to contribute to the academic 
discourse by closing a scientific gap, which has been existing until today.  
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
2.3. ANALYSED SCENARIOS 
The analysis of Manager’s decision-making in Corporate Transactions will 
be conducted with a holistic view towards the nature of Corporate Transasctions 
in general. Therefore, it will be necessary to focus not only on one perspective 
therein, but to rather diversify the analysis to capture the perspective of all three 
participants, which occur in Corporate Transactions:  
 
(1) the Selling Company,  
(2) the Purchasing Company, and 
(3) the Target Company.  
 
Whereas the first two participants named above exist in every type of 
Corporate Transaction, the Target Company is a third participant, which is only 
existing, in case the sale and purchase of shares in a company, namely the Target 
Company, are subject to the Corporate Transaction. An alternative scenario 
would be the sale and purchase of certain assets,4 where only two parties are 
involved.  
The particular interests of the participating Companies and their Managers 
will be subject to the analysis further down. However, it may be concluded 
already now that the interests of those three participants are likely to be of very 
different nature throughout the Corporate Transaction. Whereas the Seller might 
be mostly interested in disposing its shares in the Target Company and receiving 
a high purchase price, the Purchaser might be interested in containing and 
limiting its risks and uncertainties associated with the purchase and might 
therefore request detailed information and legal securities from the Seller. And 
the Target Company itself might be mostly interested to preserve its own legal 
integrity and to be able to foster and pursue its business objectives also in the 
future after the change in ownership.  
Those few aspects and considerations show already that the sphere of 
interests of every participant in a Corporate Transaction is of very unique nature 
                                                     
4 Cf. further below for a more detailed description of “Share Deal” and “Asset 
Deal”, Chapter 3.3.1. 
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– and therefore its Managers are likely to be acting and executing towards those 
very unique and therefore diverse goals for the benefit of their respective 
companies.  
The following work will therefore analyse the perspectives and frameworks 
existing for all three participants in a Corporate Transaction – only this approach 
will allow for an encompassing answer to the Research Question.  
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
2.4. RESEARCH QUESTION  
In the light of this work’s title and the first introductory remarks made 
above, the aim of the following analysis will be to close an existing scientific gap, 
as such existing at the intersection of the legal discourse regarding Management 
rights and duties in the light of Corporate Transactions on the one hand and the 
theoretical approaches and models, which have been developed to describe and 
understand human decision-making behaviour on the other hand, the following 
Research Question is defined:  
 
Which factors and motivations influence the decision-making behaviour of 
managers in cross-border corporate transactions, within the existing legal 
framework from a German and European law perspective? 
 
As depicted above, the following path towards answering this Research 
Question will be structured by different elements of analysis, all leading towards 
the answer to the Research Question as ultimate goal and justifying reason for 
their  particular description and analysis.   
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3. THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF 
CROSS-BORDER CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
3.1. SCIENTIFIC INTRODUCTION – RESEARCH FRAGMENT 1 
The applicable regulations and laws determine the playing field, in which 
managers of Companies can take their own decisions and actions – also and in 
particular with a view to M&A activities. Therefore, an overview and analysis of 
the existing legal framework is the fundamental first step to identify those areas, 
in which authentic and independent management behaviour can occur at all.  
On the path towards answering the Research Question, the analysis of the 
existing legal framework is one important step and therefore, the Research 
Fragment 1 of this work is defined as follows:  
 
 
 
Research Fragment 1: 
 
Which rights and competencies exist for the managers of Companies involved in 
Corporate Transactions, based on the specific nature of the respective Company and the 
necessary steps and phases of a Corporate Transaction in general? 
 
 
The following description will focus on the legal framework, which exists 
for Corporate Transactions with a focus to Europe and selected European 
jurisdictions. This focus and selection is made in the light of the selected Case 
Studies, which will be assessed further in Chapter 5 as examples of “real life” 
management behaviour, meaning that the jurisdictions of Germany, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and general European laws will be of relevance.5  
                                                     
5 Even though Case Study 3 and Case Study 4 involve also U.S. American 
companies, the legal framework of those is not in specific focus for the following 
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The legal fundament serves for the sole purpose of contributing to an all-
embracing analysis of this work’s Research Question and therefore focuses on 
legislative facts and theories, which are relevant in that light.  
However, in order to fully understand and assess the scope of managerial 
compentencies in M&A scenarios, first, a review and assessment of the 
particularities and specifics of the respective types of legal entities involved is 
required. Only this description and assessment reveals the general scope of 
competencies for decision-making and actions to be taken by a Company’s 
management. Therefore, a review and analysis of the legal framework for the 
most common types of Company’s will be conducted as a first step (Chapter 3.2), 
again with a view to those countries and jurisdictions, which are relevant for the 
assessment of the Case Studies later. Based on the findings and insight gained in 
this first part of the analysis, a further review and analysis of the particular 
regulatory framework of M&A will then be conducted as a second part of this 
work’s theoretical fundament of the legal framework.  
Together, the basic understanding of corporate and company laws and of 
rules and regulations applicable to Corporate Transactions, will then allow for a 
sound conclusion of the Research Fragment 1 in Chapter 3.6. As mentioned 
previously, this will include the perspective of all three participants to Corporate 
Transactions – the Seller, the Purchaser and the Target Company. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
analysis, because in both cases, the U.S. American companies were the Target of a 
takeover, which revealed only little involvement of their respective management.  
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3.2. GENERAL FACTS ON EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 
European corporate laws distinguish between partnerships, being 
conglomerates of individuals who group together to achieve a certain joint goal 
on the one side („Partnerships“ = Personengesellschaften) and corporations, such 
being legal entities that legally exist independent of the nature and number of 
their owners („Corporations“ = Kapitalgesellschaften).6  
 
3.2.1. Partnerships 
Partnerships are generally founded whenever two or more individuals 
decide to jointly aim for one defined goal. Both, the act of joining as well as the 
definition of the goal can be done explicitly or also by way of concluding 
behaviour of the involved individuals.7 There is no necessity for a written 
agreement on the foundation of a partnership,8 it will also factually come into 
existence, if and once the essential elements – (1) at least two partners and (2) one 
common goal9 - exist.  
                                                     
6 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 5 et se q., p. 189; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 7 et 
seq.; Schäfer, C. in: MüKo BGB (2017), Vor § 705, margin no. 23 & § 705 margin 
no. 76 et seq. with further references. 
7 Cf. Fleischer, H., Hahn, J. (2017): p. 2 with further references; Grunewald, B. 
(2014), p. 9 et seq., Schäfer, C. in: MüKo BGB (2017), § 705, margin no. 1 et seq & 
25 et seq. 
8 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 9 et seq., Schäfer, C. in: MüKo (2017), § 705, margin 
no. 1 et seq & 25 et seq. 
9 Cf. Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 2 et seq.; Medicus, D., Petersen, J. (2017), p. 103; 
Sprau, H. in: Palandt, O. (2018), § 705 margin no. 11; Schäfer, C. in: MüKo BGB 
(2017), § 705 margin no. 17 et seq. & margin no. 142 et seq.; Westermann, H.-P., 
Grunewald, B., Maier-Reimer, G. (2017), vor § 705 margin no. 8.  
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The partners’ common goal must not necessarily be related to an economic 
forthcoming or business,10 but can be also any other legal11 objective, as for 
example two friends who jointly live in an apartment (flat share), several students 
meeting for the purpose of joining their forces to work on a presentation 
(teamwork), a man and a woman entering into marriage or two dentists sharing a 
medical practice (joint practice).12 
The partners can define rules for their partnership, they can allocate the 
responsibilities for certain actions, which shall be conducted and they can also 
define a certain limited timeframe for their partnership. There are hardly any 
legal limits to the partners’ freedom to individually shape and regulate their 
collaboration.13 
However, the downside of sharing their forces and expertise is that the 
partners also share the responsibility for all the actions which each of them 
conducts in the name or on behalf of the partnership. As a consequence, actions 
conducted by one partner will lead to a subsequent liability of all other partners 
vis-á-vis third parties.14 
Same as many other jurisdictions, German civil and company laws regulate 
on several different types of partnerships, which all derive from one most basic 
partnership form, for Germany being stipulated in sec. 705 et seq. German Civil 
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – “BGB”) as being the “Company constituted under 
Civil Law” (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts).  
                                                     
10 Cf. Heidel, T. in: Dauner-Lieb, B., Langen, W. (2016), § 705 margin no. 38 et seq.; 
Schäfer, C. in: MüKo BGB (2017), § 705 margin no. 17 et seq.; Sprau, H. in: 
Palandt, O. (2018), § 705 margin no. 11. 
11 Cf. Schäfer, C. in: MüKo BGB (2017), § 705 margin no. 134 with further 
references.  
12 Cf. for further examples Heidel, T. in: Dauner-Lieb, B., Langen, W. (2016), § 705 
margin no. 38 et seq. 
13 Heidel, T. in: Dauner-Lieb, B., Langen, W. (2016), § 705 margin no. 38 et seq.;  
14 Cf. Schäfer, C. in: MüKo BGB (2017), § 705 margin no. 293 et seq. with further 
references.  
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Other partnership forms derive from this company setup, specifying either 
certain goals, for which the partners collaborate or certain defined allocations of 
responsibilities between the partners.  
As an example, the General Partnership according to German law (Offene 
Handelsgesellschaft) is a collaboration of two or more partners in order to pursue a 
commercial goal, such as trading of certain goods or else. This company form is 
regulated in sec. 105 et seq. German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch – 
“HGB”).15 Another legal form is the Limited Commercial Partnership 
(Kommanditgesellschaft), according to sec. 161 et seq. German Commercial Code.16  
One particularity of German company law is that all such specific 
regulations for the different company forms also make reference of the rules 
existing for the respective more general company forms. By that, the regulatory 
frame is generally set up as an elevation from basic general rules, which serve as 
the common basis, towards more specific rules for the respective company 
forms.17 
This approach cannot only be found in German company laws, but is of 
similar generality also in other European jurisdictions.18  
                                                     
15 Cf. Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 129 et seq.; Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 97 et seq.; 
Roth, M. in: Baumbach, A., Hopt, K.J. (2018), § 105 margin no. 1 et seq. with 
further references.  
16 Cf. Grunewald, B. in: MüKo HGB (2012), § 161 margin no. 2 et seq.; Henssler in: 
Henssler, M., Strohn, L. (2016), § 105 margin no. 1; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 
217 et seq.; Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 129 et seq.; Roth, M. in: Baumbach, A., Hopt, 
K.J. (2018), § 161 margin no. 1 et seq. with further references. 
17 Cf. Grunewald, B. in: MüKo HGB (2012), § 161 margin no. 1; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. 
(2011), p. 129.  
18 Cf. Schäfers (2015), p. 878 with further references.  
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3.2.2. Corporate enterprises (Corporations) 
In contrast to the Partnerships described above, European company laws 
also provide for another more elaborated set of company forms – the 
Corporations. Main characteristic of any Corporation is always its legal 
independence from the nature and number of its owners, as long as there is at 
least one owner.19 The Corporation has its own legal purpose and its own internal 
decision-making structure, to work towards this purpose, which is not necessarily 
identical with the purpose or will of its shareholders.  
Also, the Corporation will continue to exist even if the identity or the 
structure of its owners changes. The owners are free to transfer their participation, 
as abstract and separate legal assets. Such participations are called “shares”, their 
owners are subsequently called “shareholders”. In general, European corporate 
laws distinguish between different forms of Corporations, deviating in form and 
the structure of their ownership. Such different forms will be highlighted and 
briefly described in the following from a German and European law perspective 
and also with a view to the different types of Corporations, which national and 
European laws set forth, as internal structures of those entites vary and therewith 
also the room and mechanics for individual decision-making.  
 
3.2.2.1. German corporate law: General facts 
German corporate law sets forth two main20 types of Corporations: The 
Limited Liability Company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung - GmbH) and the 
Stock Corporation (Aktiengesellschaft – AktG).  
The main differentiating factor between those two types of Corporation is 
the number of their shareholders and their internal structure: Whereas the GmbH 
is the Corporation that sets the format for a small number of shareholders only, 
                                                     
19 For the German GmbH, this is fundamentally laid out in sec. 13 para. 1 
GmbHG.  
20 There are two additional types of Corporations, namely: Unternehmergesellschaft 
(UG) haftungsbeschränkt, as regulated in the sec. 5a GmbHG and the 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA), as regulated in sec. 278 et seq. AktG. 
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often having a personal connection between themselves and the necessity to 
personally interact for fundamental measures and decisions within the 
Corporation,21 the Aktiengesellschaft, on the other hand, provides the appropriate 
legal format for the interaction of a larger number of shareholders, on a rather 
anonymous platform.22 The Aktiengesellschaft can be listed on stock markets,23 
whereas shares of the GmbH are usually not transferred on a market, but in a 
private forum between individuals,24 mandatorily only by way of a notarized 
share transfer.25  
The initial motivation of the legislator to create to different types of 
Corporations was the differing economic requirements, necessitating both, a 
forum for shareholders aiming for a close and private collaboration on the one 
side and the separate wish to set up a legal structure for an agglomeration of a 
large number of shareholders in a rather anonymous forum.26   
Based upon and due to those basic differences and deviating legislative 
aims, the legal setup and main characteristics of GmbH and Aktiengesellschaft 
differ with regard to various parameters, which will be displayed in the following 
description of each such entity’s main characteristics, internal structures and 
decision-making mechanisms. However, the laws concerning GmbH and 
Aktiengesellschaft are closely connected and the main similarity between GmbH 
and Aktiengesellschaft is their nature as being Corporations – legal entities, which 
exist and act through their own organs and based upon their own financing, 
separate from the existence of their individual shareholder(s).27  
 
 
                                                     
21 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 335; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 344. 
22 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 239; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 298 et seq. 
23 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 239 with further references; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 20 
et seq., p. 931 et seq. 
24 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 335; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 20 et seq. 
25 Sec. 15 para. 3 GmbHG; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 505 et seq. 
26 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 20 et seq. 
27 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 9 et seq. with further references. 
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3.2.2.2. German corporate law: Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
The GmbH is a legal unit, which exists separately and independent from 
its owners, as all Corporations do. According to sec. 13 para. 1 GmbHG, the 
company has its own rights and obligations, it can be the acquirer and owner of 
assets, land property and hold rights associated therewith and it can pursue legal 
actions and proceedings in front of a court and be sued by other legal persons. By 
that, the GmbH has the same rights and obligations as any natural person – and 
as any other corporate form as well. The company can act on its own – via its 
management body,28 and is therewith in the position to pursue its own interest 
and goal, which might, as a consequence, also differ from the individual interests 
and/or goals of its shareholders.  
 
The purpose of a GmbH – The “Company’s Object” 
The GmbH’s goal is called the “Company’s Object”. It is the reason why the 
Corporation was established, the ultimate goal, which has been defined and 
named explicitly in its most basic statute – the Corporation’s Articles of 
Association.  
The GmbHG sets out only very few rules and restrictions for the definition 
of a Company’s Object – such being, according to sec. 1 GmbHG only that the 
GmbH is only allowed to pursue an object that is legal. There are no further 
restrictions set out directly in the law, but indirectly arising from the fact that the 
GmbH is always considered to be a commercial entity (Handelsgesellschaft) within 
the meanings of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch – HGB), 
according to sec. 13 para. 3 GmbHG.29 As a consequence, the actions taken by a 
GmbH are always considered to be actions taken by a commercial trading unit 
(Handelsgewerbe), see sec. 2 HGB, being registered with the Commercial Register 
(Handelsregister) and intending to realize economic profits 
(Gewinnerzielungsabsicht).30 
                                                     
28 Which will be further explained below in Chapter 3.2.4. 
29 Fastrich, L., in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2018), § 1 margin no. 7 et seq.  
30 Sec. 13 para. 3 GmbHG, which does constitute the basic rule that the GmbH is a 
commercial entity according to sec. 105 para. 2 and sec. 1 para. 2 HGB, which 
does not apply for the gGmbH as a special legal entity form; cf. Fastrich, L., in: 
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The Company’s Object is a mandatory element to be defined in each 
GmbH’s Articles of Association (Gesellschaftsvertrag), which the shareholders need 
to explicitly set up and resolve upon in order to constitute a GmbH.  
 
Liability limitation via the corporate veil  
Besides the freedom to freely define the company’s purpose (Company’s 
Object), one of the most essential consequences arising out of the legal 
independence of the GmbH as being a Corporation is that it is not only legally 
able to acquire and own rights and obligations, but that it is also an independent 
subject to potential liability claims from other parties, which might be associated 
with those rights and obligations. The GmbH’s liability is independent from the 
liability of its shareholders and subsequently, its liability does not pass over or 
affect the shareholders in any way. By that, the GmbH constitutes a separate 
“liability shield” for those liability claims, which are connected to the GmbH’s 
rights and obligations. A direct liability of its shareholders for liability, which 
arises out of or in connection with the GmbH, does generally not exist, except for 
very limited scenarios, which are often described as “piercing the corporate 
veil”.31 
This systematic separation of the corporate body and the individuals, who 
own it, is a basic characteristic of all forms of Corporations and is one of the most 
important reasons, why people decide to conduct their economic activities via a 
Corporation. Their private ownerships and assets are being effectively protected 
against the potential economic downturn of their business adventures. For the 
analysis of individual’s decision-making in Corporate Transactions, this structure 
is of fundamental importance, as it leads to a separation of the Corporation’s 
purpose and goals from the individual goal(s) of the human beings acting on its 
behalf.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2018), § 1 margin no. 10 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 14 
et seq. 
31 Cf. Bruns, P., (2003): p. 815 et seq.; Fleischer, H., (2004), p. 1129 et seq.; Freitag, 
R., (2003): p. 805 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 413 et seq. & p. 488 et seq.; Stöber, 
M., (2013), p. 2295 et seq. 
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Basic structures – Articles of Association 
In addition to that, the GmbH does also show some other basic 
characteristics, which mandatorily need to be fulfilled during its entire lifetime:  
The GmbH always requires to be incorporated by its shareholders resolving 
on a set of basic rules and regulations, which is called the “Articles of 
Association” (Gesellschaftsvertrag) of the GmbH. Such Articles of Association 
require to be in written form and notarized by a German notary public.32  
The Articles of Association need to display, amongst other elements, an 
explicit legal Company Object, which is considered to be the goal, the successful 
achievement of the reason for which the GmbH has been put to life.33 This could 
be, for example, the production of certain industrial goods and the therewith 
related ownership of certain facilities, plants and/or equipment, but also for 
example the conduct of an Italian restaurant or of a winery in Spain.  
Moreover, the Articles of Association are the forum for the shareholders to 
define a name for the company (Firma). The name must include the description of 
the legal form “GmbH” at the end and needs to be unique and individual, in 
order to prevent identity/name confusion with other companies.34 
Also, the shareholders have to implement certain rules and mechanisms for 
different company organs in the Articles of Association, such being the 
shareholders’ meeting and the management of the GmbH.35 In case the 
shareholders decide so, or in case mandatory labour co-determination rights 
require such,36 the GmbH can also have a Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat)37 or a 
                                                     
32 Sec. 2 para. 1 GmbHG; cf. Fastrich, L., in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2018), § 2 
margin no. 3 et seq.; Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 337; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 
348.  
33 Cf. Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 348; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 417 & p. 422 et seq. 
with further references. 
34 Sec. 3 para. 1 no. 1 GmbHG; cf. Beurskens, M., (2016), p. 681 et seq.; Raiser/Veil 
(2015), p. 422. 
35 Sec. 3 para. 1 GmbHG; cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 337; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 422 
et seq. 
36 The requirements hereto are set out in sec. 1 para. 1 no. 3 
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz (DrittelBetG).  
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Supplementary Board (Beirat)38. Both such organs have a supervising and 
monitoring function towards the management39 and can be empowered with 
certain veto- or approval-rights.40  
In addition to this, the Articles of Association always need to define a 
geographical seat for the company. Such seat needs to be a city in Germany, 
according to sec. 4a GmbHG and the company does also require to inform its 
competent Commercial Register about its valid postal address (inländische 
Geschäftsanschrift), according to sec. 10 para. 1 GmbHG.41 A controversial question 
that was recently discussed was the existence of the GmbH’s right to relocate its 
Company Seat to a place outside of Germany and also with regard to other 
European Corporations, which are comparable to the GmbH, when moving their 
seat to Germany. In a nutshell, the GmbH is of course free to relocate outside of 
Germany, but will then loose its status as being a duly registered GmbH under 
German law.42  
Instead, the GmbH will then automatically transform into the equivalent 
local entity of the respective European member state, to which it has moved its 
seat. The other way around, foreign legal entities, which move their location to 
Germany, will be registered with the competent Commercial Register in Germany 
but will not be automatically transformed into a GmbH. Instead, the German 
                                                                                                                                                  
37 According to sec. 52 GmbHG.  
38 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 372 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 592 et seq.; 
Spindler, G., in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 52 margin no. 714 et seq. with further 
references. 
39 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 592.; Roth, G.H., in: Roth/Altmeppen, GmbHG (2015), § 
52 margin no. 75 et seq. with further references.  
40 Cf. Roth, G.H., in: Roth/Altmeppen, GmbHG (2015), § 52 margin no. 75 et seq.; 
Sanders, A. (2017): p. 961 et seq. with further references; Uffmann, K. (2015), p. 
169 et seq. for specific guidance on a Beirat based on a contractual setup. 
41 Cf. Schäfer, C., in: Henssler, M., Strohn, L., (2016): § 10 margin no. 3 et seq.; 
Tebben, J., in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 10, margin no. 5. 
42 Cf. Berner, K., MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 60, margin no. 205 et seq.; Franz, T., 
(2016), p. 930 et seq. with further references; Hoffmann, J., in: Michalski, GmbHG 
(2017), § 53, margin no. 114 et seq. 
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Commercial Register will, however, register and treat such entity according to the 
statute set forth by its local law origin.43  
The Articles of Association of every GmbH also define its basic financial 
constitution: Upon incorporation of the GmbH, there always needs to be a share 
capital (Stammkapital) of minimum EUR 25,000, which is owned by and available 
to the GmbH.44 This needs to be unconditionally available to the managing 
directors’ free and sole discretion.45  
 
Registration with the Commercial Register  
Moreover, the GmbH will only come into legal existence, once it is 
registered with the Commercial Register (Handelsregister). Such registers are 
maintained by the Local Courts (Amtsgerichte) in Germany and display certain 
basic corporate information regarding each existing GmbH to the public.46  
During the lifetime of the GmbH, all events of significant importance to 
the public will need to be filed or notified with the Commercial Register, such 
being for example the removal or appointment of a Managing Director or Proxy 
Holder (Prokurist), a change in the GmbH’s Articles of Association or an increase 
or decrease – subject to the above mentioned minimum registered capital of EUR 
25,000 – of the registered share capital. Also any share transfer will need to be 
notified to the Commercial Register by naming the new shareholder with its full 
name and displaying the number and nominal value of the shares that such has 
acquired.  
One of the main differences between the GmbH and the second important 
Corporation form in German law, the Aktiengesellschaft, is the fact that shares in 
a GmbH cannot be freely transferred. Any share transfer always requires to be 
notarized and then displayed in an updated list of all shareholders, which 
mandatorily has to be filed with the locally competent Commercial Register. 
  
                                                     
43 Franz, T., (2016), p. 930 et seq. 
44 Sec. 5 para. 1 GmbHG. 
45 Sec. 8 para. 2 GmbHG; cf. . Fastrich, L., in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2018), § 8, 
margin no. 13 et seq. with further references. 
46 Electronically available via: www.handelsregister-online.de. 
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Basic structures – organs of the GmbH 
As a basic principle, and also to be described and specified in each GmbH’s 
Articles of Association, the GmbH by law has at least two corporate organs – (1) 
the shareholders meeting (Gesellschafterversammlung), being the forum in which 
the owners of the GmbH convene and resolve, amongst other things,47 on basic 
strategic matters or e.g. changes of the Articles of Association48 (and the 
appointment of Managing Directors49, as well as (2) the management 
(Geschäftsführung), which decides on the daily business matters of the GmbH and 
executes those vis-á-vis third parties. The Management can consist of either one 
or several individual managing directors50, who can be either shareholders, taking 
over a double-function (so-called Gesellschafter-Geschäftsführer) or contracted 
Managing Directors, who do not own any shares in the Company.51  
Next to those two mandatory organs, the GmbH may also have a third 
organ, serving a supervising function: The Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat), the 
existence of which can be stipulated in the Articles of Association or mandatorily 
defined by German labour laws for GmbHs with more than 500 employees.52 For 
the internal and regulatory questions concerning the Supervisory Board, sec. 52 
GmbHG makes the respective provisions in the AktG applicable in an analogous 
way.53  
Even though not explicitly stated in the GmbHG, it is nevertheless an 
undisputed and established opinion that the shareholders can also decide to 
establish another organ, having advisory and supervision functions: The 
                                                     
47 Such as for example mentioned in sec. 45 and in sec. 46 GmbHG.  
48 According to sec. 53 para. 1 GmbHG. 
49 According to sec. 46 no. 5 GmbHG. 
50 Sec. 6 para. 1 GmbHG and sec. 35 para. 2 GmbHG permits the possibility to 
have either one or several managing directors. Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 535 et seq. 
51 Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 536. 
52 See above in this Chapter - the requirements are set out in sec. 1 para. 1 no. 3 
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz (DrittelBetG); cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 595 et seq. 
53 Noack, U., in: Baumbach, A./Hueck, A., GmbHG (2017), § 52 margin no. 30; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 592. 
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Advisory Board (Beirat).54 Based on sec. 45 and sec. 52 para. 1 GmbHG, the 
legislator has generally permitted the constitution of a supervising forum for the 
GmbH. In difference from the Supervisory Board, the Advisory Board does not 
rely on parallel rights than the Supervisory Board of an Aktiengesellschaft would 
have. The rights and possibilities for the Advisory Board can be determined much 
more freely than for the Supervisory Board in a GmbH.55  
In practice, the Advisory Board is often seen as a welcomed possibility to 
include stakeholders into the constitutional regime of the GmbH, which are no 
longer part of the shareholders’ circle and also not involved in the daily business 
and corporate decision-making as Managing Directors. In family-owned 
companies, these boards often consist of family members, who are in some ways 
(still) associated with the company and its well-being, without being active in 
those other fori.  
 
Figure 1: Corporate organs of the GmbH 
 
                                                     
54 Cf. Huber, H. (2004), p. 17 et seq.; Sanders, A. (2017), p. 961 et seq.;  Spindler, G., 
in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 52 margin no. 714 et seq. 
55 Cf. Huber, H. (2004), p. 19 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 593 et seq.; Spindler, G., 
in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 52 margin no. 741 et seq. 
GmbH
Shareholders 
Meeting
Managing 
Directors
Supervisory 
Board 
(partially 
optional)
Beirat 
(optional)
41 
 
THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-BORDER 
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
 
In a nutshell - GmbH 
In a nutshell, the GmbH is to be considered as Germany’s most popular 
corporate organisational form, often established to conduct small or mid-size 
business ventures with a limited number of shareholders or as one entity in a 
multi-national group of companies.  
The GmbH acts and decides through its Managing Directors, which are by 
law obliged to conduct the Corporation’s business activities in a way that is 
helpful to flourish the achievement of the Company’s Object, as laid out in the 
Company’s Articles of Association.  
As being a legal entity, by nature separate from its shareholders, the GmbH 
has own rights and obligations, which require to be respected and executed 
lawfully by the Managing Directors. As a matter of fact, the decision-making and 
execution of decisions in the GmbH, irrespective of whether those are day-to-day 
usual business activities or more fundamental direction marks, is to be seen 
separately from the individual goals and objectives, which each Managing 
Director and/or shareholder of the GmbH might privately or with a view to other 
business ventures, have.  
Therefore, even though the GmbH is dependant on individuals to decide 
and act (Managing Directors/Shareholders), its nature does always lead to two 
different layers of decision-making: The decisions taken by the GmbH via its 
corporate organs (Corporate decision-making) and individual decisions taken by 
the human beings, who act as Managing Directors and/or Shareholders of the 
GmbH.  
For numerous actions and decisions taken by the GmbH, German corporate 
law does provide for specific formal or procedural legal requirements, such as the 
necessity to notarize certain decisions in front of a public notary, the requirement 
to publish certain decisions in the Commercial Register, as well as procedural 
requirements concerning the convening and conduct of meetings of the 
shareholders or the Managing Directors.  
For the further analysis of occasions, forms and structures of decision-
making in the GmbH, those basic facts will be of central relevance, as to be 
displayed further below.  
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3.2.2.3. German corporate law: Aktiengesellschaft 
In addition to the above-described GmbH as most commonly used type of 
Corporation in Germany, German corporate law also sets out another legal 
corporate form, which is publicly known and frequently used as well: The Stock 
Corporation (Aktiengesellschaft).  
 
Figure 2: Corporations in Germany by numbers – 2016 
Kapitalgesellschaften/Corporations  574,268 
Aktiengesellschaften (AG) 7,862 
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien (KGaA) 134 
Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) 529,970 
Europäische Aktiengesellschaft (Societas 
Europaea) 
180 
Unternehmergesellschaft = UG 
(haftungsbeschränkt) 
36,079 
Sonstige Kapitalgesellschaften/other 
Corporations 
43 
Table according to: Destatis, www.destatis.de – Gesamtwirtschaft & Umwelt – 
Unternehmen, Handwerk; last check on: 02 August 2018. 
 
Unlike the GmbH, the Aktiengesellschaft is designed to exist also with a 
large number of shareholders. The necessary interaction between those 
shareholders is much more limited than with the GmbH, as we will see further 
below in this paragraph. This makes the Aktiengesellschaft a suitable corporate 
vehicle for economic ventures of large groups of owners, who know each other 
hardly or not at all.56  
As being also a legal corporation, separated from the legal identity of its 
owners, the Aktiengesellschaft benefits from the same structural advantages as 
the GmbH, including the fact that it generallyshields away any personal liability 
                                                     
56 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 21 & p. 24 et seq. 
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risks from their owners and limits it to the value of the particular shares they hold 
in the company. 57   
Similar to the GmbH, the Aktiengesellschaft is also well-defined and 
thoroughly regulated in German corporate laws: The German Stock Corporation 
Act (Aktiengesetz – AktG) sets out the structural corset for this entity form.  
 
The key structural elements of the Aktiengesellschaft 
Looking at the Aktiengesellschaft more specifically, its internal structure 
partly differs from the setup within the GmbH, whereas both legal entity forms 
share a similar legal substratum: Both company forms have a mandatory organ 
for any executive management activities, strategic and commercial decision-
making.  
Within the Aktiengesellschaft, this organ is called “Vorstand”. The central 
legal basis for the Vorstand is layed out in sec. 76 et seq. AktG, defining the rights, 
duties and obligations of each member of the Vorstand. Similar to the GmbH’s 
Geschäftsführung, also the Vorstand may consist of one or several members, all 
together constituting the management organ of the company and therefore 
representing the company vis-á-vis third parties, such as contractual partners or 
authorities.58  
Next to the management organ, another mandatory structural element of 
the Aktiengesellschaft is the general assembly of the shareholders, i.e. the equity 
representation within the company, which is required to be constituted and 
shaped in accordance with sec. 118 et seq. AktG. It is called the 
Hauptversammlung. Again, similar to the GmbH, the Hauptversammlung of an 
Aktiengesellschaft decides via resolutions about the basic strategy of the 
company, sets up and changes the company’s statutes and resolves on other 
                                                     
57 Cf. Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 298; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2016), § 1 margin no. 8 
et seq. & 15 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 11 et seq. 
58 Sec. 78 para. 2 AktG; cf. Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2016), § 78 margin no. 3 et seq. 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 149 et seq. 
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matters of general or defined interest.59 In general, the Hauptversammlung will 
meet whenever necessary due to its obligations to preserve the interests and 
compliant constitution of the company.60  
In addition to the strategic (Hauptversammlung) and executive (Vorstand) 
organ, each Aktiengesellschaft must also mandatorily have a Supervisory Board 
(Aufsichtsrat), which  
(1) oversees the actions taken by the management and  
(2) interferes if necessary in order to maintain the compliant internal and 
external order of the company,  
(3) to approve certain listed actions,  
(4) to pose questions on certain fields of managerial activities and 
(5) to represent the company, in case the company happens not to have a 
Vorstand or vis-á-vis the members of an existing Vorstand.61  
 
According to sec. 102 AktG, the Aufsichtsrat has a supervising function, 
explicitly delineated from the executive function of the Vorstand.  
 
Central elements of the Company’s Statutes 
Same as for all types of corporations, the founding of an 
Aktiengesellschaft requires a written testimony of the (future) shareholders’ wish 
to form a company alongside with the mandatory legal requirements for such 
structural type. This testimony is conducted by way of a shareholders’ meeting, in 
which the shareholders initially resolve on the fact of founding a company in the 
                                                     
59 Cf. Bungert, H., in: Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts (2015), vol. 4, 
§ 35 margin no. 1 et seq.; Grunewald, B. (2014),  p. 283 et seq.; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. 
(2016), § 118 margin no. 2 et seq.; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 318 et seq. 
60 Sec. 121 para. 1 AktG. 
61 Cf. Fischer, H. in: Heidel, Aktienrecht (2014), § 1 margin no. 7 et seq.; Fock, T. in: 
Spindler, G., Stilz, E., Aktiengesetz (2015), § 1 margin no. 8 et seq.; Grigoleit, H.C. 
in: Grigoleit, H.C., Aktiengesetz (2013), § 1 margin no. 32 et seq.; Heider, K., in: 
MüKo AktG (2016), § 1 margin no. 13 et seq. with further references; Hüffer, U., 
Koch, J. (2016), § 1 margin no. 2 et seq.  
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format of an Aktiengesellschaft and on resolving upon the foundation Statues of 
this company.  
As required by sec. 23 para 2 AktG, the notarial deed, in which the 
foundation of the corporation is resolved by the founding shareholders, must 
include at least the following information:  
 
- Names of the founding shareholders (sec. 23 para. 2 no. 1 AktG); 
- Number and type of shares and allocation of shares among the founding 
shareholders (sec. 23 para. 2 no. 2 AktG); 
- Amount of share capital paid into the corporation (sec. 23 para. 2 no. 3 
AktG).  
 
In addition, the foundation act also requires the shareholders to set up the 
Statues (Satzung) of the corporation. Such Statutes, similar to the Articles of 
Association of a GmbH, must, by law, include certain information and content, 
which the legislator considers to be inevitable for each company of this specific 
type. The main mandatory features of each Aktiengesellschaft’s Statutes 
according to sec. 23 para. 3 AktG are as follows:  
 
- Name and Seat of the Corporation (sec. 23 para. 3 no. 1 AktG); 
- Object of the Corporation, namely specifying the products or goods to be 
manufactured ad traded, if the Corporation is established as a company 
for purposes associated with industrial manufacturing and trade (sec. 23 
para. 3 no. 2 AktG); 
- Amount of the registered share capital (sec. 23 para. 3 no. 3 AktG); 
- Allocation of the share capital into shares, such being nominal shares 
(Nennbetragsaktien) or non-par value shares (Stückaktien), as well as their 
nominal value and the number of shares issued from each category and 
potential types of shares, if such have been established by the founding 
shareholders in the Statutes (sec. 23 para. 3 no. 4); 
- Information about the shares being issued with mentioning the 
shareholder or the proprietor’s name (sec. 23 para. 3 no. 5); 
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- The statutory number of members of the Vorstand or rules for 
determining such number (sec. 23 para. 3 no. 6).  
 
In particular, the Statutes do set out the basic principles and guiding 
boundaries for the Company’s actions and its management’s economic behaviour. 
Similar as for the GmbH, strategy is limited by the definition of the Company’s 
Object in the Articles of Association.62  
The internal decision-making process is structured by mandatory legal 
requirements (sec. 76 and sec. 119 AktG) and by the additional rulings set out in 
the Articles of Association, such as e.g. for qualified majorities, specific decision-
rights for the Shareholder’s Meeting and/or approval rights for the Supervisory 
Board.   
Also similar to the GmbH, the Statutes of the Aktiengesellschaft can only be 
modified or amended by way of a shareholders’ resolution, which is conducted 
and notarized by a notary public. Moreover, all such changes and modifications 
need to be filed with the Commercial Register of the respective 
Aktiengesellschaft, in order to make sure that the Commercial Register can 
always provide the most recent version of the Statutes to any person who seeks 
for review of such.   
 
The incorporation of the Aktiengesellschaft  – main steps 
However, the resolution upon the Articles of Association is the only 
mandatory requirement for the completion of the incorporation of a 
Aktiengesellschaft. Once this resolution is passed, the shareholders need to 
explicitly appoint the first members of the Supervisory Board, as well as the first 
annual auditor (Abschlussprüfer) of the company (according to sec. 30 para. 1 and 
para. 2 AktG). After being appointed, the first Supervisory Board will then 
appoint the first members of the Vorstand, a right which is granted to the 
Supervisory Board in sec. 30 para. 3 AktG.  
                                                     
62 Cf. Pentz, A., in: MüKo AktG (2016), vol. 1, § 23 margin no. 68 et seq.; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 147 et seq. 
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As another step, the founding shareholders also require to draft a 
foundation report (Gründungsbericht). The detailed requirements for this 
document are laid out in sec. 32 AktG and shall mainly ensure that this report is a 
comprehensive factual basis for the incorporation audit, which has to be 
conducted by the appointed Vorstand, Supervisory Board and the first auditor 
altogether.63   
Still prior to the registration of the company with the Commercial Register, 
the shareholders are then requested to make their respective payments for the 
shares they have subscribed to. Such contributions need to be made in cash64 or in 
kind65, depending on the defined nature of each respective contribution. The 
payment of such cash contributions makes it also necessary that the company has 
already its own bank account, one of the first actions that the newly appointed 
Vorstand has to conduct.  
Even though the incorporation process is not yet completed, the 
Aktiengesellschaft is already then legally existing (so called pre-Corporation - 
Vor-Aktiengesellschaft) and can conduct valid legal actions via its management 
organ in the Company’s own name. Again, a similarity for all forms of 
Corporations – parallel for GmbH and Aktiengesellschaft.   
 
Registration with the Commercial Register 
Similar to the GmbH, also the Aktiengesellschaft mandatorily requires to be 
registered in section “B” of the commercial register (Handelsregister) of the Local 
Court of its seat, upon foundation (sec. 36 para. 1AktG). The registration must be 
filed by all foundation shareholders together with all members of the Vorstand 
and the Supervisory Board (sec. 36 para. 1 AktG) and  may only take place, once 
the necessary capital contributions for each share have been made in cash or in 
kind, sec. 36 para. 2 AktG.  
                                                     
63 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 88. 
64 Not the entire amounts requires to be paid in immediately, but at least one 
quarter of the nominal value of the contribution: sec. 36a AktG; cf. Raiser/Veil 
(2015) p. 87. 
65 So-called “Sachgründung” according to sec. 27 and sec. 33a AktG. 
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During the lifetime of the Aktiengesellschaft, all modifications of the 
Statutes require to be filed with the Commercial Register, as well as all changes in 
the personal structure of the Vorstand (i.e. appointment and/or removal of 
members of the Vorstand) and the company’s registered address. Certain 
modifications to the Statues will not only be visible from the updated Statues, but 
will also be published in the company’s registry book – for example changes in 
the company’s name or company’s seat.  
 
Stock Corporation particularities – Stock market listing 
The Stock Corporation is also the most common corporate form under 
German law to be listed and traded on the stock markets, which is legally 
permitted according to sec. 3 para. 2 AktG.66 As described above, the nature of the 
Aktiengesellschaft allows for a large number of shareholders to participate in the 
ownership of the company at the same time. And unlike the GmbH, certain types 
of shares of the Stock Corporation can also be traded rather easily and without 
e.g. the requirement to notarize every share transfer.  
Sec. 10 para. 1 AktG sets out the basic possibilities for trading shares in 
listed companies and therewith is one of the key norms to regulate the 
corporation’s suitability for stock market trading.  
In order to be listed on a stock market, every Aktiengesellschaft does not 
only require the suitable internal corporate structure, but must also fulfil the 
respective existing requirements set out by the market place, on which the listing 
is pursued. This includes, amongst other specific requirements, the production 
and publication of a prospectus during the application process which might lead 
to a listing of the company. Main purpose of the prospectus is to give all relevant 
information about the Corporation, its business and strategy, so that potential 
investors are in a position to assess potential risks and opportunities, which 
would come along with an investment in shares in the Company. The diligent 
and comprehensive production of the prospectus and its publication in 
                                                     
66 General definition of Companies being oriented to the stock markets: sec. 264d 
HGB; cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 239; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 923 et seq.; next to the 
Aktiengesellschaft, also the Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA) and the 
Societas Europaea (SE) can be listed on stock markets.  
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accordance with the respective formal requirements is one of the central fields of 
legal and statutory obligations for the management of a Stock Corporation and as 
such part of the additional regulatory regime67 that is applicable for Stock 
Corporations in addition to the statutory rules set out in the AktG.   
 
In a nutshell – Aktiengesellschaft 
In a nutshell, the Aktiengesellschaft is the adequate corporate structure for 
larger conglomerates of shareholder, who wish to form a joint business enterprise 
without too close interaction and personal contact. Moreover, the 
Aktiengesellschaft offers its shareholders the structural possibility to trade their 
shares via the stock markets. This makes the Aktiengesellschaft an attractive 
frame for institutional investors, and for those owners who wish to attract public 
investors and creates and additional layer of statutory duties and corporate 
obligations for its management.   
 
3.2.2.4. German corporate law: Other corporate forms 
Besides the two most commonly used corporate forms, German law does 
also provide for two alternative Corporate types: The Kommanditgesellschaft auf 
Aktien and the Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt).  
Whereas the Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA) is structurally affiliated 
to the Aktiengesellschaft, the Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt) (UG 
(haftungsbeschränkt)) derives from the GmbH as structurally parallel corporate 
form.  
The KGaA is a defined in sec. 278 para. 1 AktG as a hybrid between the 
Kommanditgesellschaft as a form of partnership and the Aktiengesellschaft as a 
Corporation. Its ownership structure consists of one or several General Partners 
(Komplementäre), who are personally liable with their private equity, as always in 
                                                     
67 Mainly regulated in Germany in the Wertpapierprospektgesetz (WpPG) and 
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG); cf. Merkt, H., Rossbach, O. (2003); Raiser/Veil 
(2015) p. 923 et seq.; Weber, M. (2018) for recent developments in European 
capital markets laws: Parmentier, M. (2018).  
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the KG,68 and of Limited Partner Shareholders (Kommanditaktionäre), who are 
invested in the registered share capital of the Company with liability limited to 
their respective share value.69  The decision-making within the KGaA, as well as 
its representation externally is duty and right of the General Partner(s), with the 
only exception that extraordinary activities in the meaning of sec. 116 para. 2 HGB 
require the consensus of all General Partners and of the Shareholders’ Meeting, 
consisting of all Limited Partner Shareholders (sec. 278 para. 2 AktG in connection 
with § 164 HGB). However, as this process might be rather cumbersome 
depending on the number of necessary participants, the Shareholders’ Meeting 
can resolve otherwise to a more appropriate and practical procedure for 
extraordinary decision-making by way of specifiying a suitable rule in the 
Company’s Articles of Association. 
The external representation of the KGaA can be limited (by way of specific 
regulation in the Articles of Association) to only one or certain General Partners 
(sec. 125 para. 2 HGB), whereas it cannot be limited to specific fields or topics of 
representation.70     
The Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt) (UG (haftungsbeschränkt) was 
introduced by the German legislator and new corporate form in 200871 and is 
mainly regulated in sec. 5a GmbHG, including its specific references to other 
norms of the GmbHG. The UG (haftungsbeschränkt) was often described as the 
“German response to the UK Limited Liability Company”72, one of the most 
popular Corporate forms in Europe.73 Due to the European High Court’s 
decisions on the free location of a corporate establishment, the UK Limited 
                                                     
68 According to sec. 128 HGB; cf. Hueffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 234; more 
specifically for the KGaA: Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 331.  
69 Sec. 278 para. 1 AktG.  
70 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 396. 
71 As one element of the changes and additions made to the GmbHG with the so-
called “MoMiG” – Begr. RegE MoMiG, BT-Drs. 16/9737.  
72 Cf.  Drygala, T. (2006), p. 587 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 458 et seq. 
73 Cf. Just, C. (2006), p. 25 et sep.; Kadel, J. (2006), p. 102 et seq. with further 
references.  
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Liability Company had become a relevant participant to the legal entity landscape 
throughout Europe, including Germany.  
Main driver for the UK Limited’s attractiveness was (and still is74) the non-
existence of any minimum share capital. The founding shareholders are free to 
incorporate the UK Limited without any significant capital injection. This central 
element was translated into the German Corporate legislation with the 
introduction of the UG (haftungsbeschränkt). Each shareholder of a UG 
(haftungsbeschränkt) is only obliged to contribute the amount of at least EUR 1 
for each share.75  
As a consequence, the Company’s liability and equity value can be 
significantly below the minimum level of a GmbH.76 Whereas this adds flexibility 
to the financial needs for the shareholders, the economic risk of failure or 
insolvency of the Company is significantly higher than with the “normal” GmbH 
and occurs as additional economic risk and burden for the business partners of 
the UG (haftungsbeschränkt), as the possibility to take recourse based on the 
liability regime of the Company is factually reduced to the amount of the 
registered share capital, which can be almost nothing.  
In addition to this main feature, the UG (haftungsbeschränkt) does also 
contain several other characteristics, which differ from the GmbH. Those concern 
mainly formal requirements and serve the goal to reduce the entrance barrier 
level for individuals to decide to incorporate a legal entity under German 
Corporate law. Reality proves that this explicit goal of the German legislatior77 so 
far has only partly manifestated.78  
With regard to the decision-making structure and representation of the UG 
(haftungsbeschränkt), its mandatory legal setup is mostly parallel to the GmbH: 
                                                     
74 See below in more detail in Chapter 3.2.2.5.  
75 Cf. Wachter, T. in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch des GmbH-Rechts (2014), § 4 
margin no. 77 et seq. with further references.   
76 Such being EUR 25,000 according to sec. 5 para. 1 GmbHG, as described above 
in Chapter 3.2.2.2.  
77 Begr. RegE MoMiG, BT-Drs. 16/9737 for no. 6. 
78 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 459 et seq.; Werner, R. (2011), p. 459 et seq.; Wicke, H. 
(2014), p. 20. 
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One or several Managing Director(s) conduct the Company’s daily business 
activities and represent the Company in the external world, whereas the 
Shareholders’ Meeting is the central organ to resolve on basic strategic 
considerations, such as changes of the Company’s Articles of Association.  
As mentioned above, the two corporate forms of KGaA and UG 
(haftungsbeschränkt) are only of secondary relevance in the German Corporate 
landscape. Therefore, the following analysis will continue to focus on the GmbH 
and the Aktiengesellschaft as main Corporations under German law and will only 
refer to the KGaA and/or UG (haftungsbeschränkt) in case of any relevant 
particularities in those corporate forms in the light of the Research Question.  
 
3.2.2.5. Other European national corporate laws: General facts 
Other national Corporate forms 
The general distinction between Partnerships and Corporations is not a 
singular phenomenon in Germany, but also structurally existing across the other 
European jurisdictions.79  
The specific characteristic of a Corporation as being a separate legal entity, 
existing independently from its shareholders and therefore also acting in a 
separate liability sphere, can be found for example in France in the form Société a 
Responsabilité Limiteé (SaRL) and as Société Anonyme (SA), showing an internal 
structure which is parallel to the German GmbH and AG. Italy provides for 
                                                     
79 And also in most other jurisdictions and judicial regions around the globe, such 
as China, Japan, the United States of America and in many countries in Latin 
America and Africa – cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 26 et seq.; instructive also Roth, 
G.H., Kindler, P. (2013). 
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similar types of Corporations as well,80 same as Spain with the Sociedad Limitada 
and the Sociedad Anónima.81  
Even though the laws of the United Kingdom structurally differ in many 
aspects from the laws of continental European jurisdictions, also UK laws do 
provide a similar Corporate form, such being the Limited Liability Company 
(Limited/Ltd.).82 
All those types of Corporations do have in common that their foundation 
requires certain formal aspects to be fulfilled and certain decisions to be made by 
the future shareholders. Amongst those, the drafting and resolution of written 
Articles of Association is one central element.83 Similar as to the provisions set out 
in German Corporate laws (GmbH: sec. 2 & sec. 3 GmbHG; AG: sec. 23 AktG) , 
those Articles of Association have to define and display basic facts about the 
Corporation: purpose, name, seat, capital structure, shareholding structure, as 
well as additional information like external representation and mechanisms for 
taking decisions, unless such are regulated by law already.  
Another similiarity across many jurisdictions is the general setup to enable 
a corporate structure of “checks and balances”, meaning that certain functions or 
a certain organ are authorized and obliged to conduct the Company’s 
management and executive business activities, whereas a separate instance within 
the Company is authorized and obliged to monitor and supervise those executive 
actions.84  
                                                     
80 Cf. Falco, A., in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, M., (2018), Italien, margin no. 
12 et seq.; Süß, R., Wachter, T. (2016), Länderberichte Italien, margin no. 4 et seq. 
with further references. 
81 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 8 et seq. & margin no. 121 et seq.;  Süß, R., 
Wachter, T. (2016), Länderberichte Spanien, margin no. 1 et seq. 
82 Cf. Just, C. (2006), p. 25 et seq.; Kadel, J. (2006), p. 102 et seq.; Reiser/Veil (2015), 
p. 28 et seq.; Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 11 et seq. with further 
references. 
83 Cf. Reiser/Veil (2015), p. 28 et seq. with further references.  
84 Cf. Reiser/Veil (2015), p. 28 et seq. with further references. 
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This aspect is commonly perceived to be resulting from the legal 
independence of the Corporation from its owners – the existence as separate legal 
entity requires mechanisms to ensure and enforce the Corporation’s rights also 
vis-á-vis its shareholders and management personnel. Therefore, internally, a 
division and balancing of power is required.  
Even though the foundation process and certain structural elemants do 
provide for certain similar aspects in different jurisdictions, other more specific 
characteristics of Corporations differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
For example, the organisation of a Corporation’s internal decision-making 
as well as external execution and representation shows differences, even between 
jurisdictions in Europe: Many jurisdictions define the “Board of Directors” to be 
the representative organ of a Corporation, but the actual shape and function of 
the “Board” is not defined uniformely. Many jurisdictions set out a so-called 
“one-tier board system”, whereas other jurisdictions rule on a “two-tier board 
system”. Coming back to the above-mentioned aspect of an internal regime of 
“checks and balances” within the Corporation, the main difference of those two 
board systems is the question, if the internal authority to manage and execute and 
the internal authority to supervise and monitor such actions are all embedded in 
one uniform organ of the Corporation (= one-tier board) or if those are conducted 
by two independent instances within the Corporation (= two-tier board).85 Other 
differences can be made regarding the internal structure of the management 
board, such as for example the installation of “managing directors” and 
“executive directors” or “non-executive directors” and “executive directors”.86  
Besides the internal organisation, the capital structure of Corporations also 
reveals differences between many jurisdictions. Whereas, for example, German 
laws set out minimum requirements for the registered share capital of GmbH87 
and AG88 and Italian laws do even require a minimum of EUR 120,000 for the 
                                                     
85 Cf. Reiser/Veil (2015), p. 29 et seq. with further references. 
86 Cf. Reiser/Veil (2015), p. 29 et seq. with further references. 
87 See above, sec. 3.2.2.2; EUR 25,000 according to sec. 5 para. 1 GmbHG.  
88 See above, sec. 3.2.2.3: EUR 50,000 according to sec. 7 AktG.  
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SpA,89 a Limited Liability Company under the laws of the United Kingdom can be 
installed without any minimum capital injection90 and the French SaRL is 
required to have a minimum of EUR 1 as capital.91  
As a result of the European motivation to create a harmonized European 
domestic market and to provide for equal standards for commercial and trade 
across all member-states,92 European legislation has significantly driven changes 
in its member states corporate law regimes during the last years.93 For national 
Corporate forms, such as the examples mentioned above, this has lead to a partial 
harmonisation and to an increase of the Companies’ ability to resolve and execute 
corporate actions across the EU domestic market.94 The European-wide freedom 
of domicile was ruled in various decisions of the European High Court of Justice 
to be applicable also to Corporations.95 This has lead to a direct competition of the 
national corporate forms. If a UK Limited Liability Company can also have its 
                                                     
89 Cf. Falco, A., in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, M., (2018), Italien, margin no. 
12; Süß, R., Wachter, T. (2016), Länderberichte Italien, margin no.4 et seq. 
90 Cf. Just, C. (2006), p. 25 et seq.; Kadel, J. (2006), p. 102 et seq.; Reiser/Veil (2015), 
p. 28 et seq.; Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 11 et seq. 
91 Cf. Basuyaux, B., Delpech, P., de Labrouh, S. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Frankreich, margin no. 16 et seq. 
92 As stipulated in Art. 26 AEUV.  
93 Cf.  Kindler, P. in: MüKo BGB (2018), vol. 12, part 10.A.VI.; Lutter, M., Bayer, 
W., Schmidt, J. (2017), p. 7 et seq. with further references. 
94  Overview of existing legislative efforts and directives: Kindler, P. in: MüKo 
BGB (2018), vol. 12, part 10.A.V with further references; Lutter, M., Bayer, W., 
Schmidt, J. (2017), p. 7 et seq. & p. 147 et seq. with further references. 
95 The so-called “freedom of domicile” was ruled by the European High Court of 
Justice in various court decisions over the past years – overview to such 
developments and rulings is provided by: Bayer, W., Schmidt, J. (2012), p. 1481 et 
seq.; Hirte, H. (2018), p. 1222 et seq.; Kindler, P. in: MüKo BGB (2018), vol. 12, part 
10.A.VI. with further references; Lutter, M., Bayer, W., Schmidt, J. (2017), p. 90 et 
seq.; Verse, D.A. (2013), p. 458 et seq.; Zimmer, D., Naendrup, C. (2009), p 545 et 
seq. 
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registered seat in Germany or Spain, then it proves to be a realistic alternative to 
the respective national corporate forms. In practice, this has lead to numerous 
case-by-case questions,96 such as for example, if a UK Limited Liability Company 
can and/or has to be registered in the German Commercial Register and else.97   
With those developments in Europe, national corporate laws are in a 
process of constant change and adaption, even though the basic principles of 
Corporate forms appear to be reliable and settled already for some time.  
 
Cross-border European Corporate forms and initiatives  
Besides the national laws, Corporations are also subject to other means of 
European legislation. The European Union has developed – by way of 
Directives98, which require transformation into the member states’ national law 
systems99, and by way of Regulations, which apply in all member states without 
any act of local transformation100 - not only specific requirements and harmonized 
standards for local Corporations, but it has also created new forms of 
Corporations, standardized and available to businesses throughout the European 
Union.  
The most commonly known European legal entity form is the Societas 
Europaea (SE), which can be briefly described as the European pendant of the 
national stock corporations.101  
                                                     
96 Cf. Kindler, P. in: MüKo BGB (2018), vol. 12, part 10.A.V with further references. 
97 Cf. Holzborn, T., Israel, A. (2003), 3014 et seq.; Just, C. (2006), p. 25 et seq.; 
Kadel, J. (2006), p. 102 et seq.; regarding the registration of a branch office of a UK 
Ltd. cf. Klose-Mokroß, L. (2005): p. 971 et seq. 
98 European Directives can be accessed via: www.ec.europa.eu; Overview of 
Corporate law Directives: cf. Kindler, P. in: MüKo BGB (2018), vol. 12, part 
10.A.V; Lutter, M., Bayer, W., Schmidt, J. (2017), p. 7 et seq. & p. 147 et seq. with 
further references. 
99 According to Art. 288 para. 3 sent. 1 AEUV; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 33 et seq. 
100 According to Art. 288 para. 2 AEUV; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 34 et seq. 
101 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 334; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 443 et seq.; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 34 et seq.; Teichmann, C. in: Münchener Handbuch des 
Gesellschaftsrechts (2015), vol. 6, § 49 with further references. 
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Unlike the German Aktiengesellschaft, the internal structure of the SE is a 
board-system and can be opted either as a monistic one-tier system, where 
strategic decision-making and supervising function are not held separately, or as 
a two-tier board system. Another key difference to the German AG is the 
possibility to significantly limit the employee participation rights.102  
Next to the SE as main European corporate form for large enterprises, the 
European Commission has also driven the project of installing another type of 
Corporation, addressing the needs and structure of small and medium sized 
companies mainly. The so-called Societas Privata Europaea (SPE) has been in 
discussion and legislative drafting for several years, but so far without 
implementation.103 Instead, the European Commission’s project to establish a 
European Corporation for single shareholders only – the Societas Unius Personae 
(SUP) is currently gaining legislative traction.104 The SUP shall be designed to 
serve for individuals and legal entities as sole shareholders, to offer an easy 
foundation procedure and to require a minimum share capital of EUR 1 only.105    
Regarding the internal structure and corporate decision-making, the SUP 
would be comparable to other Corporations, same as also the SE does, and 
constitute an internal instance for strategic decision-making on the level of its 
owner, but also an executive organ to serve for daily business activities and 
decision-making associated therewith.  
 
  
                                                     
102 Cf. Bayer, W. (2016), p. 1932 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 35; Schmitz, K. in: 
Heidel, Aktienrecht (2014), part 1, Die Societas Europaea, lit. A; Raiser/Veil (2015), 
p. 374 et seq.; Spitzbart, B. (2006), p. 369 et seq.  
103 Cf. Teichmann, C. in: Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts (2015), vol. 
6, § 50 with further references; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 35. 
104 Cf. Krauß, W.W., Meichelbeck, H. (2015) p. 1562 et seq.; Omlor, S. (2014), p. 
1137 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 35. 
105 Cf. Krauß, W.W., Meichelbeck, H. (2015) p. 1562 et seq.; Omlor, S. (2014), p. 
1137 et seq. 
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3.2.3. Rights and duties of shareholders in Corporations  
As briefly described above, each Corporation, as being an abstract legal 
construction, is required to have certain internal institutional bodies, in order to 
decide, act and to always stay compliant with its own basic principles, mandatory 
laws and separate from the actions and decisions taken by the individuals owning 
and/or managing the Corporation. Such internal bodies are – irrespective of its 
type and the legislation of its incorporation:  
For each Corporation, there is always  
(1) a forum for its shareholders, always  
(2) an organ to externally and internally conduct actions and  
(3) in most cases106 also a third organ to supervise or advise the 
management.  
 
Even though the basic internal organisation is similar for all forms of 
Corporations, there are certain differences with regard to the rights and duties of 
their shareholders, which will be further highlighted in the following. This basic 
internal structure of the Corporations does closely connect with the Research 
Question: The rights and duties of the Companies’ shareholder(s) limit and depict 
the level playing field of a Company’s managers and is also an inevitable 
component in understanding the duties and rights of managers, as well as the 
legislative purpose behind their scope of responsibility.  
A thorough description of the managers’ scope of competencies has to be 
conducted with also looking at the rights and duties of the shareholders and other 
Corporate organs, in order to reveal the logic of managerial competencies, rights 
and duties in a comprehensive way.  
Again, the description shall focus on some of the most common forms of 
Corporations in Europe: The GmbH and the Aktiengesellschaft according to 
                                                     
106 Exception is the GmbH, for which a Supervisory Board or an Advisory Board is 
only necessary, if required due to mandatory labour law regulations or in case 
this organ is explicitly constituted within the GmbH’s Articles of Association, as 
described in detail above in Chapter 3.2.2.2. 
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German law, the Limited Company according to British laws, as well as the [xx] 
according to Spanish laws.  
 
3.2.3.1. GmbH 
The number of shareholders of a GmbH is usually rather low.107 This 
typically leads to a relatively close connection and interaction between them, 
what is also impacting the particular nature of certain rights and duties each one 
of them have and of the way that each shareholder can request the other 
shareholders to contribute to the business purpose of the Company. 
 
Duties - Contribution 
First and foremost, each shareholder is obliged to pay hiscontribution to the 
Company’s share capital, upon foundation of the Company and in the pro-rata 
amount equalling the respective shareholder’s participation in the Company, sec. 
19 para. 1 GmbHG. As the registered share capital forms the financial basis of the 
Company, this obligation is of central importance for the Company. This 
obligation strictly applies to the shareholders themselves and cannot be assigned 
or otherwise transferred to other parties, sec. 19 para. 2 GmbHG.  
The contribution can be either paid in cash or in kind. Whereas the 
contribution in cash is rather straightforward and requires mere payment to the 
Company’s own bank account, the contribution in kind requires some more 
efforts in order to be a valid performance of the shareholder’s obligation. The 
assets require to be proven and audited, in order to have a certain value, in order 
to set it in relation to the amount of the shareholder’s contribution obligation. The 
asset’s value must be an objective market value, not any kind of affectionary or 
other kind of subjective value, which would not be beneficial to the Company’s 
economic position.108  
According to sec. 5 para. 4 GmbHG, any asset contribution also requires the 
asset value to be assessed and asserted in a respective asset report 
                                                     
107 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 21 et seq. 
108 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 431 et seq. & p. 473 et seq. 
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(Sachgründungsbericht), stating adequate reasons why the asset shall inherit the 
objective value that it claims to have.109 Moreover, in case a contribution in kind 
has been valued excessive, then the contributing shareholder is obliged to 
contribute the delta between the asset’s actual value and the amount to be 
contributed by way of a cash payment to the Company, sec. 9 GmbHG.110 Those 
provisions demonstrate the legislator’s general reluctance to accept the giving of 
assets as an acceptable performance of the shareholder’s obligation to contribute 
to the share capital. However, the high standards and formal requirements 
appear adequate in the light of the outstanding importance of the capital 
contribution for the Company’s factual existence.  
In case of a cash contribution, it is of utmost importance that the full 
amount contributed is freely available to the managing directors on a company-
owned bank account upon incorporation of the Company.111  
If, during the lifetime of the Company, it is found that the original cash 
contribution was initially too low with regard to the respective shareholder’s 
obligations, or if a contribution in kind is found out to be valued excessively, then 
the obligation to make the contribution may revive and will oblige the 
shareholder to contribute further. Nontheless, there is no general duty to make 
further contributions to the Company’s capital, unless under very rare and 
specific circumstances,112 if the initial contribution had fully covered the 
shareholder’s respective obligation.  
Furthermore, the shareholders may also be required to comply with any 
other ancillary or extraordinary obligations that might arise out of the Company’s 
Articles of Association. Unlike the obligation to contribute to the share capital, 
                                                     
109 Cf. Fastrich, L. in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 5 margin no. 54 et seq. 
with further references; Leitzen, M. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 5, margin no. 
151 et seq. 
110 Cf. Fastrich, L. in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 9, margin no. 2 et seq. 
111 Respective statement is to be given by the Managing Directors according to sec. 
8 para. 2 GmbHG.  
112 Such can be the duty to further capitalize the Corporation, in case such is 
stipulated in the Articles of Association, according to sec. 26 GmbHG  – 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 479 et seq. with further references. 
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such additional obligations are based on an agreement between the shareholders 
that manifested in the Articles of Association. Such obligations can be, for 
example, to grant certain usage rights or licenses to the Company, to provide any 
services to the Company, or the like.113 Again, such obligations can be imposed on 
one or all shareholders by way of explicit statement in the Company’s Articles of 
Association, but will always come as a supplement to the obligation to contribute 
to the share capital, not as a substitution thereof.114 
Another specific duty might arise for a shareholder from the Company’s 
Articles of Association, in the light of a potential transfer of its share in the 
Company. The Articles of Association may, by way of explicit wording, oblige 
each shareholder who wishes to sell its share to make an offer to the other 
shareholders for purchasing such share, before selling its share to a third party 
(right of first refusal).115 Such restriction of transferability (Vinkulierung) is 
permitted according to sec. 15 para 5 GmbHG, but requires an explicit regulation 
and description in the Articles of Association.  
 
Duty of loyalty 
Next to the duty to contribute to the share capital, there is a second 
important duty, which binds all shareholders throughout the entire lifetime of 
their participation in the Company and eventually even beyond that: The duty of 
loyalty to the Company (Treuepflicht).  
In essence, such duty means that each shareholder is always bound to 
acknowledge and abide to the Company and to foster and enable its Business 
Object and to work to protect the Company from damages for as long as he is a 
shareholder in the Company. This general duty of each shareholder is not only 
                                                     
113 Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 478. 
114 The shareholders cannot free themselves from their obligation to contribute to 
the share capital by way of simply providing services to the company. Such 
would require qualifying as a contribution in kind and to comply with the 
therewith related standards and requirements described above – Raiser/Veil 
(2015), p. 473 et seq. 
115 Cf. Altmeppen, H. in: Roth/Altmeppen, GmbHG (2015), § 15, margin no. 97 et 
seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 506 et seq. 
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typical for the GmbH, but originally derives from – as many basic corporate and 
structural elements of Corporations do – the concept of the Company constituted 
under German Civil Law (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts), which is stipulated in 
sec. 705 et seq. German Civil Code.116 It is, however, of special importance with 
the GmbH, as the number of shareholders is here typically rather limited and 
such few shareholders are usually, unlike with Stock Corporations 
(Aktiengesellschaft), known and connected to each other by personal relationships, 
including the necessity to resolve on major questions concerning the Company 
together.117  
The general duty of loyalty of every shareholder towards the Company is 
often considered to be a general “catch-all” obligation, in order to make sure that 
the shareholders’ basic interests are always aligned into the similiar direction as 
the Company’s basic interests. Due to a high amount of scientific discussions and 
practical case law rulings, this phenomenon is nowadays seen as two-fold118: 
There is still a general “catch-all” character within the existing concept of the 
shareholders’ loyalty towards the Company, but there are also very specific 
peculiarities existing based on this general concept. Such are, for example, certain 
restrictions to the shareholders’ freedom to decide and vote, in specific situations, 
as well as the prohibition to compete with the Company (Wettbewerbsverbot). 
The right to resolve and vote freely might be limited due to the general duty 
of loyalty, in a way that obliges a minority or majority shareholder to vote in a 
certain way that favours the Company’s main interests.  
This might even result in an (unwritten) obligation to change the 
Company’s Articles of Association in certain situations.119 Especially for a 
shareholder, holding the majority of voting rights in a Company, there might be 
                                                     
116 Cf. Schäfer, C., in: MüKo BGB (2017), § 705, margin no. 226 et seq. 
117 Cf. Liebscher, T., MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 45, margin no. 18 et seq.; Raiser/Veil 
(2015), p. 21 et seq. 
118 Cf. Lieder, J. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 13 margin no. 137 et seq.; Merkt, 
H. in: MüKo GmbHG, § 13, margin no. 88 et seq. with further references; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 480 & p. 483 et seq. 
119 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 483 et seq. 
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restrictions in the freedom to vote, if a vote could result in a disadvantage for the 
Company in the light of the shareholder’s position within other group companies.  
Even though a Company might be part of a group of companies, this does 
not change its general ambition to act only in its own favour and not to sacrifice 
its own Company Object in favour of another group company’s well-being.120 
In addition to that, the duty of loyalty does also result in a restriction for the 
shareholders121 to not take certain actions, which would be solely in their personal 
favour, but to the disadvantage of the Company. Such might be, for example, 
taking business opportunities away from the Company, by responding to those 
personally and not in the name of the Company – a shareholder might be able to 
provide certain services on his own and for his own account to somebody, who 
might have otherwise also been a customer of the Company, in which the 
shareholder owns a participation. Such so-called “corporate opportunities”122 
must be left for the Company’s benefit and not disturbed by personal interests of 
one of its shareholders.  
As a matter of fact, such scenarios, in which the Company’s interests and 
the direct personal interests of one of its shareholders collide or compete, are 
more likely to occur in case a shareholder is also a managing director of the 
Company (so-called Gesellschafter-Geschäftsführer).  
The particular characteristics of the duty of loyalty also depend on the 
shareholding structure of the respective Company. In case of only few 
shareholders – e.g. two – the duty of loyalty might lead for each of them to a 
much higher level of necessary activity for the Company, than might be the case if 
the Company has a rather high number of shareholders, who all share the work 
and tasks that practically need to be accomplished in order to foster the Company 
and work towards the Company’s Object. Moreover, in case one shareholder 
                                                     
120 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 483. 
121 As well as for the Managing Directors, as will be further described and set forth 
below in Chapter 3.2.4. 
122 Cf. Noack, U. in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 35, margin no. 41 et seq.; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 485; Wiegand-Schneider, A. in: Münchener Handbuch des 
Gesellschaftsrechts (2016) vol. 7, part 2, chapter 2, § 37.2.2.e.bb with further 
references. 
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owns the majority of voting rights in the Company, he is also obliged to not 
discriminate any of the minority shareholders, a specific duty deriving from the 
general rule of equal treatment amongst the shareholders.123  
In case of one sole shareholder, the general duty of loyalty and its particular 
manifestations are of specific character: Even though this might seem to be the 
case at first thought, the Company’s own interest might not always run in parallel 
to its sole shareholders’ own interest.  
This might, for example, become apparent for questions related to the 
financial setup of the Company: The Company might have a strong interest to 
keep the profits it has earned and to re-invest those into an expansion of its 
business activities, whereas the shareholder might have the deviating interest to 
resolve on the payout of such profits as a cash dividend, in order to use the 
money for its private, non-corporate related activities.  
 
Legal consequences in case of non-compliance to existing duties 
All duties described above are generally applicable for each shareholder of 
a GmbH. However, such regime of obligations is effective only because there are 
also certain consequences attached to the non-compliance.  
The Company may, represented by its Managing Director(s), request its 
shareholder(s) to comply with existing obligations and may also seek for a 
clarification and enforcement of such obligations in court. As being an 
independent legal person, the Company is free to do so, based on written 
obligations, stipulated by law or in the Company’s Articles of Association or 
based on unwritten legal principles, such as the general duty of loyalty. In any 
case, the Company has the active power to force its shareholder(s) to comply with 
their obligations.  
Moreover, in case a Company has more than one shareholder, the 
shareholders may also request each other to comply with any existing obligations. 
The right to claim such is based on an enforcement of the Articles of Association 
or, again, the unwritten corporate law principles, which ultimately include a 
                                                     
123 Cf. Hoffmann, J. in: Michalski GmbHG (2017), § 53, margin no. 86 et seq.; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 487. 
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component of effective security against discrimination of a shareholder by the 
non-compliance of another shareholder.124  
Legal consequences can also be defined in the Articles of Association of the 
Company: payment of a monetary penalty or even the forfeiture (Kaduzierung)  or 
redemption (Einziehung)125 of its share(s) might be permitted consequences of a 
breach of a shareholder’s obligations, in case they are defined as such in the 
Articles of Association. Again, the enforcement of such can be actively conducted 
by the other shareholder(s) or by the Company’s Managing Director(s).  
 
Piercing the corporate veil  
Even though each Corporation is legally defined and considered to be an 
independent legal subject (sec. 13 para. 1 GmbHG), entering into all its contracts 
by itself and on its own behalf solely and existing solely on its own, nevertheless, 
there are certain exceptional situations, in which the shareholder can be exposed 
to liability for the way they do or do not influence or care for the Company. Such 
exceptional scenarios are often called a “piercing of the corporate veil”, because 
they result in a financial responsibility of the shareholders for actions or 
omissions they took “via” the Company.  
As being a separate legal person, every Corporation under German law is in 
a position to make claims, as far as those are substantiated.  
This does also include claims of a Corporation against its own shareholders, 
for example based on contractual obligations existing between Corporation and 
shareholder,126 specific civil law claims structures,127 or also based on tort law 
(Deliktsrecht).  
                                                     
124 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 405; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 470 et seq. with further 
references.  
125 According to. Sec. 34 para. 1 GmbHG; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 520 et seq.; 
Sosnitza, O. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 34, margin no. 8 et seq. with further 
references. 
126 The legal basis for such claims will either depend on the specific nature of the 
contract, for example claims due to defective delivery in the course of a purchase 
contract would be based upon sec. 434 or sec. 435 German Civil Code, or fall back 
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The most prominent example of the latter category is the shareholder’s 
liability for fraudulent violation of the Corporation against the principles of good 
faith (vorsätzliche sittenwidrige Schädigung) according to sec. 826 German Civil 
Code. In several rulings, the German Federal Court has defined the requirements 
and consequences of this liability instrument, which is often called “liability for 
extermination”128: In case one or several shareholders wilfully interfere with the 
financial integrity of their Corporation in a way that leads the Corporation into 
insolvency, then the Corporation has the right to claim reimbursement of all such 
damages suffered.129 This liability does not mean to serve as a compensation 
mechanism for poor or unlucky economic decision-making and management, but 
only in cases, where the shareholders fraudulently take benefit from the 
Corporation’s legal independency and its liability limitation to the registered 
share capital. 
The scenarios, in which such a piercing of the corporate veil towards the 
shareholders is legally justified based on jurisdiction, are to be seen as an 
restrictive set of extraordinary situations. By no means is a direct liability of the 
shareholders supposed to be a common tool to create additional volume of 
                                                                                                                                                  
to one of the general rules on contractual liability, according to sec. 241 para. 1 
German Civil Code.  
127 E.g. Culpa in contrahendo according to sec. 241 para. 2 German Civil Code.  
128 In German “Existenzvernichtungshaftung” as one prominent category of the 
personal liability of the shareholders by way of “piercing of the corporate veil” – 
cf. Fastrich, L., in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2018), § 13 margin no. 43 et seq.;  
Grunewald, B. (2014) p. 403; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 382; Lieder, J., in 
Michalski GmbHG (2017), § 13, E.III; Merkt, H. in: MüKo GmbHG (2018), § 13, 
margin no. 343 et seq.; Prütting, J. (2018), p. 409 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 488 
et seq.; Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 123 et seq. with further references.   
129 Cf. Regarding the old concept and case law around „Bremer Vulkan“: Bruns, P. 
(2003), p. 815; Freitag, R. (2003), p. 805 et seq.; regarding the recent case law after 
“Trihotel”: Katzenmeier, C., in: Dauner-Lieb, B., Langen, W. (2016), § 826 margin 
no. 38 et seq.; Kölbl, A. (2009), 1194 et seq.; Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 126 et 
seq.; Stöber, M. (2013), p. 2295 et seq.; Wagner, G., in: MüKo BGB (2017), § 826, 
margin no. 165 et seq. with further references.  
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recoverable assets for creditors of the Company. As often re-emphasized by the 
courts, these liability constructs pose an ultima ratio legal construction only, which 
shall close the unintentional gap of fraudulent misusage of the Corporation by its 
shareholders and therewith serves as a protection of the Corporation itself and its 
creditors in the business environment.130  
 
Rights 
As a matter of fact, the shareholders do not only face a significant number 
of obligations, but they are also entitled to numerous rights concerning the 
Company and their standing as owner of such.  
The central right of each shareholder is the right to vote in the shareholders’ 
meeting, according to sec. 47 GmbHG.131 The voting rights are allocated amongst 
all shareholders in a pro-rata amount to their particular amount of participation 
in the Company. However, such proportional allocation of voting rights can be 
modified by specific agreements between the shareholders – one shareholder 
might for example accept to have less or no voting rights, but a higher pro-rata 
dividend payout instead (so-called “preferential shares” = Vorzugsanteile). As a 
logical pre-condition of the voting right, each shareholder is also entitled to be 
invited to and to participate in each shareholders’ meeting, which is convened.132 
The scope of resolutions to be made by the shareholders by way of voting is 
determined either by the Company’s Articles of Association – which, in this 
regard, are also the constitutional basis for the allocation of competencies between 
the shareholders and the management – and/or by statutory requirements, as set 
out in sec. 46 GmbHG. Such certain competencies stipulated therein cannot be 
                                                     
130 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 399; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 493 et seq. 
131 Cf. Noack, U. in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 47, margin no. 32 et seq.; 
Römermann, V., in: Michalski GmbHG (2017), § 47, margin no. 43 et seq. with 
further references.  
132 For details regarding the invitation and convening of a shareholders‘ meeting – 
see further: sec. 48 - 51 GmbHG; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 570 et seq.; Seeling, O., 
Zwickel, M. (2009), p. 1097 et seq.; Wicke, H. (2017), p. 235 et seq. 
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transferred from the shareholders to any other constitutional body/organ of the 
Company.133  
Next to the rights associated with the conduct and participation in the 
shareholders‘ meeting, each shareholder also has certain other rights, which 
directly result from the proportional scope of his participation in the Company. 
The right to claim and receive a dividend payout, in case the Company has 
earned profits, is one of the most prominent ones.134 Again depending on the 
stipulation set forth in the Articles of Association, such payout might be claimed 
under certain circumstances only and/or at a certain time – e.g. on an annual 
basis.135  
In order to be in a position to always have sufficient knowledge about the 
Company’s status and business, each shareholder has the right to be fully 
informed by the Managing Directors about all matters related to the Company136 
and to take insight into all books and records of the Company at all times.137  
Such basic rights are stipulated in sec. 51a and sec. 51b GmbHG. 
Information is considered to be the basis for any decision to be taken by the 
shareholders. This right cannot be waived or limited and does exist irrespective of 
the number, nature and value of the shares held by a shareholder.138 Its scope is 
very broad: all information, which the shareholder(s) consider(s) to be of 
relevance can be requested and all books and records of the Company can be 
                                                     
133 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 465 & p. 570 with further references.  
134 According to sec. 29 para. 1 GmbHG; cf. Ekkenga, J., in: MüKo GmbHG (2018), 
§ 29, margin no. 1 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 605 et seq. 
135 Cf. Ekkenga, J., in: MüKo GmbHG (2018), § 29, margin no. 3 et seq.; Raiser/Veil 
(2015), p. 605 et seq. 
136 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 118 et seq.; Hillmann, R., in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), 
§ 51a, marin no. 40 et seq.; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 378;  Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 
466 et seq.; Römermann, V. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 51a, margin no. 20 et 
seq. with further references; Schneider, B. (2008), p. 638 et seq. 
137 Cf. Hillmann, R., in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 51a, marin no. 50 et seq.; Noack, 
U., in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 51a, margin no. 19 et seq. with further 
references.   
138 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 470 with further references.  
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reviewed. A limitation to only those information, which is relevant to prepare for 
the agenda items of a shareholders’ meeting, as this is the case for Stock 
Corporations according to sec. 131 AktG, is not existing for the GmbH – the 
shareholders have the mandatory right to know and see everything related to the 
Company.139  
The right to receive insight into the Company’s books and records does also 
include external consultants acting on behalf of the respective shareholder(s), if 
such consultants have previously signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement and are 
thereby bound to strict confidentiality concerning all aspects of the information 
they shall receive.140  
Limits to the shareholder’(s) rights for information and insight are 
stipulated in sec. 51 a para. 2 GmbHG and do only capture scenarios, in which the 
execution of such rights would (1) allegedly be used for interests of the respective 
shareholders outside of his interests concerning the Company or (2) if the 
execution of such rights would significantly harm the Company. Moreover, the 
general legal principles of good faith and proportionality set out certain 
restrictions as well.141  
Another important aspect of the legal relations between the shareholders is 
general rule, by which each shareholder is obliged to treat each other shareholder 
fair and without discrimination. This legal construct works both ways: Each 
shareholder is also entitled to claim and receive a fair treatment, which is equal to 
the treatment and position of all other shareholders.142  
Again, such right can be enforced by way of a court decision initiated by a 
claim filed by the affected shareholder, who fears to be treated to his 
disadvantage, discriminated and therewith violated in his rights of fair and equal 
                                                     
139 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 470 with further references. 
140 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 469 with further references.  
141 According to sec. 51a para. 2 GmbHG.  
142 Cf. Fastrich, L. in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 13, margin no. 31 et seq.; 
Saenger, I. in: Saenger/Inhester, GmbHG (2016), § 13, margin no. 64 et seq. with 
further references.  
70 
 
ANNE SCHRÖER-CONIGLIELLO 
treatment (so-called actio pro socio).143 This right to file a claim against 
all/several/one of his fellow shareholders sets out a strong control mechanism 
amongst the shareholders, which is not explicitly set out in the GmbHG, but was 
developed and defined by jurisdiction in various court decisions,144 targeted for 
example to provide for a specific legal instrument to enforce the rights arising out 
of sec. 31 GmbHG or als sec. 9 and sec. 9a GmbHG, which also include the 
component of a specific right for each shareholder.  
The right to execute an actio pro socio cannot be waived.145 It can be used as 
the legal vehicle to execute rights to claim performance of certain acts146 or 
omissions147, including specific actions to be taken by one of the Company’s 
organs148.  
 
3.2.3.2. Aktiengesellschaft 
Similar to the GmbH, also the stockholders of a German Aktiengesellschaft 
live their participation in the context of various specific duties and rights defined 
by mandatory law and also by various court decisions over the years.  
The entire landscape of duties and rights of the shareholders does indirectly 
shape and influence the position and scope of legal leverage of the Company’s 
management. Therefore, also those aspects are part of the theoretical fundament 
required to answer the Research Question.  
                                                     
143 Cf. Altmeppen, H. in: Roth/Altmeppen, GmbHG, (2015), § 13 margin no. 15 et 
seq.; Barnert, T. (2003), p. 63 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 470. 
144 Cf. Altmeppen, H. in: Roth/Altmeppen, GmbHG, (2015), § 13 margin no. 16 et 
seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 471 et seq. with further references. 
145 Cf. Altmeppen, H. in: Roth/Altmeppen, GmbHG, (2015), § 13 margin no. 16 et 
seq. 
146 Cf. Barnert, T. (2003), p. 63 et seq.;  Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 472 with further 
references. 
147 Cf. Barnert, T. (2003), p. 63 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 473 with further 
references.  
148 Cf. Barnert, T. (2003), p. 63 et seq.; Altmeppen, H. in: Roth/Altmeppen, 
GmbHG, (2015), § 13 margin no. 18 et seq. 
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Duties – Contribution in cash or in kind 
According to sec. 54 AktG, each shareholder is obliged to fully pay his 
contribution to the Company. This is the “central obligation”149 of each 
shareholder and no release or limitations are permitted, as stipulated in sec. 54 
para. 1 and sec. 66 AktG. This includes also the prohibition to set-off claims, 
which the shareholder might have against the Company, against the duty to fully 
contribute to the Company’s registered share capital.150 Moreover, the 
contribution has to be made in cash, unless a contribution in kind is explicitly 
resolved in accordance with sec. 27 AktG.  
 
Duty of loyalty 
Next to the duty to contribute to the Company’s financial structure, German 
courts have also developed a legal construction to further ensure that the 
Company’s interests and existence is properly ensured and not to be put at risk 
by the shareholders and their potential individual interests151: Every shareholder 
is generally obliged to act in strict loyality towards the Company and the other 
shareholders. In particular, this loyalty does include the prohibition to harm the 
Company, to take sufficient care and consideration of the Company’s interests 
and to foster the Company’s statutory Object according to the Articles of 
Association.152  
 
                                                     
149 Sec. 54 para. 1 AktG talks about the Hauptverpflichtung [= central obligation] of 
each shareholder; cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), 305; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 334; ; 
Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2016), § 55, margin no. 2 et seq. with further references.  
150 According to sec. 66 para. 1 AktG; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 111. 
151 Cf. Cahn, A., von Spannenberg, M.A. in: Spindler, G., Stilz, E., Aktiengesetz 
(2015), § 53a, margin no. 49 et seq. with further references; Krieger, G. in: 
Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts (2015), vol. 4, § 70.B.II.2; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 113 et seq. 
152 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 254 et seq.; Lange, K.W. in: Henssler, M., Strohn, L. 
(2016), § 53a, margin no. 7 et seq. with further references; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 113 
et seq. 
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Specific duty to compensate  
Moreover, sec. 117 AktG sets out a specific duty to compensate the 
Company and/or the shareholders for any losses suffered because one or several 
shareholder(s) have used their influence on the Company’s management in a 
fraudulent way to pursue personal interests. Such a misusage of the respective 
shareholders’ powers and position leads to a personal liability for damages 
suffered and to a right for the Company and/or the suffering shareholders, to 
claim full compensation of all damages that occurred.   
 
Rights - Administrative rights (Verwaltungsrechte) 
German Stock Corporation law distinguishes between Administrative 
Rights and Property Rights of shareholders. Both categories include and 
summarize particular aspects that come along with the ownership of participation 
in a Corporation and are therefore inevitably connected with the ownership in the 
shares.153  
Regarding the administration of the Company, each shareholder is entitled 
to participate in all shareholders’ meetings, including the right to speak and vote 
during the meetings.154 In order to effectively and actively manage and conduct its 
participation, each shareholder is also entitled to challenge decisions, which have 
been taken and to have them checked by the competent courts.155  
In case a shareholder does own only a minority of the shares in a Company, 
certain additional rights occur, which aim to protect his particular position as 
minority shareholder against the power of the majority.156  
                                                     
153 Cf. Heider, K. in: MüKo AktG (2016), § 11, margin no. 11 et seq.; Raiser/Veil 
(2015), p. 101 et seq.; Rieckers, O. in: Münchener Handbuch des 
Gesellschaftsrechts (2015), vol. 4, § 17.I.3, margin no. 3 et seq. with further 
references.   
154 Cf. Heider, K. in: MüKo AktG (2016), § 12, margin no. 6 et seq.; Hüffer, U., 
Koch, J. (2011), p. 326 et seq. 
155 Cf. Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2016), § 245, margin no. 5 et seq. with further 
references. 
156 Regulated in particular in sec. 122 and sec. 148 AktG; cf. Cahn, A., von 
Spannenberg, M.A. in: Spindler, G., Stilz, E., Aktiengesetz (2015), § 53a, margin 
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In general, the Administrative Rights of the shareholders are designed in a 
way to be suitable to offer an appropriate level of protection and participation for 
the shareholders, but at the same time also practical in the light of Stock 
Corporation’s nature as Company with a large number of shareholders – unlike 
the GmbH, where the number of shareholders is typically rather low.157  
 
Rights - Property rights (Vermögensrechte) 
Next to the rights for administrative participation in the Stock Corporation, 
the AktG does also stipulate specific rights for each shareholder to ensure his 
participation in the economic and financial situation of the Company. First and 
foremost, this aspect does include the right for each shareholder to claim 
dividends according to the pro rata amount of his shares. This right is basically 
stipulated in sec. 58 para. 4 and sec. 60 AktG. For most shareholders in Stock 
Corporations, this right is the central reason for their participation – they seek for 
a good investment of their liquidity and this is mainly determined by the financial 
return they can gain for such investment via the right to claim dividends as 
participation in the financial success of the Company.  
Next to that, each shareholder also has the right to subscribe to new shares, 
which the Company decides to emit by way of a capital increase.158 This right 
does safeguard the shareholder’s position in the Company and enables him to 
ensure that his percentual participation in the company is not factually reduced 
by the overall increase of existing shares. However, this right to subscribe to new 
shares can be excluded under certain defined conditions or waived by the 
shareholder himself.159   
 
Right for equal treatment  
Sec. 53a AktG rules that all shareholders have to be treated equally. 
Thereby, this norm creates the basis for each shareholder(s)’ right to claim an 
                                                                                                                                                  
no. 50 et seq.; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2016), § 122, margin no. 2 et seq.; Raiser/Veil 
(2015), p. 101.  
157 As described above in Chapter 3.2.2.2. 
158 According to sec. 186 para. 1 AktG.   
159 According to sec. 186 para. 4 AktG.   
74 
 
ANNE SCHRÖER-CONIGLIELLO 
equal treatment. In case of a violation of this basic principle of German Corporate 
law, the respective resolution or action, which constitutes and manifests the 
unequal treatment, is contestable by the discriminated shareholder, according to 
sec 243 para. 1 AktG.160  
 
Special rights/primary rights (Vorzugsrechte) 
Another more specific category of shareholders rights can be voluntarily 
created based on the Company’s Articles of Association – the Articles can allow 
e.g. for specific types of shares, which do not offer the full portfolio of rights as 
“common” shares do, but e.g. limit the respective shareholder’s administrative 
rights in the Company for the advantage of a higher dividend payout right.  
Such rights are often called “primary rights” and the respective category of 
shares is then called “primary shares”.161 Those are of interest especially for 
publicly listed Companies, which want to attract investors via the capital markets 
with an “easy” and high return expectancy on their investment.  
 
Right to file judicial claims against the Company 
Based on various court decisions, the existing range of shareholders’ rights 
has been further expanded throughout the past years and decades. Amongst 
others, a specific right of a shareholder to file for a judicial claim against the 
Company in case an act or omission of the Company would restrict the 
shareholder’s rights more than legally justified.162 As a matter of fact, this right to 
file a claim against the Company is seen as an ultima ratio of the respective 
shareholder, but still as a valid instrument to ensure and enforce his statutory 
legal participation rights in the Company.163  
                                                     
160 Cf. Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2016), § 53a, margin no. 2 et seq. with further 
references.  
161 Cf. Heider, K. in: MüKo AktG (2016), § 12 margin no. 30 et seq.; Raiser/Veil 
(2015), p. 103 et seq. with further references. 
162 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 105 et seq. with further references. 
163 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 323 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 105 et seq. with 
further references. 
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In contrast to such rights to make claims against the Company, any 
enforcement of rights between the shareholders would require to be put on an 
existing legal basis outside of the pure means of German Corporate law. Such 
could be for example the existence of a claimable right based on tort law or 
arising out of or in connection with a contract between the shareholders.164  
 
3.2.3.3. UK Limited 
Even though the UK Limited structurally differs from continental European 
legal forms in many aspects, the rights and duties of its shareholders are 
comparable to those of e.g. German or Spanish corporations. These similarities are 
not a conincidence. They merely derive from the fact that shareholders, as being 
the owners and principals of a Corporation, must logically be equipped with 
certain rights in order to enforce and execute their ownership position as a role of 
ultimate control. Nevertheless, the shareholders’ rights are, also in the UK 
Limited, limited and fenced by the interests of the Corporation itself, which are 
mainly represented and safeguarded by its Managing Directors.  
 
Rights – participation, information and attendance 
The most important rights of shareholders in a UK Limited Company are  
(1) The right to take decisions of general directive and strategic 
importance for the Corporation,  
(2) the right to be informed by the Corporation’s management about 
all relevant events and developments concerning the Corporation, 
and 
(3) the right to participate and vote in the annual and extraordinary 
general meetings, in order to be able to execute their right 
described above.165  
                                                     
164 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 105 et seq. with further references.  
165 Cf. Just, C. (2006), p. 25 et seq.; Kadel, J. (2006), p. 102 et seq. with further 
references; Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
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Such rights constitute the fundamental regime by which the shareholders 
are legally in a position to execute their ownership rights and to determine and 
change the objective, towards which the Corporation operates.  
In particular, the decisions-making regarding the structural fundaments of 
the Corporation by way of changes or amendments to the Corporation’s  articles 
of association, which is to be resolved by the shareholders’ general meeting.166  
The shareholders’ rights to participate and vote in the general meetings 
might depend on the nature of the shares held by the respective shareholder. By 
way of specific ruling in the Corporation’s articles of association, resolution can 
be made to create different categories of shares with different rights attached. The 
most common example is the creating of preferential shares, which are entitled to 
receive an increased dividend payout, whereas they restrict their owner’s voting 
rights in the annual meeting.  
If the respective nature of shares does allow for a full participation and 
voting of the shareholder in the general meeting, then such will include resolving 
about the following matters:  
(1) Approval of the Corporation’s report and annual accounts, 
(2) Approval of the directors’ remuneration report,  
(3) Approval of the Corporation’s dividend payout, 
(4) Appointment of the Corporation’s directors, and 
(5) Approval of any amendments or changes to the Corporation’s 
articles of association.167 
 
Duties  
Similar as for Corporations established under German law, also the 
shareholders of a UK Limited are obliged to follow any obligations stipulated for 
                                                                                                                                                  
Barth, M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 43 et seq. with further 
references. 
166 Cf. Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, 
M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 29 et seq. with further references.  
167 Cf. Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, 
M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 43 et seq. with further references. 
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them in the Corporation’s articles of association, such as for example to support 
the Company’s Object. Moreover, the shareholder face a liability, which is, 
however, limited to the value of the shares they hold.168 Similar to the German 
Corporations, this highlights the nature of the UK Limited as a separate legal 
entity, which is the target of the liabilities it does create alongside its business 
activities. There is no direct liability of the shareholders for such actions of the 
Corporation, except for the respective share value and for specific fraudulent 
scenarios in which a piercing of the corporate veil is permitted.   
Moreover, the most important duty of the shareholders of a UK Limited is 
the duty of loyalty vis-á-vis the Corporation. It is triggered by the binding effect 
of the Corporation’s articles of association and evolves for example in situations, 
in which one shareholder considers setting up another separate business that 
would directly compete with the Corporation’s business activities. Such 
behaviour would not be permitted for shareholders.169  
In a nutshell, the rights and obligations of shareholders in UK Limited 
Corporations are to some extend comparable to those existing under German 
Corporate laws, whereas they are also significantly determined by British case 
law, as such being a typical characteristic of Common Law jurisdictions, such as 
UK law.170  
 
3.2.3.4. Spanish Corporations 
Also under Spanish Corporate law, the shareholders’ role as owners of the 
Company is manifestated by a variety of rights, which entitle them to shape and 
influence the Company with regards to the most fundamental decisions and 
directions.  
 
Rights  
                                                     
168 Cf. Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, 
M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 11 et seq. with further references. 
169 Cf. Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, 
M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 43 et seq. with further references. 
170 Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 26 et seq. with further references. 
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In particular, each shareholder is entitled to participate and vote in the 
General Shareholders’ Meeting, unless he is owner of a specific class of shares for 
which voting rights are restricted or excluded (e.g. preferential shares). Unless 
further expanded in the Company’s Articles of Association, the shareholders are 
required and entitled to at least resolve about  
(1) the approval of the Company’s annual accounts, 
(2) the distribution of the Company’s profits and allocation of losses,  
(3) appointment and removal of managing directors, and Company 
auditors 
(4) any changes or amendments to the Company’s articles of association 
(5) any matters of organisational and structural importance, such as 
transformations of the legal entity, mergers, spin-offs or else.171  
 
Moreover, the shareholders have specific rights to challenge and interfere 
into decisions taken by the management, if such are not in compliance with 
existing laws and/or not in line with the Company’s articles of association.  
In order to be in a position to effectively execute their rights, in particular to 
assess the legal and statutorial compliance, the shareholders also have an 
encompassing right to receive all relevant information and e.g. to examine the 
Company’s financial statements.172  
 
Duties 
Inversely to their rights, the shareholders do also have certain duties 
attached to their position and role. First and foremost, they are bound by the 
Company’s articles of association and the competencies and objectives stated 
therein (unless they have validly resolved on a change of those).  
                                                     
171 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 33 et seq. & margin no. 148 et seq. 
172 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 33 et seq. & margin no. 148 et seq. 
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Similar as for the UK Limited and German corporate forms, also the 
Corporations under Spanish law are to be seen as separate legal institutions, 
which can defend their rights, even if it is against their owners.173  
Moreover, the shareholders are again bound by certain unwritten principles 
of Corporate law, also in Spain – first and foremost the duty of loyalty and care 
for the Company, which derive as duties out of the property of the shareholders 
in the Company.174  
  
                                                     
173 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 18 et seq. 
174 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 33 et seq. & margin no. 68 et seq. with 
further references. 
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3.2.4. Rights and duties of management board members in Corporations 
As seen above, the internal organisation of Corporations differs, depending 
on the type and legislative background. However, in all Corporations, the 
authorities for strategic questions and day-to-day business decision-making are 
separated into the competencies of the shareholders and of the management of 
the Corporation. This is the most fundamental expression of the Corporations’ 
independence from its own shareholders.175  
Moreover, this consequentially leads to the fact that the management of a 
Corporation has its own, individual rights and obligations, determined by both – 
the mandatory legal regime, in which the Corporation has been founded and is 
existing, as well as its internal constitutional basis – the articles of association and 
perhaps even by special by-laws for the Managing Directors.176  
From both such regimes, individual rights and duties arise for the 
managing directors, which shall be further described and analysed in the 
following, taking into consideration again some of the most typical forms of 
Corporations in Europe, which will also be of relevance for the analysis of the 
Case Studies further down in Chapter 5: The German Corporate forms, the 
Limited Company according to British laws, as well as the Sociedad Limitada and 
Sociedad Anónima according to Spanish laws.  
 
3.2.4.1. GmbH 
A GmbH incorporated under German law must have one or several 
Managing Directors.177 They represent the GmbH in its daily business and also in 
front of judicial courts.178 The scope of their rights and duties is partially 
determined by mandatorily applicable laws and partially also set out by the 
                                                     
175 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 18 et seq. 
176 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 47 et seq. & margin no 166 et seq. 
177 According to sec. 35 para. 2 GmbHG.  
178 According to sec. 35 para. 1 GmbHG.  
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Articles of Association. This two-fold regulatory regime sets the scene for the 
assessment of each individual decision and action taken by a Managing Director.  
In case the shareholders appoint more than one Managing Director, they 
can be either authorized to represent the GmbH always alone (Sole 
Representation Power =  Einzelvertretungsbefugnis)179 or always together with a 
second Managing Director180 (Joint Representation Power – 
Gesamtvertretungsbefugnis).181 If the shareholders wish to grant Sole Representation 
Power to the Managing Directors, this requires being resolved explicitly in the 
Articles of Association.  
If no such resolution is made in the Articles of Association, then any 
Managing Director will always be automatically granted the power to jointly 
represent the GmbH, as this is the legal standard constellation, according to sec. 
35 para. 2 sent. 1. The type of representation power (sole/joint) also requires to be 
filed and published with the Commercial Register, in order to allow any third 
party to be able to verify the nature of the representation power of each Managing 
Director of a GmbH. This is of particular interest for contract partners, in order to 
verify, if the other party is validly represented and if, for example, one Managing 
Director can validly sign a contract alone.    
 
Duties of the Managing Directors 
The duties and obligations, which exist for every Managing Director of a 
GmbH can be segmented into five different groups of duties:  
                                                     
179 According to sec. 35 para. 2 GmbHG; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 535 et seq.; 
Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 45 with further references;  Stephan, K.-D., Tieves, J. 
in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 35, margin no. 2 et seq.  
180 Cf. Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 45 with further references; in case the 
shareholders or Managing Directors have also appointed one or more proxy 
holders (Prokuristen), those have to comply with the same rules as the Managing 
Directors, but the GmbH can be also represented by one Managing Director and 
one Proxy Holder in case of multi-representation – Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 538 et 
seq. 
181 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 541 with further references. 
82 
 
ANNE SCHRÖER-CONIGLIELLO 
(1) duties arising out of the applicable statutory laws and the 
Company’s Articles of Association182,  
(2) the overall duty to always act compliant and in accordance 
with mandatory laws, orders and binding rules (duty of 
legality/compliance duty),  
(3) the duty to cooperate with all other member of the 
management board,  
(4) the general duty of care and  
(5) the general duty of loyalty towards the Company.183  
 
When now looking closer to each of those groups, it will become apparent 
that those layers of responsibility create and define a radius for manoeuvres that 
enables each Managing Director to conduct the Company’s business activities 
with a rather large amount of flexibility.  
 
Duties to comply with statutory laws and the Company’s constitution 
The number of specific statutory duties for the Managing Directors is high: 
The general duty to protect the Company’s registered share capital as minimum 
capitalization according to sec. 43 para. 3 GmbHG; the duty to file for insolvency, 
if the preconditions for insolvency apply to the Company according to sec. 64 
GmbHG and sec. 15a InsO; the duty to always conduct adequate and orderly 
accounting of all business activities of the Company according to sec. 41 GmbHG 
and to set up and publish184 the Annual Accounts of the Company according to 
                                                     
182 Such, themselves being put to existence based on the statutory constitutional 
regulations which apply for every GmbH and which enable the shareholders to 
resolve on an allocation of rights and duties for the management – and to modify 
the specifics of this setup at any later point in time, during the life of the 
Company – according to sec. 45 GmbHG.  
183 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 555 et seq.; v.Woedtke, N. (2013), p. 484 et seq. 
184 After approval of the annual accounts by the shareholders’ meeting, according 
to sec. 42a GmbHG. 
83 
 
THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-BORDER 
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
sec. 242, 264 HGB, these are only some few and most prominent examples of such 
mandatory legal duties.185  
The Managing Directors can never be exempt from the constant compliance 
with those duties – they exist for as long as the Managing Director(s) is/are in 
office.186 Even though they often regulate rather specific legal topics, they form the 
inevitable basis of the scope of actions that the Managing Director is responsible 
for. Failure to comply with those rules leads to a direct liability of the Managing 
Director vis-á-vis the Company and/or any third party, who suffers damages due 
to such incompliance.  
In addition to mandatory laws, the Managing Directors are also directly 
bound to fulfil the obligations and responsibilities imposed on them in the 
Company’s Articles of Association. Resolution about the content and 
modifications of the Articles of Association are the sole competency of the 
shareholders.187 But “living” the Articles of Association, making sure to always 
abide with them and to transform the business concept depicted therein into 
reality, this obligation is partially imposed on the Managing Directors as well.  
This includes the alignment and steering of the Company’s business 
activities with the Company’s object, as defined in the Articles of Association. The 
Managing Directors are obliged to conduct the Company’s business in a way to 
foster its defined object and are not allowed to conduct activities which would in 
no way, neither directly nor indirectly, relate to the Company’s object.188  
                                                     
185 For a general overview see also: Axhausen, M. in: Beck’sches Handbuch der 
GmbH (2014), § 5, margin no. 177 et seq.; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2014), p. 365 et seq.; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 555 et seq.; Schauf, M. (2017), p. 2883 et seq. 
186 Registration with the Commercial Register is not decisive for the existence of 
such obligations, not even the existence of an employment law agreement or 
service contract between the Managing Director and the employing Company – 
cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 555 et seq. with further references; Schmittmann, J.M. 
(2018), p. 45 with further references.  
187 According to sec. 53 GmbHG.   
188 Cf. Axhausen, M. in: Beck’sches Handbuch der GmbH (2014), § 5, margin no. 
177 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 555; Wicke, H. in: MüKo GmbHG (2018), § 3 
B.III.2.b with further references.  
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Moreover, the Articles of Association can also include certain other explicit 
duties and responsibilities for the Managing Directors. If so, then all these 
stipulate mandatory duties, the non-compliance with which would result in a 
liability of the Managing Directors.  
Next to the Articles of Association, many Companies have also specific 
written by-laws, which further define or narrow down the rights and duties of the 
Company’s Managing Directors, as well as the management’s internal setup and 
organisation. Such by-laws are usually adopted by the Managing Directors 
themselves. In case they exist, they form an essential part of the constitutional 
structure of the management organ. However, there is no necessity to always 
install such additional rules, as they are not a mandatory requirement for the 
organisational basis of a Company.189 If such by-laws exist, then they typically 
define the allocation of duties and responsibilities between the Managing 
Directors. 
In addition to the by-laws, further duties or rights for a Managing Directors 
can be also defined in its individual employment or service contract.190 This 
contract would typically rule on the specific relationship between an individual 
Managing Director and its employer/principal, such being the Company.  
Examples of such individual rights or duties, which might be defined in the 
service agreement, could be an specific obligation for the Managing Director not 
to compete with the Company and not to enter into a service agreement with one 
of the Company’s director competitors for a certain period of time after the end of 
the service agreement.191 
  
                                                     
189 Cf. Leuering, D., Dornhegge, S. (2010), p. 13 et seq.; Ziemons, H.in: Michalski 
GmbHG (2017), § 43, margin no. 326 et seq. with further references.  
190 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 361; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 363; Raiser/Veil 
(2015), p. 556; Tebben, J. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 6, margin no. 152 et seq. 
with further references.  
191 Cf. Jaeger, G. in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 35 margin no. 360 et seq.; Oetker, H. 
in: Henssler/Strohn, GmbHG (2016), § 35, margin no. 20 et seq. with further 
references.   
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Duty of legality 
In addition to all the specific obligations imposed onto the Managing 
Directors by particular regulation or arising out of Company-specific 
constitutional documents, such as the Articles of Association, each Managing 
Director does also have the general duty to ensure that the Company always 
complies with all applicable legal requirements and statutory orders.  
For obvious and clear obligations, such as the duty to make all due and 
payable social security payments for the Company’s employees192 or not to violate 
the rules of applicable criminal laws193, this is more a question of a proper and 
effective company-internal organisation and reporting.  
Discussions and concepts regarding such installation and maintenance of an 
appropriate internal Compliance system has been subject to numerous 
discussions and court decisions in the last years.194 In a nutshell, the most crucial 
elements of a reliable Compliance system are:195 
(1) an organisational structure that creates and allows for a proper and 
unfiltered reporting of all relevant means196 and information about 
the Company up to the Management’s level, 
                                                     
192 Cf. Brand, J., Bentlage, M. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 37, margin 
no. 30 et seq. with further references; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 556 with further 
references. 
193 Cf. Krause, D.M. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 40 with further 
references. 
194 Cf. Kiethe, K. (2007), p. 393 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 557 & p. 173 et seq.; 
Schulz, M. (2017), p. 1475 et seq.; Sonnenberg, T. (2017), p. 917 et seq. with further 
references; Stephan, K.-D., Thieves, J. in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 37, margin no. 
25 et seq.; Ziemons, H. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 43, margin no. 174 et seq. 
with further references. 
195 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 557 & p. 173 et seq.; Sonnenberg, T. (2017), p. 917 et 
seq. with further references. 
196 Such include not only relevant data concerning the Company’s business and 
financial performance, but also related to existing legal requirements e.g. from the 
fields of Environmental, Health & Safety (EHS), Antitrust and competition laws, 
anti-corruption and anti-bribery and others. 
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(2) the installation and roll-out of understandable and focused 
Compliance policies, in which the most important rules for conduct 
of daily business activities of the Company are described and 
explained for the employees – in many Companies this is often 
supplemented by a “Code of Conduct”, in which the most relevant 
legal regulations and instructions are summarized, 
(3) the creation and constant training of a company-wide awareness for 
existing Compliance policies and risks, 
(4) the installation and maintenance of an independent reporting 
system for Compliance concerns and breaches, ideally via different 
channels such as a Whistleblowing-Hotline for anonymous 
information, the existence of ombuds persons at the Company’s 
offices and sites for personal interaction and questions to be raised 
by the associates or a general availability of the Legal and/or HR 
department for any kinds of Compliance-related questions.  
 
First and foremost, the installation and proper maintenance of such a 
Compliance system is a duty of the Managing Directors. In case of failure of such 
measures, they will be responsible and liable, also on a personal level.197  
However, the Compliance system and organisation in a Company does 
provide for general instruments and organisation only.  
For any specific cases and circumstances, under which it is not clear and 
obvious to detect a legal obligation of the Company or a violation of such, the 
Managing Directors are obliged to always investigate and determine, if a certain 
obligation or risk of violation exists, or not. Especially in situations, which require 
deep investigations to gather all necessary facts and a thorough legal assessment 
to evaluate the Company’s duties, the Managing Directors can be obliged to take 
immediate action, and to even seek for assistance of outside experts.198  
                                                     
197 According to sec. 43 para. 2 GmbHG; cf. Vetter, E. in: Handbuch 
Managerhaftung (2017), § 22 with further references.  
198 Cf. Fuhrmann, L. (2016), p. 881 et seq.; Paefgen, W.G. (2016), p. 433 et seq.; 
Theusinger, I., Jung, O. in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch GmbH-Recht (2014), § 
24, margin no. 36 et seq. 
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A field, in which outside legal assessment is often required in order to 
properly identify the Company’s existing rights and duties is the vast field of 
competition and cartel laws. This aspect of Managerial obligations exists in 
particular in Corporate Transactions and any form of Mergers & Acquisitions, 
where the likelihood of relevance in the light of existing competition laws is 
significantly high.  
As a basic principle, the existing competition laws in Germany199 and 
throughout Europe200 aim to protect a free and fair competition on the markets. 
Whenever certain actions of the market participants put this concept at risk, then 
competition laws impose certain restrictions to individual and/or collective 
behaviour.201 The most prominent examples of such restrictions would be the 
prohibition of common pricing of several competing market participants202. As the 
prices, which are achievable for certain goods or services, shall be freely 
determined by the general economic market principles of demand and supply 
resources,203 the market participants may not interfere to this mechanisms by way 
of overruling such market freedom with individual agreements to ask for certain 
(minimum) prices from all potential customers.204  
                                                     
199 Cf. Bosch, W. (2018), p. 1731 et seq.; Dreher, M. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung 
(2017), § 35 with further references; Glöckner, J. (2017), p. 905 et seq.; Volmar, M., 
Kranz, J. (2018), p. 14 et seq. 
200 Cf. Bosch, W. (2018), p. 1731 et seq.; Meessen, K.M., Kersting, C. in: 
Meessen/Riesenkampff/Kersting/Meyer-Lindemann, Kartellrecht (2016), part A, 
margin no. 3 et seq.; Mühle, J., Weitbrecht, A. (2018), p. 181 et seq. 
201 Cf. Meessen, K.M., Kersting, C. in: Meessen/Riesenkampff/Kersting/Meyer-
Lindemann, Kartellrecht (2016), part A, margin no. 3 et seq. with further 
references. 
202 Cf. Dreher, M. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 35, margin no. 37 et seq. 
with further references. 
203 According to sec. 1 GWB (German law against market restrictions); cf. 
Nordemann, J.B. in: Meessen/Riesenkampff/Kersting/Meyer-Lindemann, 
Kartellrecht (2016), GWB § 1, margin no. 6 et seq. 
204 Cf. Bosch, W. (2018), p. 1731 et seq.; Volmar, M., Kranz, J. (2018), p. 14 et seq. 
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From the perspective of the Managing Directors, the constant monitoring of 
Antitrust and Competition law compliance of the Company is of fundamental 
importance, not only in the context of Corporate Transactions, but then in an even 
increased way.  
The consequences of a violation of existing obligations in this regard are 
severe – not only the reputational loss in the market,205 which might mean the 
ruin for the Company, but also significant fines, which the cartel authorities on a 
national206 and a European207 level may impose on the Company and on the 
responsible individuals are a realistic threat.208 Therefore, Managing Directors are 
well-advised to always actively monitor and operate strict compliance in this 
regard and to seek for outside expert advice, whenever in doubt.  
 
Duty to cooperate 
Moreover, there is another basic duty, which logically only applies in case 
the Company has more than one appointed Managing Director: Each Managing 
Director is obliged to always cooperate with all other Managing Directors of the 
Company for the Company’s well-being and advantage.  
First and foremost, this general duty implies the specific duty to exchange 
all information,209 which is related to the Company and which is helpful and/or 
important, in order to manage the Company’s business activities. Usually, regular 
meetings of all Managing Directors will form the organisational basis of this 
information exchange. In addition, significant information must be also shared 
among all Managing Directors immediately, if required for the well-being of the 
Company. This can be then either done by summoning and hosting an 
                                                     
205 Cf. Dreher, M. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 35, margin no. 7 et seq. 
206 Cf. Dreher, M. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 35, margin no. 75 et seq. 
with further references. 
207 Cf. Dreher, M. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 35, margin no. 75 et seq. 
with further references. 
208 Cf. Dreher, M. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 35, margin no. 7 et seq. 
209 Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 557; Ziemons, H. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 43, 
margin no. 324 et seq. 
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extraordinary meeting of all Managing Directors, or by any other means of 
information exchange.210 
Next to the exchange of relevant information, the Managing Director’s Duty 
to Cooperate does also imply the necessity of reciprocal control and supervision 
among all members of the Management. Even though it is – within certain 
limits211 – permitted for the Managing Directors to allocate certain responsibilities 
and to therewith limit the other Managing Directors’ required involvement for 
certain topics or areas of competence, a general obligation to stay informed and to 
monitor the particular activities of the other Managing Directors cannot be 
excluded for any member of the Company’s management.212 Same as with the 
regular information exchange, this mutual control and monitoring is usually an 
integrated part of every regular meeting held by all Managing Directors. Each 
Managing Director will report out on the specific areas of responsibility, which he 
is in charge of and will therewith give all his colleagues the possibility to 
question, demand further information and/or make any comments to this. Again, 
this obligation aims to create a high level of transparency and information 
equality among the Managing Directors.  
In case of reasonable doubt or evidence that an individual Managing 
Director does not properly manage its areas of responsibility, the other Managing 
Directors have the duty to interfere and to take necessary actions themselves, as 
appropriate. Again, the benchmark for the assessment and for any actions taken is 
the well-being of the Company and the ongoing aim to achieve and fulfil the 
Company’s Object, as defined in the Articles of Association.213  
                                                     
210 Main requirement here is that the information exchange has to be done in due 
course and effectively amongst the Managing Directors; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 
557 & p. 173 with further references.  
211 See above in this Chapter 3.2.4.1; cf. Leuering, D., Dornhegge, S. (2010), p. 13 et 
seq. 
212 Cf. Fleischer, H. in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 43, margin no. 108 et seq.; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 557; Vetter, E. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 22, 
margin no. 19 with further references. 
213 See above in this Chapter 3.2.4.1; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 557; Ziemons, H. in: 
Michalski, GmbHG (2017), §  43, margin no. 110 et seq. with further references. 
90 
 
ANNE SCHRÖER-CONIGLIELLO 
 
Duty of care  
One of the most important and vast categories of individual duties for each 
Managing Director is the general Duty of Care, which is applicable always and to 
every appointed Managing Director. This duty is commonly regarded as a 
general category of numerous specific duties, which might arise in specific 
situations, but which all revert back to the same basic principles.214  
Fundamentally, every Managing Director of a GmbH is obliged to always 
conduct all actions for the Company with the due care of a diligent 
businessman215, according to sec. 43 para. 1 GmbHG. This principle does apply for 
any and all actions (and omissions) conducted by the Managing Director for 
and/or on behalf of the Company. More specifically, this means that the 
Managing Director is always obliged to be and keep himself properly informed 
about all relevant facts concerning the Company.216  
Next to proper information, the Managing Director is also always required 
to seek for adequate external advice, in case he cannot fully assess a certain risk or 
situation on his own.217 Alongside with adequate external advice, if needed, the 
Managing Director does also have the duty to regularly monitor and receive 
reports and advice from the Company’s internal organisation. Reporting and 
organisational structures must be set up in a way that enables the Management to 
                                                     
214 Cf.  Altmeppen, H. in: Roth/Altmeppen, GmbHG (2015), § 43 margin no. 
26 et seq.; Fleischer, H. in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 43, margin no. 152 et seq.;  
Ziemons, H. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), §  43, margin no. 204 et seq. with 
further references. 
215 As set out in sec. 43 para. 1 GmbHG; cf. Altmeppen, H. in: Roth/Altmeppen, 
GmbHG (2015), § 43, margin no. 3 et seq.; Noack, U. in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. 
(2017), § 43, margin no. 7 et seq. with further referencecs;  Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 
557 & p. 559.  
216 This ties into the obligation to cooperate with all other Managing Directors, as 
described above in this Chapter 3.2.4.1 and evidenced above in footnote 209 et 
seq. 
217 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 557 & p. 170; Vetter, E. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung 
(2017), § 22, margin no. 83 et seq. 
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constantly receive and know, what is going on in the Company,218 how 
responsibilities are allocated on each organisational level within the Company 
and to give directions, whenever needed to prevent incompliant behaviour or 
unreasonable risks for the Company.219  
The main task of each Managing Director is, to actively conduct the 
Company’s business activities in the light of the existing Company’s Object.220 For 
doing so, each Managing Director has, and may always claim to have221, a certain 
scope of discretion (Ermessensspielraum), which includes the freedom to take and 
accept certain economic risks for the Company. The Managing Director does even 
have the right to realize economic disadvantages for the Company. As long as all 
his decisions are taken on an adequate information basis, even economic failure is 
not prohibited.222  
Taking a general perspective on this, it is apparent that this freedom is 
evidently required: Only the freedom to also take risks makes it possible for the 
Managing Director to steer the Company and to make the Company always be an 
active participant in its microeconomic environment and the markets, in which it 
participates.223 Without this freedom, the Company would be immobilized and 
not able to move and realize its Company’s Object, because every management 
                                                     
218 Cf. Vetter, E. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 22, margin no. 72 et seq. 
with further references.  
219 Cf. Fleischer, H. in: MüKo GmbHG (2017), § 43, margin no. 52 et seq.; 
Sonnenberg, T. (2017), p. 917 et seq. with further references. 
220 Cf. Fleischer, H. in: MüKo GmbHG (2017), § 43, margin no. 87 et seq. with 
further references. 
221 Cf. Fleischer, H. in: MüKo GmbHG (2017), § 43, margin no. 66 et seq.; Lücke, 
O., Simon, S. in: Saenger/Inhester, GmbHG (2016), § 43, margin no. 30 et seq;  
Oetker, H. in: Henssler/Strohn, GmbHG (2016), § 43, margin no. 27 et seq.; 
Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 557 & p. 166. 
222 Cf. Fleischer, H. (2011), p. 521 et seq.; Lücke, O., Simon, S. in: Saenger/Inhester, 
GmbHG (2016), § 43, margin no. 36 et seq.; Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 38 with 
further references.  
223 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 166 et seq.; Schneider, U.H. in: Handbuch 
Managerhaftung (2017), § 2, margin no. 14 et seq. with further references.  
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decisions would quintessentially require to be driven by a risk-adverse mitigation 
strategy. No positive movements, no economic growth would be possible, in fact. 
Over past years, the scope and particular shape of this freedom has often 
been subject to disputes, litigation and court rulings in almost every jurisdiction. 
Especially for the Stock Corporation, where the Management is exposed to a 
bigger and mostly anonymous group of shareholders, management decisions 
were often disputed.224 
As described further down as well for the Stock Corporation’s 
perspective,225 jurisdiction and judicial literature has developed a concept, which 
originally served as a baseline interpretation in the United States of America: The 
so-called Business Judgement Rule:  
In essence, the Business Judgement Rule describes the freedom of every 
manager to take risks and to be mistaken with regard to its business decisions, as 
long as each of such decisions has always been placed on a sufficient information 
basis.226  
Liability shall not occur “only” because of a manifestation of market risks, 
in losses or a financial downturn of the Company (even if such is as significant as 
the Company’s insolvency), but the Management does only face liability, in case 
of negligent or fraudulent misconduct.  
  
                                                     
224 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 165 et seq.; Schneider, U.H. in: Handbuch 
Managerhaftung (2017), § 2, margin no. 14 et seq. with further references; general 
overview of older court rulings and literature: Roth, M. (2001) with further 
references. 
225 See below Chapter 3.2.4.2. 
226 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 362; Lücke, O., Simon, S. in: Saenger/Inhester, 
GmbHG (2016), § 43, margin no. 30 et seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 165 et seq.; 
Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 38 with further references; Schneider, U.H. in: 
Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 2, margin no. 14 et seq. with further 
references. 
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Duty of loyalty  
As a fifth category of the Managing Directors’ duties towards the Company, 
each Managing Director is also always obliged to act with loyalty to the 
Company. Again, this general duty includes several different sub-categories of 
specific obligations, which are not explicitly depicted in the applicable laws, but 
which have been developed by jurisdiction and judicial literature over decades of 
judging particular disputes and cases.  
One of the most prominent sub-categories of the general Duty of Loyalty is 
the duty of each Managing Director to keep all information related to the 
Company and all internal facts he gets to know in strict confidence. All 
information must be kept secret, unless there is an evident interest or an explicit 
instruction from the Company to share certain information with third parties or 
to make it generally available to the public.227  
The duty to always maintain strict confidentiality is closely connected also 
to the duty of legality with regard to existing competition laws – certain market-
sensitive data is not permitted to be shared with competitors.228  In practice, such 
obligation will most likely also be re-emphasized by an explicit obligation 
mentioned in the respective Managing Director’s service agreement or in the 
Company’s By-laws.229  
Next to that, the Duty of Loyalty also requires every Managing Director to 
refrain from any actions that would be a competition to the Company’s business 
activities during the lifetime of the Managing Director’s appointment and for a 
certain timeframe thereafter.230 Here again, the aim is to protect the Company’s 
economic and strategic interests and to install a specific layer of protection 
because of the specific exposure that comes from the fact that the Managing 
                                                     
227 Cf. Ziemons, H. in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 43, margin no. 291 et seq. 
228 Cf. Altmeppen, H. in: Roth/Altmeppen, GmbHG  (2015), § 43, margin no. 25 et 
seq.; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 557 et seq. 
229 Cf. Noack, U. in: Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 35, margin no. 40 et seq.; 
Tebben, J., in: Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 6, margin no. 152 et seq. 
230  Cf. Schneider, U.H. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 2, margin no. 33 
with further references. 
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Director has vast and deep knowledge of all the business activities, strategic 
plans, strengthens and weaknesses of the Company. The fundamental duty not to 
compete with the Company is explicitly laid out in sec. 112 HGB and sec. 88 
AktG, whereas for the GmbH, such duty is interpreted to apply in analogy of 
such provisions in conjunction to the unwritten fundamental Duty of Care.  
As displayed above,231 an explicit non-competition clause is often also 
included in a Managing Directors’ service agreement,232 in order to prevent any 
misunderstandings in that regard and to simplify the enforcement thereof.  
In addition, the Duty of Loyalty of every Managing Director can also lead to 
the requirement to summon and convene a meeting of the shareholders, in case 
strategic or fundamental decisions have to be taken, which go beyond the 
management competencies of the Managing Directors.233  
 
Specific obligations  
Next to the general obligations described above, Corporations also face 
various other specific legal obligations, which might arise and apply either by the 
nature of the specific business and actions the Corporation conducts or because of 
the nature of the Corporation as being a separate legal entity. Even though most 
of those legal obligations name the Corporation as their addressee and obligated 
party, this means de facto that it is the individual Managing Directors, who bear 
the burden of such obligations, as they are the Corporation’s organ for any 
activities and representation.  
Attached to the business and activities of a Corporation are often duties that 
aim to protect the interests and rights of third parties or specific goods of 
particular relevance, such as for example the protection of nature and 
environment against emmissions or pollutions caused by certain methods of 
industrial production, threats to the health and safety of the Corporation’s 
employees or contract partners or tax and accounting laws, which ensure the 
financial compliance of the Corporation.  
                                                     
231 See above, Chapter 3.2.2.2.  
232 Cf. Michalski, GmbHG (2017), § 6, margin no. 152 et seq. 
233 According to sec. 49 para. 2 GmbHG; cf. Liebscher, T. in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), 
§ 49, margin no. 43 et seq. 
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As a matter of fact, the Managing Director must not necessarily know all 
those specific obligations himself, but again, he is responsible to set up and 
maintain an organisational structure in the Corporation, which ensures constant 
and complete awareness and compliance with all such obligations.  
 
Legal consequences of a violation of existing duties 
In case of any violation of the existing duties and obligations of the 
Company, the Managing Directors bear the legal responsibility. For the GmbH, 
this is mainly stated in sec. 43 para. 2 and para. 3 GmbHG – the Managing 
Directors are liable for any damages they cause towards the Company. This 
applies without limitation and as a joint liability of all Managing Directors, in case 
there is more than one.  
The conceptual design of sec. 43 para. 2 GmbHG leads to a right for the 
Company to claim any damages it might have suffered from its own Managing 
Directors.234 A direct claim of any external third party cannot be legally based on 
this norm, but exists only in case of separate specific legal provisions,235 arising for 
example out of the general civil law provisions such as sec. 823 para. 1 German 
Civil Code or others.  
The scope of sec. 43 para. 2 GmbHG is generally unlimited. This means that 
there is no statutory maximum amount up to which the Managing Director(s) 
could be held liable or else, unless such is explicitly agreed upon in the Articles of 
Association or in the service agreement between the Company and the Managing 
Director.236 Whatever damages are proven to exist, the Managing Director(s) will 
have to compensate for, with their own private equity.  
Moreover, the non-compliance of existing legal obligations of the Company 
– and thereby its Managing Directors – can also trigger not only civil law liability 
                                                     
234 Cf. Fleischer, H. in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 43, margin no. 214 et seq.; 
Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 362 et seq.; Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 29 et seq.; 
Schneider, U.H. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 2, margin no. 6 et seq.;   
235 Cf. Raiser/Veil S. 562; Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 93 et seq. with further 
references. 
236 Cf. Schneider, U.H. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 2, margin no. 50 et 
seq. with further references.  
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to financially compensate for damages, but can also result in criminal law 
consequences for the individual Managing Director.  
One category of specific importance in that regard is the liability for 
“organisational failure” (Organisationsversagen),237 which has been developed by 
courts over the years to capture and legally reason liability of Managing Directors 
in case the internal compliance organisation and structures, which they were 
obliged to install, did fail to work successfully. This consequence, threat, brings 
an immediate urge and personal interest for the Managing Directors to ensure 
that their Compliance organisation is working most effectively.  
As a result of the above description, analysis can be made that Managing 
Directors are, in contrast to the shareholders, exposed to the risk of unlimited 
liability for misconduct and non-conformance to existing legal obligations of the 
Corporation. The “corporate veil”, which does exist as a protective shield for the 
shareholders and keeps their liability fenced into the scope of their respective 
investment in the Corporation, does not grant any positive effects for the 
Managing Directors.  
Therefore, their motivation to keep the Corporation in compliance with 
existing legal requirements and obligations in all aspects of daily business, 
organisational measures as well as extraordinary projects, such as Corporate 
Transactions and other instruments of Mergers & Acquisitions is much more 
direct and apparent than for the shareholders.  
 
Rights of the Managing Directors 
As the natural opposite to the extensive duties and liability threat of the 
Managing Directors, each of them does also have defined rights, which is may 
always rely on and enforce, in case other Company organs challenge those.  
The most fundamental right of each Managing Director is the right to fully 
manage the Company’s business activities, free from any illegal interference from 
                                                     
237 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 562 et seq. with further references.  
97 
 
THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-BORDER 
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
the shareholders, the Company’s employees or any other stakeholders.238 As 
being the central organ to take actions and decisions for the Company in the fields 
of its daily business activities in the scope of the Company’s Object, as defined in 
the Articles of Association, the Managing Directors are also the sole organ that is 
fully entitled to represent the Corporation to the outside world for any such daily 
business dealings.239 There is no legal possibility for the shareholders to limit this 
right of representation vis-á-vis third parties, according to sec. 36 and sec. 37 para. 
2 GmbHG.  
However, the logic of clear allocation of responsibilities between the 
different organs of a Corporation brings along the factual limitation of the 
Managing Directors’ rights by the nature of the sphere of sole rights of the 
shareholders: The Managing Directors’ rights and competency ends, where those 
of the shareholders begin. Therefore, any changes or amendments to the Articles 
of Association, the appointment and/or removal of other Managing Directors or 
most fundamental decisions on the direction and strategy of the Corporation are 
not within the catalogue of rights for the Managing Directors. Their level playing 
field is the day-to-day business activities and the representation of the Company 
in business related means.  
Looking more specifically to this field of daily business activities, the 
Managing Directors are to be seen as the instance that takes decisions. Even 
though the Company’s Object as defined in the Articles of Association might set 
out the general guidance to that, there is only little framing and instructions to the 
specific execution of this right in the circumstances of daily business.  
Is one specific contract with a customer benefitial for the Company? Is a 
specific price offered by a vendor for a needed raw material appropriate and 
should be paid by the Company? All those daily descisions have to be taken, in 
the absence of specific instructions that might serve as guidelines to the Managers 
who have to take them. Here, the above-mentioned “Business Judgement Rule” 
comes into play again:  
                                                     
238 Cf. Grunewald, B. (2014), p. 359 et seq.;  Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 534 et seq. & p. 
538 et seq.; Stephan, K.-D., Tieves, J. in: MüKo GmbHG (2016), § 35, margin no. 79 
et seq. with further references.  
239 Cf. Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2011), p. 363; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 538. 
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A Managing Director is entitled to take a risk for the Company, to make a 
decision that could also turn out to be a disadvantage for the Company. It is the 
Managing Director’s right to take risky decisions without the threat of personal 
liability. As described above, the key lies within the proper information basis and 
objective consideration of facts, the weighing of pros and cons.  
The Managing Director’s right to manage the Corporation also includes, as 
often called the “Business Judgement Rule”240, the freedom to take certain 
commercial risks for the Company, as long as such decision is taken on a robust 
information fundament, as described in more detail above.  
 
3.2.4.2. Aktiengesellschaft 
In the light of the Case Studies to be described and analysed further down 
in this work, also the second form of Corporations under German law is of 
interest. Whereas the description of structure, legal framework and specific rights 
and duties of the organs of the GmbH was conducted to achieve a comprehensive 
understanding of German corporate law in general, the specific insight into the 
rights and duties of Managing Directors (Vorstände) of the Aktiengesellschaft now 
concentrates on those elements, which differ from or add to the legal setup of the 
GmbH.  
 
Duties 
The duties of Managing Directors of an Aktiengesellschaft generally 
include  
(1) the duty to execute and foster the Corporation’s business purpose 
(duty of care), 
(2) the duty to ensure the Corporation’s compliance with existing 
laws, contractual obligations and the means set out in the Articles 
of Association (duty of legality), 
(3) the duty to always act I n loyality towards the Corporation (duty of 
loyality) and 
                                                     
240 See above in this Chapter 3.2.4.1.  
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(4) the duty to always cooperate with any other Managing Director of 
the Corporation for the Corporation’s well-being.241 
 
The Corporations business activities are conducted by the Managing 
Directors in their full and own responsibility and again, shaped and structurally 
depicted by the Business Judgment Rule.242  
The duty of legality in particular also includes the compliance with any 
specific legal obligations which apply for the Corporation or more specifically for 
the Managing Directors as direct addresses of the norm, such as in sec. 92 AktG.  
Attention is hereby drawn to the fact that it must not necessarily be a 
“corporate law” provision, which includes a specific obligation for the 
Corporation and/or its management, but can also be part of any other existing 
legal code, such as for example sec. 15a para. 1 sent. 1 InsO. This specific norm 
from the German Insolvency Code does set out an explicit obligation for the 
Managing Directors to apply for insolvency of the corporation without undue 
delay, in case the corporation is illiquid or overindebted.243  
 
                                                     
241 Cf. Fleischer, H. in: Fleischer, Vorstandsrecht (2006), § 8 with further references; 
Mertens, H.-J., Cahn, A. in: Kölner Kommentar AktG (2004-2017), § 76, margin no. 
4 et seq.; Raiser/ Veil (2015), p. 149 et seq. & p. 151 et seq. 
242 Cf. Fleischer, H. (2004), p. 1129 et seq.; Fleischer, H. in: Spindler G., Stilz E., 
AktG (2015), § 93, margin no. 59 et seq.; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2018), § 76, margin 
no. 28 et seq. & § 93, margin no. 16 et seq.; Mertens, H.-J., Cahn, A. in: Kölner 
Kommentar AktG (2004-2017), § 76, margin no. 15 et seq.; Fleischer, H. in: 
Spindler G., Stilz E., AktG (2015), § 93, margin no. 59 et seq. with further 
references. 
243 Cf. Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 101 et seq.; Schmittmann, J.M. (2014), p. 607 et 
seq.; such liability is, however, the external element of the corporate duty 
according to sec. 64 sent. 3 GmbHG and sec. 92 para. 2 sent. 3 AktG, cf. thereto 
Schmittmann, J.M. (2018), p. 75 et seq. with further references, and such liability is 
also complementary to a potential liability of external advisors in the light of the 
factual insolvency of the Corporation – cf. Schmittmann, J.M. (2004), p. 308 et seq.; 
Schmittmann, J.M. (2014), p. 536 et seq. with further references.  
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Rights 
Whereas the Managing Directors’ duties set the stage for specific actions, 
which are required to be taken or intentional omissions, their rights define the 
scope of their options and possibilities, again also in distinction and separation 
from the other organs of the Corporation, such being the Shareholders’ Meeting 
and the Supervisory Board.   
Especially with a view to decision-making in connection with Corporate 
Transactions, this distinction and the rights of the Managing Directors plays a 
critical role – how far can the Management go without interfering into the sphere 
of strategic decision-making, for which only the shareholders hold the central 
competence? This is one of the more specific questions to be answered later and 
analysed in the Case Studies, but to do so, first a basic understanding of the setup 
and structure of the Managing Directors’ rights is required.  
A view into this basic setup and structure reveals similarities to the rights 
and competencies of Managing Directors of a GmbH:  
The Managing Directors have the right to independently conduct the 
Company’s business activities,244 meaning to enter into agreements, source and 
sell products, create an internal organisational structure, employ staff and give 
specific instructions to those, in order to execute the business. Bound solely by the 
Company’s object and their general duties as depicted above, the Company’s 
daily business execution is the main reach of play for the Managing Directors.   
Moreover, the Managing Directors are also entitled to receive any 
information and to gather insight into any of the Company’s books and records, if 
and as they deem appropriate in order to conduct their managerial 
responsibilities.  
  
                                                     
244 Cf. Dauner-Lieb, B. in: Henssler, M., Strohn, L. (2016), AktG § 76, margin no. 3 
et seq.; Hüffer, U., Koch, J. (2018), § 76, margin no. 8 et seq. with further 
references; Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 144; Mertens, H.-J., Cahn, A. in: Kölner 
Kommentar AktG (2004-2017), § 76, margin no. 81 et seq.; Vedder, E. in: Grigoleit, 
AktG (2013), § 76, margin no. 8 et seq. with further references.  
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3.2.4.3. UK Limited 
The duties and rights of Managing Directors in the UK Limited are, similar 
to the German law corporations, determined from two angles: First, the 
applicable laws regulate certain duties and rights for the Limited’s 
management,245 and secondly, also the Company’s Statutes contain a variety of 
duties and rights, which are to some extend even flexible to be individualized by 
the shareholders’ meeting.246  
 
Duties 
Besides the catalogue of specific duties and responsibilities of the 
Company’s Managing Directors, statutory UK laws also provide for more general 
requirements and expectations towards the behaviour of a Company’s Managing 
Director.  
These are as follows:247  
(1) to promote the success of the Company for the benefit of its members, 
(2) to always exercise an independent objective judgement, 
(3) to always exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence,  
(4) to avoid conflicts of interest,  
(5) to disclose any personal interest in transactions involving the Company,  
(6) not to accept any benefits from third parties, and 
                                                     
245 Cf. Just, C. (2006), p. 25 et seq.; Kadel, J. (2006), p. 102 et seq. with further 
references; Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 51 et seq. with further 
references. 
246 Cf. Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, 
M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 29 et seq. with further references. 
247 Cf. Just, C. (2006), p. 25 et seq.; Kadel, J. (2006), p. 102 et seq.; Rothenburg, V., 
Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, M., (2018), Vereinigtes 
Königreich, margin no. 51 et seq. & margin no. 68 et seq. with further references. 
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(7) to always act in accordance with the Company’s constitution and to use 
their Managing Directors’ powers only for the purposes for which they 
were conferred.  
 
The last obligation mentioned above interconnects the statutory duties with 
the duties arising out of the Company’s Articles of Association and thereby 
elevate them to the same level of authority than any explicit statutory obligation.  
The more specific duties and responsibilities of the Managing Directors 
largely depend on the business activities and customer sectors, in which the 
Company is engaged in. Whereas, for example, the duties for Managing Directors 
in industrial companies would include also specific requirements regarding 
Environmental laws, workers’ health and safety and requirements as to the 
technical standards of the manufacturing assets, the duties for Managing 
Directors of banking or finance institutions will be more centered around the 
requirements as to the institutions’ net equity base, stability and security of the 
Company’s IT infrastructure and requirements as to the privacy of any personal 
data collected, used and/or processed.  
However, some specific legal obligations will be applicable for any 
Managing Director of a Company, such as for example to ensure that the 
Company does pay its taxes and file its annual financial accounts timely and 
correctly.  
 
Rights 
The Managing Directors of a UK Limited, again similar to other Corporate 
forms based on European jurisdictions, are mainly a manifestation of the 
Managing Directors’ general function in the interplay between the different 
corporate organs: The Managing Directors have the right to conduct the 
Company’s business and to take all decisions thereto related without interference 
from outside.248  
 
                                                     
248 Cf. Rothenburg, V., Walter, M., Platts, T. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., Barth, 
M., (2018), Vereinigtes Königreich, margin no. 51 et seq. with further references. 
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3.2.4.4. Spanish corporations 
Spanish Corporate law sets out different standards for the two Corporate 
forms, the Sociedad Limitada (S.L.) and the Sociedad Anónima (S.A.):  
Whereas the shareholders of a S.L. can decide and subsequently resolve in 
the Company’s Articles of Association, to establish  
(1) only one sole Managing Director or  
(2) several Managing Directors or a  
(3) Board of Directors.249 
 
The S.A. is always incorporated with a Board of Directors, always in the 
form of a one-tier Board system, meaning that the Board consists of managers 
only, who all have executive powers and duties  but can be Company-internal or 
external individuals, and no supervisory obligation, as it would be the case in a 
two-tier Board system.250  
Irrespective of those structural differences, the obligations and rights 
existing for Managing Directors are similar for S.L. and S.A. The only variance 
can be the allocation of specific responsibilities in case of the existence of several 
Managing Directors or a Board of Directors.  
 
Duties 
Again, the obligations of the Managing Directors in S.L. and S.A. arise from 
two sources: Obligations based on the Company’s Articles of Association and 
obligations based on specific regulations that require the Company and/or its 
                                                     
249 With a minimum of three and maximum number of twelve members to the 
Board; cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, 
A., Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 40 et seq. with further references.  
250 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 155 et seq. with further references.  
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Managing Directors to certain acts or omissions. Some of the most fundamental 
and important obligations are:251  
(1) to always conduct any actions and tasks for the Company with the 
diligence of a prudent businessman,  
(2) to always be sufficiently well-informed about the current status and 
activities of the Company,  
(3) to always clearly differentiate between the professional sphere of their 
actions for the Company and their private sphere of actions in personal 
interest,  
(4) to always inform about any direct or indirect conflict between personal 
interests of the respective Managing Director and the interests of the 
Company,  
(5) to always keep all information and data concerning the Company in strict 
secrecy, unless such information is meant to be disclosed to the public or 
required for disclosure by law,  
(6) not to compete with the Company and/or engage in business activities, 
which would be competing with the Company, unless such is explicitly 
authorized,  
(7) to always act in true loyalty towards the Company and in the Company’s 
best interest and in compliance with all requirements set out in the 
Companies Articles of Association.  
The last point mentioned does constitute the bridge towards the set of 
specific obligations for the Managing Directors, which might be set in the 
Company’s Articles of Association and which thereby receive the same binding 
character as any statutory legal duty.  
  
                                                     
251 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 40 et seq. & margin no. 155 et seq. with 
further references.  
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Rights  
Again, as a flipside to the existing duties, the Managing Directors of 
Spanish Corporations also possess certain rights. Those are mainly designed to 
enable and protect the constitutional function which they have: The Managing 
Directors have the right to conduct the Company’s business activities without 
illegal interference from other organs.252  
Within the daily execution of this right, this entails many facets and specific 
factors, such as, for example, the right to be always informed about all relevant 
facts and developments within the Company, but also the right to change the 
organisational structure of the Company, if such is deemed to be necessary or 
helpful by the Managing Directors to foster the Company’s business goals and/or 
to install and maintain an effective Compliance and reporting structure.  
As a matter of fact, the question of the definition and scope of the Managing 
Director’s right to conduct the day-to-day business activities of the Company is 
often a field for discussion and dispute. Is a decision taken still within the scope 
of normal business operations or is it an extraordinary decision of strategic 
importance? Such question might not always be easy to be answered and is 
therefore then subject to a specific judicial interpretation and decision on a case-
by-case basis.  
 
 
 
  
                                                     
252 Cf. Fischer, K.C., Grupp, M., Baumeister, B.M. in: Wegen, G., Spahlinger, A., 
Barth, M., (2018), Spanien, margin no. 40 et seq. & margin no. 155 et seq. with 
further references.  
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3.3. GENERAL FACTS ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
In general, the well-established buzzword „Mergers & Acquisitions“ is in 
itself misleading with regard to the field of action that it aims to describe. As the 
pure wording tells, this term describes two possible ways of transactions of 
companies: The merger of one company into another company and also the 
acquisition of a company or certain assets by another company. Nevertheless, this 
term is often used, inside and outside the legal or economic expert communities, 
in order to describe the more general fields of company transactions, share 
transfers and takeovers of one legal entity by another.253  
However, when looking at the mere wording first, there are two general 
categories of corporate measures described, which shall now be highlighted in 
more detail:  
 
Mergers (of one company into another company) 
One possibility to change a company’s constitutional character and/or to 
transfer its shares from one shareholder to another is the so-called merger of one 
legal entity into another legal entity. European corporate laws provide for various 
different possibilities in this context, such as for example:  
(1) Merger by way of absorption (Verschmelzung im Wege der Aufnahme),254  
(2) Merger by way of foundation of a new legal entity (Verschmelzung im Wege 
der Neugründung),255 and 
                                                     
253 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.; Picot, G. in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch 
GmbH-Recht (2014), § 21, margin no. 1 et seq.; Richardt, W. in: 
Hauschild/Kallrath/Wachter, Notar-Handbuch (2017), part 2, § 3.V.4 with further 
references; Schiessl, A. in: Beck’sches M&A-Handbuch (2017), § 1 with further 
references.  
254 According to sec. 2 para. 1 UmwG; cf. Stengel, A. in: Semler/Stengel, 
Umwandlungsgesetz (2017), § 2, margin no. 23 et seq. with further references.  
255 According to sec. 2 para. 2 UmwG; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 825; Stengel, A. in: 
Semler/Stengel, Umwandlungsgesetz (2017), § 2, margin no. 28 et seq. with 
further references. 
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(3) Merger by way of a spin-off (also called de-merger) of certain parts of a 
legal entity (Abspaltung)256.  
 
In comparison to the fields of share acquisitions, the different types of 
mergers are widely regulated and described by European legislation by now.257 In 
Germany, the German Transformation Act (Umwandlungsgesetz – UmwG) displays 
and describes chapter by chapter the different forms of a merger and sets out 
certain formal and factual requirements for the participating legal entities, also 
legally applicable and incorporated into local laws in Spain and in the United 
Kingdom.258  
The common legal construction, which is underlying all types of merger is 
the transfer of certain assets from one legal entity into the property and corporate 
body of another legal entity, may such be a long-existing entity, or a newly 
established one.  
The assets are assumed by the absorbing legal entity and thereby become a 
part of its own assets, books, financial and factual properties.259 For Corporations, 
this also has an implication on the public existence and registration of the 
transferring legal entity.  
In case of a merger of all assets of one legal entity, such will cease to exist as 
legally independent entity, but will be absorbed by the assuming entity. The 
commercial register will take a final note of this merger and will then hold public 
the files of the company only as being an inactive, terminated one, no longer 
actively existing. The legal body of the transferring entity ceases to exist, its 
shareholders cease to be shareholders, as there are no shares anymore and its 
organs cease to be active, as there is no corporate body to constitute and represent 
any longer.  
                                                     
256 According to sec. 126 et seq. UmwG; cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 825 et seq.; 
Schröer, H. in: Semler/Stengel, Umwandlungsgesetz (2017), § 126, margin no. 1 et 
seq. with further references. 
257 Cf. Behme, C. (2018), p. 32 et seq. with further references.  
258 European Merger Directive, no. 2009/133/EU, available via: www.eur-
lex.europa.eu. 
259 Cf. Raiser/Veil (2015), p. 825 with further references.  
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In practice, the corporate instruments offered by the European 
transformation laws are often used as a restructuring tool, for example within 
company groups or in the course of other corporate transactions, in order to 
“clean up” group entity structures afterwards.  
Company mergers can be either described as “downstream” or “upstream” 
on the one hand or “side-ways” on the other hand. Within a multi-level group of 
companies, all such ways are permitted: the merger of a subsidiary into its 
shareholding company is permitted (“upstream”)260 as well as the merger of a 
shareholder into (one of its) subsidiary companies (“downstream”)261, or the 
merger of two sibling-companies.262  
The legal construction and consequences of such measures remain similar, 
irrespective of the “direction” of a merger within a group.263 
 
Acquisitions (of one company by another company)  
The alternative way of modifying a legal entity’s strategic positioning and 
its financial and legal status vis-á-vis other legal entities is an acquisition, i.e. a 
purchase. This can be conducted either by way of a purchase of certain defined 
assets, which are owned (and then transferred) by a legal entity (Asset Deal) or by 
way of a purchase of certain shares in the company from its owners (Share Deal).  
For both alternatives, the basic scenario is the same: As for all situations, in 
which something, which is a definable piece, may it be tangible or intangible, and 
which is associated with a certain economic/financial value, is transferred from 
somebody to somebody else, subject to the transfer of a defined counter-
                                                     
260 Cf. Jäckle, C., Strehle, E.P., Claus, A. in: Beck’sches M&A-Handbuch (2017), 
Chapter 10, § 51, margin no. 94 et seq; Schröer, H. in: Semler/Stengel, 
Umwandlungsgesetz (2017), § 5, margin no. 128 et seq. 
261 Cf. Sagasser, B., Luke, A. in: Sagasser/Bula/Brünger, Umwandlungen (2017); 
part 3, § 9, margin no. 347 et seq.; Schröer, H. in: Semler/Stengel, 
Umwandlungsgesetz (2017), § 5, margin no. 134 et seq. 
262 Cf. Sagasser, B., Luke, A. in: Sagasser/Bula/Brünger, Umwandlungen (2017); 
part 3, § 9, margin no. 352 et seq. 
263 Cf. Sagasser, B., Luke, A. in: Sagasser/Bula/Brünger, Umwandlungen (2017); 
part 3, § 9, margin no. 334 et seq. 
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performance, there are at least three (3) parties involved – a seller, a purchaser 
and a target, which is being transferred.  
 
Figure 3: Overview of the Acquisition Triangle 
 
 
 
 
In addition, there is an altnerative to the conduct of an acquisition for 
certain scenarios: In particular in situations, where two or more companies seek 
for collaboration in certain dedicated fields of their activities only and not for a 
full acquisition and integration into one another, the foundation of a Joint Venture 
can be an alternative worth considering, instead of a merger or an acquisition 
between those companies. The most common approach in such scenarios is to set 
up a new legal entity for the joint adventure that the partners intend to make 
reality. The shares in the Joint Venture company will be held by the Joint Venture 
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partners, proportionate to the scope of their individual participation in the 
collaboration.264  
As being a separate legal entity, the Joint Venture company will be 
established according to basic corporate law principles, including the necessity to 
set up Articles of Association, to implement a management organ and all other 
mandatory requirements for the specific type of corporation, which the Joint 
Venture partners have chosen for.  
Next to the Articles of Association, the Joint Venture partners will most 
likely also establish an additional contractual connection between each other – the 
Joint Venture Agreement. This contract is made to rule out and define the basic 
principles of the planned collaboration, decision and collaboration mechanisms, 
as well as all other principles and goals, which the Joint Venture partners wish to 
agree upon.265 In practice, the discussions and negotiations regarding the Joint 
Venture Agreement are often the most crucial element during the foundation and 
realisation of a Joint Venture. In this context, the reaching of a consensus on basic 
mechanisms for a potential future exit from the Joint Venture should not be 
underestimated.266 
Of course, Joint Ventures are not a fixed legal category of cooperations 
between legal entities. The word stands as a synonym for an open type of 
contractual connection and factual purpose of certain companies. Based on the 
basic principle of contractual freedom, the Joint Venture parties are free to agree 
upon any possible and legal way of collaboration – but once they decide to 
conduct this collaboration in the way of a separate, dedicated legal entity, such 
                                                     
264 Cf. Goethel, S.R. (2014), 1475; Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Joint Venture“; Wirbel, 
B. in: Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts (2014), vol. 1, § 28, margin 
no. 1 et seq. with further references.  
265 Cf. Thurn, O., Ziegenhain, H-J. in: Beck’sches Formularbuch Ziv-, Wirt- und 
UnternehmensR (2018), N.5; Wirbel, B. in: Münchener Handbuch des 
Gesellschaftsrechts (2014), vol. 1, § 28, margin no. 27 et seq. with further 
references. 
266 Cf. Giesen, H.-M. in: Beck’sches Formularbuch M&A (2018), G.I. with further 
references; Goethel, S.R. (2014), 1475 et seq.; Willms, N., Bicker, E. (2014), p. 1337 
et seq. 
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legal entity is bound to the basic corporate law requirements, according to its 
legal type (GmbH, Limited, or else).  
The foundation of a Joint Venture can be a suitable option for partners, who 
wish to collaborate without a direct ownership connection between each other or 
for defined fields of activities only – a common example for this are Joint 
Ventures, which are set up in order to pool resources and expertise in the fields of 
Research & Development of two or more companies.267  
Away from the particularities of Joint Ventures, also the different ways of 
corporate acquisitions leave room for various ways and forms of acquisitions, 
depending on the nature and amount of assets or shares transferred, the 
constitutional (voting) rights associated therewith, as well as on the nature of 
future contractual cooperation between the acquisition partners.  
National and European corporate and takeover laws set the scenes for these 
different ways of acquisitions.  
 
  
                                                     
267 Cf. Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Joint Venture“; Wirbel, B. in: Münchener 
Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts (2014), vol. 1, § 28, margin no. 1 et seq. 
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3.3.1. Types of corporate transactions 
As briefly mentioned above, Corporate Transactions can be conducted in 
different forms. Once the decision to conduct an acquisition, either as Seller or 
Buyer, is taken, the next logical question is always: What exactly shall be 
purchased or sold?  Are there only certain assets, which the Seller wishes to place 
on the market and sell for a good price, or is it the entirety of a Company, which 
shall be sold as Target of the Corporate Transaction?  
In case the Seller and Purchaser decide to transfer only certain dedicated 
assets by way of a sale, this procedure is described as an “Asset Deal”. The 
agreement about and contractual description of the particular assets to be 
transferred is of crucial importance, because the basic regulations of national sales 
laws, which apply to such a construction, require a clear and affirmative 
description of the actual object of the sales agreement.268 Particularities in Asset 
Deal scenarios can arise due to the nature of the assets to be transferred, if such, 
for example cannot be freely transferred, but require a certain formal transfer 
process.  
One of the most prominent examples is the transfer of real property, which 
cannot be done by way of a private contract, but is required to be notarized by a 
notary public and registered with the competent land register.269  
In case the Purchaser is interested in the acquisition of more than only 
certain defined assets, but wishes instead to get hold of the entire legal entity, 
which the Seller holds shares in, then the transaction would be named to be a 
“Share Deal”. Here, not specific assets, such as machinery, contracts, patents or 
other is transferred, but it is solely the shares in a (target) Company, which are 
subject to the sale.  
                                                     
268 Such legal requirement to identify and describe the contractual objects in a way 
that is adequately certain and clear (so-called principle of legal certainty – 
Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz) in derived in German Civil law based on the general 
clause of sec. 214 para. 1 BGB – cf. Bachmann, G. in: MüKo BGB (2016), § 241, 
margin no. 12 et seq.; Krebs, D. in: Dauner-Lieb, B., Langen, W. (2016); § 241, 
margin no. 8. 
269 According to sec. 311 b para. 1 BGB. 
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As mentioned previously, certain formal requirements have to be fulfilled 
in order to conduct a transfer of shares in a Corporation, most specificially, the 
purchase contract requires to be notarized.270  
  
                                                     
270 According to sec. 15 para. 3 GmbHG.  
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3.3.2. Transaction project steps and timelines 
Although the individual structure of each Corporate Transaction might 
vary from other transactions, there are certain key elements and steps in the 
“lifecycle” of an Acquisition, which allow a categorization on a general 
descriptive level.  
 
Figure 4: Project Steps of a Corporate Transaction 
 
 
 
3.3.2.1. Finding phase – the Parties define their intentions  
As mentioned above271, a transaction always requires the existence of at 
least three participants: Seller, Purchaser and a Target Company272 or a respective 
                                                     
271 See above, Chapter. 2.3.  
272 At least in case of a Share Deal, where the Target is a company, or a certain 
share participation therein and not only mere assets to be transferred.   
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agglomeration of Target Assets273. And even before those three participants 
require finding and contacting each other, the existence of their intention to 
conduct a transaction is the most basic precondition for any kind of corporate 
transaction.  
 
The intention to sell and the Vendor Due Diligence 
One company may develop the intention to sell certain shares or assets it 
owns. The reason for this might be either strategic or purely monetary – a certain 
current investment might no longer fit into a company’s general business strategy 
or might be an adequate way to gain liquidity by selling such assets. An example 
for a strategic intention to sell is the sale of the shares in a subsidiary, which, due 
to changes in the market environment, does no longer fit into the asset and 
business portfolio of a company and the company might therefore decide to 
divest from this business adventure by way of selling its shares in the respective 
subsidiary to a third party.274  
An example for a purely monetary intention might be the sale of certain 
assets, for example of manufacturing equipment, which a company decides to do 
in order to generate cash income in order to be able to purchase other, new or 
different pieces of equipment or to pay back its debts to its creditors. There are, of 
course, countless other examples and for some of those, the underlying intention 
to sell something (assets or shares) might also be complex and serve multiple 
purposes at the same time. Nevertheless, the intention to sell something is always 
the necessary precondition for entering into a transactional scenario.  
This also includes that the seller has defined the particular “something” that 
he intends to sell and has made some first basic investigations and assumptions 
already. In the reality of many corporations, such definition of a potential “target” 
requires a rather extensive internal review and analysis. In case this process is 
                                                     
273 Such a transfer of tangible or intangible assets would qualify as an Asset Deal.   
274 Prominent examples for such strategic divestitures are, amongst others, 
Siemens AG‘s divestiture from Osram and Bayer AG’s divestiture from Lanxess 
AG and Covestro AG – all such cases resulted in IPOs, in which the former sole 
shareholder sold certain parts of its majority in the subsidiaries shares.  
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conducted in a concerted and organized way, it is often described as a so-called 
“Vendor Due Diligence”275.  
In particular, in case a company or certain shares in a company shall be 
sold, the Seller will need to develop a clear knowledge of the shares, their 
financial value and the factual steps that would need to be taken in order to sell 
those to a third party. Especially in case the Target Company is part of a company 
group structure, the Seller is well-advised to consider the impact and necessary 
preparatory steps of the sale prior to its execution.  
 
The intention to buy and the finding phase on the purchaser’s side  
Looking more closely to the second active participant in a transactional 
scenario – the Buyer – one might easily spot that the intention to acquire certain 
assets or shares might be driven by various different circumstances: The Buyer 
might be searching for a potential target to be acquired for strategic reasons or the 
Buyer might discover the opportunity to invest incidental, without actively 
searching for it.  
In case of a strategic search for potential acquisition targets, the Buyer might 
be driven by the intention to broaden the geographical scope of its business 
activities, by the wish to secure further know-how or developments, which the 
Target Company owns, or even by the idea to endeavour business segments and 
market fields, which have not been yet within the Buyer’s radius of activities.276 In 
such situations, the Buyer might rely on external advisors or business facilitators 
or brokers in order to define and locate a suitable investment target.277 
                                                     
275 Cf. Beisel, W. in: Beisel/Klumpp, Unternehmenskauf (2016); § 2 margin no. 6 et 
seq.; Elfring, C. (2007), p. 3 et seq.; Pfeiffer, G., Timmerbeil, S. in: Herrler, 
Gesellschaftsrecht (2017); § 13, margin no. 75 et seq.; Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), 
“Vendor Due Diligence“.  
276 Such would be often described as “Expansion Strategy” or “Diversification” – 
cf. Munkert, M.J. (2008), p. 2501 et seq. with further descriptions of these 
approaches in the context of planning a Corporate Transaction; Seibt, C.H. in: 
Beck’sches Formularbuch M&A (2018), A.I.2. with further references.  
277 Cf. Beisel, W. in: Beisel/Klumpp, Unternehmenskauf (2016), § 1 margin no. 34 et 
seq. 
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Alternatively, the Buyer might also develop the intention to conduct an 
acquisition by accident, by chance, without having strategically planned to 
develop this opportunity. In such situations, outside brokers, advisors or other 
third parties might even function as incubators of the investment intention, if they 
inform the Buyer of an opportunity to invest for the first time and therewith catch 
its interest.  
The Buyer’s general decision to invest will consequentially be connected 
with a general decision on the most basic parameters of such investment: Even 
though the Buyer might not yet have a detailed knowledge of the potential target 
company, it might well know its own needs and financial limits. The reason to do 
an investment necessitates a definition of its most basic characteristics, limits and 
opportunities. 
 
3.3.2.2. First contact  
Once, Seller and Buyer have found each other, may that be by connection 
via a broker or other third party business facilitator or also by way of a direct 
contact based on market connections or previous business relationships, and once 
Seller and Buyer have also indicated each other that they would be generally 
interested to further investigate on the opportunity for a corporate transaction, 
they often aim to express their general intention and their first basic outlines for a 
potential structure of a potential transaction in a legal frame that allows for a 
minimum amount of certainty and significance already. If that is done in written 
form, such an express of a general intention is of called “Letter of Intent” or a 
“Memorandum of Understanding”.278  
Two of the key aspects of a Letter of Intent are often (1) the Buyer’s wish to 
secure exclusivity for a certain time, in order to eliminate potential competing 
                                                     
278 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.; Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017) p. 142 et 
seq.; Schönhaar, T. (2014), p. 273 et seq.; Korch, S. (2018), p. 521 et seq.; Risse, J., 
Kästle, F. (2018), “Letter of Intent”; Seibt, C.H. in: Beck’sches Formularbuch M&A 
(2018), B.VIII. & B.IX.1; regarding the agreement of a break-fee in an LoI: Hilgard, 
M.C. (2008), p. 286 et seq.; v. Hoyenberg, P. in: Münchener Vertragshandbuch 
WirtschaftsR (2015), part I.1 with further references.  
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bids and (2) the Parties view and willingness to agree upon a binding or non-
binding character of the Letter of Intent.  
It depends on the particular wording, if a Party’s expression of general 
intent is to be interpreted as a binding offer to sell or buy, or if such expression is 
made as a general statement only, without binding legal consequences.279 
The Letter of Intent often captures general topics like the following:  
(1) General outline of the envisaged transaction, with regard to participants, 
scope and possible financing structures;280 
(2) Estimated timeframe for the transaction, or even a first suggestion for 
explicit dates for Signing and Closing; 
(3) Explicit confirmation of exclusivity of discussions between Seller and 
Buyer, often linked to a certain defined timeframe or subject to other 
factual requirements.281 
 
As such topics already outline a possible future transaction in a substantial 
way, the therewith related discussion between the Parties can be rather 
controversial and time-consuming already.282   
Moreover, already in this early stage of a possible transaction, both Parties 
have a vital interest to keep all information exchanged, including the general 
expression of their intention to perhaps enter into a corporate transaction, strictly 
confidential to competing market participants, other third parties and also their 
internal stakeholders, such as employees, works council and others.  
In order to achieve an adequate level of reliable confidentiality, Buyer and 
Seller often enter into a written Non-Disclosure Agreement283, signed by 
                                                     
279 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq; Korch, S. (2018), p. 521 et seq. 
280 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq. 
281 Cf. Tophoven. A. (2010), p. 2919 et seq. with further references; v. Hoyenberg, 
P. in: Münchener Vertragshandbuch WirtschaftsR (2015), part I.A.3 with further 
references.  
282 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq. 
283 Cf. Linke, J., Fröhlich, M. (2014), p. 449 et seq.; von Werder, A., Kost, T. (2010), 
p. 2903 et seq. 
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authorized representatives of both parties and valid to cover at least the 
envisaged timeframe in which discussions and negotiations of a potential 
transaction might take place, but often also securing an additional time frame 
thereafter.  
 
3.3.2.3. Proper inspection of the object in question 
Due Diligence, question process and DD reporting 
The potential Buyer will only be in a position to take an appropriate 
investment decision, if a broad information basis is available. The Buyer must 
know in detail, what it is about to consider purchasing. This process of getting to 
know the target is often called “Due Diligence”. 
Depending on the scope and type of transaction, this information 
requirement is as wide-spread or narrow in scope, as the assets which are 
targeted to be purchased – in case of an asset deal of certain very limited assets 
only, similar to any kind of sale and purchase agreement, the potential Buyer will 
want to inspect such assets, will want and need to know their constitution, 
features, age, maintenance status and any legal or factual boundaries that might 
affect its usage. The very same basic rule also applies in case of a share transfer, 
but only shows a larger amount of information and details to be provided.284 
 
Data Room 
It is most common for the Seller to provide any such information, which it 
deems to be relevant in order to achieve a possibly high purchase price and to 
give a comprehensive overview of the acquisition target, in the form of a data 
disclosure, which is often called a “Data Room”.  
                                                     
284 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017), p. 157  et 
seq.; Hölters, W. in: Hölters, AktG (2017), AktG § 93, margin no. 176 et seq.; 
Meurer, T. in: in: Beck’sches M&A-Handbuch (2017), § 5 with further references.  
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Whether such room is a physical place,285 where the Seller locates certain 
hard-copy information and makes it available to the potential Buyer, or whether 
such room is a virtual place, where the information to be provided is stored and 
accessible in electronical form,286 the potential Buyer will always have an interest 
to receive as much information as possible, in order to depict an encompassing 
overview of the key features, information and data. Based on this information, the 
potential Buyer will then be able to assess and evaluate the strategic and factual 
value that the target might have from its point of view and in the light of its 
strategic plans and considerations.  
In case of a Share Deal of an entire company, such information might for 
example include the constitutional and corporate documents of the company, 
including its Articles of Association, shareholders’ resolutions, board minutes, 
correspondence with the commercial register, as well as the Target’s most 
essential commercial sales contracts, agency agreements, service and purchasing 
agreements, as well as information regarding the physical and immaterial assets 
held by the company, such as manufacturing facilities, patents, trademarks, 
inventory and raw material stocks, as well as data regarding the Target’s 
employees, pension obligations, internal financial records, annual accounts, 
current sales and purchasing figures, cash flow projections, profit and loss related 
information, strategic outlook, R&D related information, as well as the Target’s 
internal organisation as to compliance, corporate functions and reporting lines.  
Depending on the amount and available form of the information, the Data 
Room can bei either set up physically or virtually, for example via an internet 
platform.287 Those different options give both parties, Buyer and Seller, also 
                                                     
285 Cf. Hanke, K., Socher, O. (2010), p. 829 et seq.; Seibt, C.H. in: Beck’sches 
Formularbuch M&A (2018), B.VI.1 with templates for Physical Data Room Rules 
and further references. 
286 Cf. Hanke, K., Socher, O. (2010), p. 829 et seq.; Seibt, C.H. in: Beck’sches 
Formularbuch M&A (2018), B.VI.2 with templates for Online Data Room Rules 
and further references. 
287 Cf. Grub, M., Krispenz, S. (2018), p. 235 et seq.; Hanke, K., Socher, O. (2010), p. 
829 et seq.; Seibt, C.H. in: Beck’sches Formularbuch M&A (2018), B.VI.2 with 
templates for Online Data Room Rules and further references. 
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different possibilities to mine the data, to track the other party’s actions and/or to 
streamline the further process of investigations and negotiations.  
The Due Diligence process is often split into different steps and phases of 
the data and document disclosure. Because of the strong interest of the Target and 
the Seller to keep all information provided under strict confidentiality, the seller 
might perhaps only be willing to disclose them, if the likelihood that the 
transaction might be successfully conducted afterwards is considered to be rather 
high. On the other hand, the potential Buyer might only be willing to really 
consider purchasing the Target, if it has gained a sufficiently deep insight into the 
Target’s interna, in order to be able to assess, if it really is an attractive acquisition 
target.  
These antagonistic interests will find their balance in the scope of the 
information provided in the Data Room and requested and disclosed in the 
further ongoing Due Diligence process.  
 
Due Diligence Report 
The potential Buyer will very often have the main workload of reviewing 
and analysing the documents and information provided by a team of external 
advisors, which have expert knowledge in conducting such review and 
assessment processes from the legal and/or financial point of view. The outcome 
of such review, as well as the advice given by the external project counsels on 
potential so-called “findings”288 of the Due Diligence will form the basis for the 
Buyer’s assessment of whether it is generally interested in purchasing the Target 
or not.289 In the latter case, the transaction will come to an end during or right 
after the Due Diligence phase.  
If, however, the Purchaser is interested in the acquisition, then the 
assessment made during the Due Diligence, and most often condensed and 
displayed in a so-called Due Diligence Report290, will form the basis for the 
Purchaser’s discussions and further negotiations with the Seller.  
                                                     
288 Cf. Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017), p. 157; Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq. 
289 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq. 
290 Cf. Andreas, F.E. in: Handbuch Due Diligence (2017), § 10 margin no. 4 et seq.; 
Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Due Diligence Report“. 
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The Due Diligence Report is not a fixed format, but a general description for 
a document that is worded and designed as a resume, assessment and description 
of all information disclosed in the Data Room and during the Due Diligence 
phase, as well as a list of all open issues, unanswered questions or potential 
information gaps, which would be of potential importance for the future steps of 
the transaction process for the Buyer.  
Typical topics covered in a Due Diligence and the thereafter produced Due 
Diligence Report are:  
(1) Commercial Due Diligence,  
(2) Corporate Due Diligence,  
(3) Financial Due Diligence,  
(4) Compliance Due Diligence,  
(5) Tax Due Diligence,  
(6) Environmental Due Diligence, 
just to name a few.291 
 
Due Diligence question process 
In most transactions, the Due Diligence process is not a static process of 
providing one set of information, which is then subject to the inspection by the 
Buyer’s advisors. In most cases, the Seller will set out certain rules and 
regulations for the conduct of the Due Diligence, which the Buyer will most likely 
sign off on – so-called Data Room Rules.292 Amongst other topics, such as a 
confidentiality obligation for the Buyer and all its advisors, rules on the 
availability of documents, restrictions or allowances to technically use them 
(copy, print, etc.), these Data Room Rules might also define a process for the 
Buyer to ask questions or to request additional information.  
                                                     
291 Cf. Beisel, W. in: Handbuch Due Diligence (2017), § 1 margin no. 49 et seq.; 
Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Due Diligence“. 
292 Cf. Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Data Room Rules“; Seibt, C.H. in: Beck’sches 
Formularbuch M&A (2018), B.VI.1 & B.VI.2 with templates for Online Data Room 
Rules and further references. 
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Such information requests are often channelled by the Seller into a certain 
defined format and frame. For example, the Seller might allow the Buyer to raise 
additional questions, but only if such are collected and displayed in a Due 
Diligence Q&A list and submitted to the Buyer once per day or only at the end of 
a defined Data Room opening period.  
There are no mandatory restrictions for this, but reality shows that the 
Buyer might severely streamline the information flow, in case a practical Q&A 
format is defined. Moreover, it is also of crucial importance to monitor and 
restrict the accessibility to the Data Room, in order to serve the Seller’s 
confidentiality needs and to divert all information requests to certain dedicated 
persons within Seller’s or the Target’s own organisation.  
Moreover, most Data Rooms are opened for a fixed period of time only. 
Thus extensions might be granted, this has proven to be an effective way for the 
Seller to shape the transaction timeline and to avoid that the potential Buyer has 
too much time to analyse and reflect upon the data provided in the Data Room. 
On the contrary, the Seller might even request the Buyer to issue an indicative bid 
or estimated purchase price range for the Target shortly after the closure of the 
Data Room, or might as well provide the Buyer with a draft Purchase Agreement 
and a fixed negotiations timeline straightaway.  
In any case, the Due Diligence is the information fundament of every 
transaction. It sets the scene for the detailed discussions of Seller and Purchaser 
and provides a detailed insight into the live and being of the Target – irrespective 
of whether such Target is a company or an agglomeration of assets.  
 
3.3.2.4. Defining parameters – Contract negotiations 
In case the Due Diligence has led to the outcome that the potential 
Purchaser is interested in acquiring the Target, then the Parties might wish to 
start negotiating about a Purchase Agreement, in order to bring this transaction to 
live. The nature and type of the Purchase Agreement is determined by and does 
reflect the overall structure of the envisaged transaction, also coming back to the 
general distinction between an Asset Deal or a Share Deal.  
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One of the Parties, in most cases this is the Seller, as he is also in the driver’s 
seat steering the transaction at its own gusto, will prepare an initial draft of a 
Purchase Agreement regarding the sale and purchase of the Target. This initial 
draft will then form the basis for the discussions and negotiations between the 
Parties. The initial draft should already include all essential provisions, which the 
Seller wishes the Buyer to agree upon. Depending on the Seller’s negotiation 
strategy, he might be also willing to grant a rather balanced set of rights and 
responsibilities to the Buyer.  
However, as a principle embedded in most negotiation strategies, the initial 
drafting in most cases sets the maximum frame for what the party, proposing 
such, can achieve as a compromise and outcome of negotiations.293 
Parties to the Purchase Agreement and participants to the discussions 
thereabout will be the Seller and the Buyer. In most cases, the Target itself is not 
represented in the discussions. Alongside with the Seller and Buyer, potential 
financing parties or guarantors are often involved in the negotiations in an 
indirect way or as a result of specific talks about financing and financial 
securization of the deal. 
The negotiations about a potential transaction are often conducted in a 
hybrid way – partially by way of exchanging written drafts and countering such 
with so-called “mark-ups”, in which the respective other party indicates and 
introduces the changes to the wording, it deems necessary. Such written 
negotiation rounds are often accompanied by oral negotiations, typically in the 
form of face-to-face meetings of the principals or negotiation delegates from each 
Party, as well as their external advisors (legal, tax and/or finance).294   
The final goal of the negotiations between the Parties is to reach an 
agreement on the main commercial and legal parameters of the transaction, which 
will be fixed and described in the Transaction Contracts, mainly consisting of a 
Purchase Agreement – depending on the nature of the transaction, this can be 
                                                     
293 Cf. Bücker, T., Kulenkamp, S. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 29, 
margin no. 94 et seq.; Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.; Kästle, F., Oberbracht, D. 
(2018), A.I.5.c; Korch, S. (2018), p. 521 et seq.; Lips, J. in: Handbuch 
Unternehmenskauf (2013), § 3, margin no. 29 & 54 et seq. 
294 Cf. Lips, J. in: Handbuch Unternehmenskauf (2013), § 3, margin no. 65 et seq. 
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named and shaped either as a Share Purchase Agreement (Share Deal) or as an 
Asset Purchase Agreement (Asset Deal) and exhibit contracts and documents, 
relating thereto.  
The main content of the Purchase Agreement295 will be, for example:  
(1) Description of transaction and assets to be transferred; 
(2) Display of transaction process – obligation of Seller to sell and transfer 
and obligation of Buyer to accept and pay for; 
(3) Purchase Price – amount, financing structure and payment terms; 
(4) Warranties given by the Seller regarding the Target and its legal and 
factual status; 
(5) Warranties given by both Parties as to their legal status and ability to 
conduct the Transaction;  
(6) Conduct of the Target’s business by the Seller between the signing of 
the Purchase Agreement and the factual and legal hand-over of the 
assets; 
(7) Termination rights and rights to withdraw from the Transaction under 
certain defined circumstances;  
(8) Conditions precedent and/or conditions subsequent for the execution of 
the Transaction; 
(9) Scope of liability of Seller  
(10) Scope of indemnity granted by the Parties to each other;  
(11) Governing law of the Transaction; 
(12) As well as any other circumstances or requirements which the Parties 
agree to insert into the Purchase Agreement.  
 
The nature of the Purchase Agreement is to form the extensive and single 
legal basis for the transfer of the shares or assets from the Seller to the Buyer. 
Given this, the agreement needs to contain all information, which is necessary to 
                                                     
295 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.; Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017), p. 186 et 
seq.; Kästle, F., Oberbracht, D. (2018), B.III. et seq. with further references; Korch, 
S. (2018), p. 521 et seq. 
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fully describe the Target, which shall be transferred, as well as the way this 
transfer shall be conducted and the commercial conditions, under which it takes 
place.  
This makes is in most cases necessary to supplement the Purchase 
Agreement with a number of exhibits, such being additional documents that 
contain information which is of essential nature for the validity and 
comprehensiveness of the Purchase Agreement.  
Such exhibits are typically:  
(1) Wholesale and detailed description of the transferring assets or shares; 
(2) Powers of Attorney based on which certain individuals are authorized to 
conduct the transaction; 
(3) Ancillary Agreements between the Parties, for example regarding the 
licensing of certain intellectual property; 
(4) lists with names and details of the employees affected by and involved in 
a transaction; 
(5) as well as any other documents or agreements, which the Parties would 
want to be physically separated from the main body of the Purchase 
Agreement, in order to facilitate its usage or amendment at a later point in 
time.  
 
Moreover, the Due Diligence Report prepared by the Buyer is often 
incorporated as being an integral part of the Purchase Agreement in such a way 
as it describes the disclosed information and knowledge of the Buyer at the time 
of the signing of the Purchase Agreement. Such information is often the basis for 
excluding certain warranties given by the Seller in the sense that the information 
which was already know to the Purchaser at the time of signing, could not form 
the basis of a warranty claim of the Purchaser against the Seller at a later point in 
time.296  
                                                     
296 Cf. Kästle, F., Oberbracht, D. (2018), B.III.7; Lips, J. in: Handbuch 
Unternehmenskauf (2013), § 3, margin no. 185 et seq.; Schmitz, C. (2006), p. 561 et 
seq.; Weißhaupt, F. (2013), p. 783 et seq. 
127 
 
THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-BORDER 
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
The Parties’ negotiations about the terms and conditions worded in the 
Purchase Agreement are likely to consume a rather huge amount of time and 
capacities for Seller and Purchaser. Moreover, the mere fact that Seller and Buyer 
are negotiating a Purchase Agreement does not (yet) have any generally binding 
effect. Still, the negotiations can be terminated by either Party at any point in 
time.  
Such discussions are often conducted at various different levels of 
competence and decision-making-power of both Parties. It will often not be 
directly the principals, the managing directors of the Selling Company and of the 
Purchase Company, who directly negotiate the deal, but it will be most likely 
negotiation delegations from each side. This has a huge advantage with regard to 
the Parties’ agility to negotiate and discuss a potential transaction alongside with 
each their general conduct of its daily business297.  
Moreover, this modus operandi gives the Parties an additional leverage to 
resolve on disputed or even dead-locked situations by way of escalating certain 
questions or discussions up to their respective senior management. From a 
dispute resolution and negotiation standpoint, such an option provides for a 
flexible and effective possibility to conduct and manage contractual negotiations.  
 
3.3.2.5. Executing the agreed 
If and when the Parties have found common grounds regarding all issues, 
which require it to be discussed and agreed and once the drafting of the 
Transaction agreements and ancillary documents is finalized, then the Parties can 
execute the Transaction agreements by signing them. Usually, the date on which 
this “Signing” takes place is agreed between the Parties upfront298 and it often 
                                                     
297 Cf. Imagine the CEO’s of two DAX-listed companies meeting on a daily basis 
for weeks, in order to discuss a possible transaction of one of its subsidiaries and 
draft contracts to execute it – this would strongly limit both Parties’ ability to also 
conduct its daily business decisions and actions in the meantime and the core 
business of the Parties might suffer during these times – cf. Stratz, R.-C., Hettler, 
S. in: Handbuch Unternehmenskauf (2013), § 1, margin no. 25 et seq. 
298 Cf. Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Signing”.  
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serves as a deadline to work against with all necessary discussions and drafting 
work. Here again, the external counsels, especially the external M&A lawyers, 
often play an important role in preparing all the paperwork that requires to be set 
up and ready from a legal point of view.299  
For Transactions, which are conducted under German law, the Signing date 
will be the time at which the contractual obligation (schuldrechtliche 
Übertragung300) of the Target from the Seller to the Buyer takes place by way of 
signing the Purchase Agreement.  
From that moment on, the Buyer has the right to claim also the factual 
hand-over (dingliche Übertragung301) of the Target, which is, however, from a 
German law point of view, a different legal step. Such latter step is usually called 
the “Closing” of the Transaction,302 meaning that all necessary actions and 
handover steps are then finally closed. The ownership of the Target will transfer 
at Closing.303  Consequentially, also the purchase price is usually paid upon 
Closing only.  
In case the transfer of the Target Company or the Targeted Assets can be 
done immediately and without any interim steps, then Signing and Closing can 
take place at the same time. This structure would be also equivalent to any 
purchases of goods in daily life – the contractual obligation to transfer a certain 
good and the execution of this obligation fall into the very same “legal second”.  
There might be certain formal requirements or other interim or preparation 
steps necessary, in order to execute the transfer, even though the contractual 
obligation to do so has already been created by way of the signing of the 
transaction agreements.  
                                                     
299 Cf. Stratz, R.-C., Hettler, S. in: Handbuch Unternehmenskauf (2013), § 1, 
margin no. 25 et seq. 
300 Cf. Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017), p. 286 et seq.; Kleinheisterkamp, T., 
Schell, M. (2010), p. 833 et seq.; Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Signing”. 
301 Cf. Jacques, H.  in: Handbuch Unternehmenskauf Mittelstand (2017), D.VIII.3, 
margin no. 175 et seq. & D.VIII.3 margin no. 200 et seq. with further references.  
302 Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Closing”. 
303 Cf. Jacques, H.  in: Handbuch Unternehmenskauf Mittelstand (2017), D.VIII.3, 
margin no. 175 et seq. & D.VIII.3 margin no. 200 et seq. with further references. 
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Signing 
Depending on the complexity and structure of the Transaction, the Signing 
of the transaction documents might be either a short signing exercise or a time-
consuming multi-step requirement for both Parties and their external advisors.  
In case the Transaction is structured as a Share Deal, certain basic formal 
requirements are to be complied with – which also need proper preparation and 
consideration of the Parties upfront. For example, the transfer of shares in a 
German Limited Liability Company (GmbH) cannot be legally conducted by way 
of a plain purchase agreement, but requires a notarized share transfer agreement, 
according to sec. 15 para. 3 GmbHG.304  
A similar requirement is of relevance in case the Transaction includes the transfer 
of real estate located in Germany: According to sec. 311b BGB, such transfer can 
only be executed in a notarized form. As such formal requirements effectuate an 
immediate transfer of the ownership in the respective GmbH-shares or real estate, 
such notarized transfer will usually take place at Closing date only.  
Whereas at Signing, the Parties will then commit and enter into preparatory 
agreements, agreements regarding other assets to be transferred or the Parties 
might as well decide to conduct Signing and Closing of the Transaction at the 
very same time, if all other particularities of the Transaction permit it.  
Upon Signing, all participants to the Transaction need to be present and 
duly represented by their authorized representatives (Managing Directors or 
Proxy Holders, as far as the latter are permitted to conduct the Transaction305) or 
by other individuals, who are authorized to act on their behalf based on a Power 
of Attorney covering the entire Transaction.  
For some smaller Transactions or in situations, in which no last-minute 
discussions or open issues are to be expected, the principals from Seller and/or 
                                                     
304 Cf. Jacques, H.  in: Handbuch Unternehmenskauf Mittelstand (2017), D.VIII.3 
margin no. 201 et seq. with further references; Jaletzke, M. in: Jaletzke/Henle 
M&A Agreements (2011), I.5 with further references.  
305 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq;  Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017), p. 286 et 
seq.; Jaletzke, M. in: Jaletzke/Henle M&A Agreements (2011), I.4. 
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Buyer might even not be present at the Signing at all, but might as well authorize 
any other person, for example their respective external counsels, to act on their 
behalf, according to instructions given in advance.  
For Transactions which inherit a high level of complexity or where a large 
number of contracts and documents require to be signed and executed upon 
Signing, the Parties would be well-advised to agree on a formal “Step Plan” for 
the Signing process upfront. This creates transparency and clarity for the involved 
individuals and serves as a double-check to make sure that no necessary steps are 
omitted. Due to legal requirements, there might be even a certain timing for the 
chain of events necessary. For example, a pledge agreement regarding certain 
assets would ideally only be executed, once the assets have been factually 
transferred to the respective party.  
Nevertheless, irrespective of the complexity and individual structure of the 
deal, any Signing of a Transaction constitutes quintessentially the mutual 
agreement of the parties to a purchase agreement regarding certain assets, may 
such be physical, immaterial or of legal nature only (i.e. shares in a company). 
According to German law, such a purchase agreement is defined in sec. 433 BGB, 
which also applies to any corporate transaction, governed by German law.306  
As such mutual agreement is binding for both parties, each of them has to 
ensure that they really wish to enter into the agreement. Once this is done, there 
would be almost no way to manoeuvre back.  
This internal decision-making process on the Seller’s and on the Buyer’s 
side, the reasons and motivations behind the final steps of approving and 
executing a transaction, this forms the subject matter of this thesis and the details 
around such will be the analytical heart of the following Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
Whereas, for this first glance at the general structure of a corporate Transaction, 
the mere fact that there is to be an internal process of decision-making by way of 
approval of the transaction shape, structure and agreements by the respective 
Participant’s internal decision-making authority (Board of Directors, 
                                                     
306 Cf. Büdenbender, U. in: in: Dauner-Lieb, B., Langen, W. (2016), § 433 margin 
no. 5 et seq. & § 453 margin no. 17 et seq.; . Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq; 
Westermann, H.P. in: MüKo BGB, § 453, margin no. 17 et seq. with further 
references.  
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Shareholders’ meeting, or another equivalently empowered internal institution), 
is sufficient.  
 
The interim period 
The reasons that Signing and Closing have to take place at different times, 
can be diverse:  
Depending on the structure and size of the Transaction and its Participants, 
a filing with the cartel authorities can be necessary. The assessment, whether such 
filing is required or not, is usually conducted prior to the signing, but the filing 
can often only be obtained, once the Signing has taken place. 
Moreover, also some other corporate law related preparation steps might 
need to be conducted, before the Target can be transferred from the Seller to the 
Buyer. Sometimes, the Target Company is at Signing not yet in a corporate shape 
in order to be separated from the Seller and transferred as a stand-alone corporate 
construct.  Such scenarios are often described as a “Carve Out” of the Target out 
of the Seller’s corporate structure.307  
In case of an Asset Deal, the Seller often needs to prepare the physical hand-
over of the assets and before being even able to do so, the Seller might require to 
make such assets redundant and to structure its own business activities in a way 
that does no longer include or rely on such assets.    
Also, the Parties might have conditioned308 the Closing on any other 
circumstances they deem to be appropriate and necessarily to be fulfilled prior to 
the conduct of the Closing. Such conditions can be, for example, related to 
securing the Buyer’s ability to finance the Transaction – obtaining of external 
financing from banks or else.  
                                                     
307 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.; Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017), p. 295 et 
seq. & p. 544 et seq.; Jacques, H.  in: Handbuch Unternehmenskauf Mittelstand 
(2017), D.VIII.2,f margin no. 199 et seq.; Jäckle, C., Strehle, E.P., Claus, A. in: 
Beck’sches M&A-Handbuch (2017), § 52, margin no. 68 et seq. 
308 Cf. Kästle, F., Oberbracht, D. (2018), B.III.6 with further references and template 
wording; Picot, G. in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch GmbH-Recht (2014), § 21, 
margin no. 172 et seq.; Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Closing Conditions“.  
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From a management and business perspective, the time period between 
Signing and Closing can be a difficult time. The Seller is still responsible for the 
Target Company, for the ongoing daily business and all therewith related 
decisions, which need to be taken. However, the prospect of transferring the 
Target Company to the Buyer shifts the strategic aims for the Target Company 
away from its previous positon as an integral part of the Seller into the new 
hemisphere of the Buyer.309 Previously obtained interests of the Seller and new or 
future interests of the Buyer might lead to a conflict concerning the basic daily 
management decisions and steps.  
In order to prevent conflicts and to streamline the ongoing management 
and economic success of the Target Company in the interim period, the Parties 
often agree on explicit management rules, which apply for as long as the Seller is 
still in charge of steering the Target’s activities after the Signing. By that, that the 
Buyer can – as far as possible – assure that he will indeed receive at Closing, what 
he has purchased upon Signing.  
In that regard, the Parties may, for instance, secure in the Purchase 
Agreement certain boundaries for the Seller’s management of the Target 
Company by way of defining explicit scenarios, in which the Seller is obliged to 
consult the Buyer or to seek for its approval.310 Clauses like these are of called 
“Conduct of Business”-clauses.311 The scenarios such clauses aim to capture can 
be, for example, concluding sales or sourcing contracts above a certain financial 
value (e.g. EUR 100,000) or the acquisition or sale of any real property owned by 
                                                     
309 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.; Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017), p. 295 et 
seq. 
310 Cf. Picot, G. in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch GmbH-Recht (2014), § 21, 
margin no. 172 et seq. 
311 Cf. Henle, W. in: Jaletzke/Henle M&A Agreements (2011), II.17 with further 
references and template wording. 
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the Target Company.312 Legal contractual freedom sets few boundaries to the 
Parties’ intentions and wishes in this regard.313  
In addition to the day-to-day management of the Company, the time 
between Signing and Closing of a Transaction is also the point in time, when 
agreed Closing conditions require to be fulfilled or its execution to be fulfilled. 
Apart from obtaining a secured financing, merger control clearance and other 
external circumstances, the Parties might have also agreed on other individual 
Closing conditions in the Purchase Agreement – such as, for example, certain 
preparatory corporate steps to be taken, i.e. conduct of a capital increase or 
issuance of new shares in the Target Company, but also agreement to any kind of 
commercial contract between the Parties, which shall be executed and cherished 
after the Closing, as for example a license agreement, toll manufacturing 
agreement, sales agreement or any other kind of commercial connection between 
the two Parties.  
 
What else? 
Moreover, the upcoming Closing might also make it necessary for the 
Parties to agree on certain other preparatory steps. The Closing documentation, 
including a Closing Memorandum314, by which the Parties document the steps 
conducted at Closing and the agreements signed thereupon.  
  
                                                     
312 Cf. Henle, W. in: Jaletzke/Henle M&A Agreements (2011), II.8 & II.17 with 
further references and template wording. 
313 Only factual boundaries such as the general principle of good faith prohibiting 
discriminating behaviour according to sec. 242 and sec. 138 BGB as a central 
guideline hereto.  
314 Cf. Bormann, J., Seebach, D. in: Herrler, Gesellschaftsrecht (2017); § 15, margin 
no. 285 et seq.; Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.; Kästle, F., Oberbracht, D. (2018), 
A.I.5.d.  
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Closing 
As the Signing constitutes the creation of the legal obligation for the Seller 
to transfer the Target to the Buyer, the Closing of the Transaction then constitutes 
the factual hand-over and the transfer of the Target between the parties.315  
Typically, the occurrence of the Closing itself is subject to the fulfilment of certain 
conditions by one or both parties, such as obtaining merger clearance, certain 
restructural or organizational measures at the Target Company or else. Closing 
will only occur, once those conditions are fulfilled, unless there is an agreement to 
do so only afterwards.316  
Moreover, the Seller will have a vital interest to receive the purchase price, before 
the actual Closing occurs and the Target Company is thereby legally transferred 
into the ownership of the Purchasing Company. Typically, the Closing would 
therefore be a defined sequence of events, with the Purchasing Company 
initiating the purchase price payment as one of those. In order to document the 
agreements found and the occurrence of the Closing, the concluding of a Closing 
Memorandum is a common instrument to have a clear and transparent 
documentation.317  
 
3.3.2.6. Wrap up, clean up and implementation of the change 
Once the Closing has successfully occurred, particularly in case of a Share 
Deal, the Purchaser would want to integrate the Target Company into its own 
group structure, in a legal and in a commercial and factual way. The particular 
setup and level of integration and inter-company conjunctions will of course 
depend on the Purchaser’s strategic setup and future plans.  
The Purchaser might want to manage and maintain the Target Company as 
a separate unit, from a corporate and/or commercial perspective or the Purchaser 
                                                     
315 Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq; Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Closing”. 
316 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq.; Kästle, F., Oberbracht, D. in: Kästle, F., 
Oberbracht, D. (2018), B.III.6. 
317 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq; Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “Closing 
Memorandum”. 
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might also want to fully integrate the new acquisition into its existing corporate 
and strategic setup. 
 
Post-merger integration  
But in any event, and irrespective of the intended level of integration into 
the Purchaser’s structure, it will be of crucial importance for the Purchaser to 
create a strengthened and unified corporate culture and corporate identity within 
the Target Company. Such cultural integration and the realisation of synergies are 
vital to the mid- and long-term strategic success of the entire transaction. 
Essential steps of a successful post-merger integration of the Target 
Company are, amongst others: The swift and thorough information of business 
partners, potential future customers and contract parties, the swift and thorough 
internal information strategy, in order to calm down, safeguard and incentify the 
key work force that has been acquired within the Transaction, as well as the 
transition and integration of all technical and factual requirements of the Target 
Company, in order to stay active and profitable.  
A successful post-merger integration of the Target Company is the basis for 
the actual pay-off of any transaction.318 Only then, if the acquisition turns out to 
lift synergies between the Target Company and the Buyer itself, is the Transaction 
going to be a sustainable economic success for the Buyer.  
There are numerous examples of “failed” Transaction, which did not melt 
down during the actual acquisition process, but which turned out to be ineffective 
post Closing.319  
  
                                                     
318 Cf. Bücker, T., Kulenkamp, S. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung, § 29, margin no. 
98 et seq. with further references.  
319 Cf. Holzapfel, H.-J., Pöllath, R. (2017), p. 322 et seq.; Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), 
“Post Merger Integration”; Rosengarten, J. in: Beck’sches M&A-Handbuch (2017), 
§ 4.II.10 with further references.  
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3.3.3. Key aspects of M&A contracting 
Throughout the full lifetime of the Transaction, there are a number of 
different contracts, which the Parties may want or are required to enter into. Such 
contracts will always reflect the structure and scope of the Transaction and will be 
also subject to the negotiation positions and bargaining powers of the Parties.  
Overall, the most common contracts within the context of M&A 
Transactions are the following:  
- Non-Disclosure Agreement 
- Letter of Intent/Memorandum of Understanding 
- Data Room Rules (one-sided, counter signing only) 
- Purchase Agreement (including Exhibits) 
- Closing Memorandum 
- Ancillary contracts: Local Transfer Agreements, IP Transfer Agreements, 
etc.  
 
The Non-Disclosure Agreement 
To be signed at the very beginning of every information disclosure or 
exchange, the Non-Disclosure Agreement is designed to ensure the 
confidentiality of each Party’s proprietary information, to which one Party grants 
the respective other Party access in the course of the discussions and negotiations 
regarding an envisaged corporate transaction. Such agreements can either obliged 
both Parties to keep the respective information received from the other Party 
confidential, or might be designed to work one-way only. The question, which 
design of a Non-Disclosure Agreement is suitable, does primarily depend on the 
planned information disclosure – if both Parties are to distribute information, 
then a mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement should be concluded.320  
Due to the potentially sensitive nature of the information, the Non-
Disclosure Agreement should be entered into for a rather long term, not only 
covering the envisaged timeframe to negotiate the Transaction. The term does 
                                                     
320 Cf. Linke, J., Fröhlich, M. (2014), p. 449 et seq.; von Werder, A., Kost, T. (2010), 
p. 2903 et seq. 
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determine the time period during which the receiving Party is obliged to maintain 
strict confidentiality regarding the received data. After the end of such 
confidentiality obligation term, the information is often required to be either 
destroyed or any documents to be handed back to the revealing Party.321    
However, the Non-Disclosure Agreement is not a typical M&A Transaction 
Document. It is a general commercial contract, which is often concluded, if the 
collaboration or discussion between two or more Parties might potentially 
involve information that is not fully deemed to be known in public.  
Moreover, the signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement is often regarded as a 
first and formal step towards closer discussions in the light of a potential 
Transaction.322  
 
Letter of Intent 
Also timed for the very beginning of the Transaction, the Letter of Intent, 
often also called Memorandum of Understanding,323 is a format that enables the 
Parties to express their first and most basic intentions for the ongoing discussions. 
There are no fixed elements that must govern such a contract.324 It is open to 
whatever content and binding or non-binding character the Parties wish to 
include.  
Same as for the Non-Disclosure Agreement, the Letter of Intent is also not a 
specific M&A Transaction contract, but a general commercial contracting format, 
which can serve the Parties intentions and benefits in a Transactional scenario 
well.325  
 
Data Room Rules  
                                                     
321 Cf. Linke, J., Fröhlich, M. (2014), p. 449 et seq. with further references.  
322 See above, Chapter 3.3.2.2 with further references  
323 See above, Chapter 3.3.2.2 with further references.  
324 See above, Chapter 3.3.2.2 with further references. 
325 Cf. Hanke, K., Socher, O. (2010), p. 664 et seq.; Jacques, H. in: Handbuch 
Unternehmenskauf Mittelstand (2017), C.II.1, margin no. 45 et seq.; Kästle, F., 
Oberbracht, D. (2018), A.I.5.a. 
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In case the Transaction involves the installation and review of a Data Room 
with information regarding the Target Company or the Target Assets, then the 
Seller might have a strong interest to define certain rules and conducts for the 
review and usage of this Data Room. Irrespective, whether it is a physical data 
room or an electronic platform or folder, the Seller can set out certain boundaries 
for the Buyer’s possibility to review, copy, print or safe the documents contained 
in the Data Room.326 These boundaries are often explicitly written down and 
collected in a document called “Data Room Rules”.  
As it is usually set up by the Seller, it is not by all means a contract between 
the Parties, but more a one-sided definition of rules. However, Sellers often 
require the potential Buyer and all individuals, which shall be accessing the data 
room on its behalf, to counter-sign a declaration stating that they will comply 
with all rules set out for the usage and access to the Data Room.327  
 
Purchase Agreement  
The most important contract for any kind of Corporate Transaction is 
always the Purchase Agreement, by which the Parties agree to sell, purchase and 
transfer the Target Company or Target Assets. The content and structure of this 
contract depends on the structure, scope and nature of the Transaction and the 
agreement found between the Parties.  
In case the Buyer wishes to acquire shares in the Target Company, the 
Purchase Agreement will be called a Share Purchaser Agreement (SPA). 
Consequentially, in case the Buyer wishes to acquire certain assets, the Purchase 
Agreement will be called an Asset Purchase Agreement. In despite of certain 
differences, some of the most basic elements are similar for both types of Purchase 
Agreements:  
As the Purchase Agreement will form the contractual heart of the Corporate 
Transaction, the Parties should always aim for an explicit and clear wording, in 
order to leave little room for misleading interpretation or misunderstandings.  
 
                                                     
326 See above, Chapter 3.3.2.3 with further references.  
327 See above, Chapter 3.3.2.3 with further references.  
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The Purchase Agreement - Transaction Object 
The Purchase Agreement is always to name and list all Parties to the 
Corporate Transaction,328 explicitly name and describe the Transaction Object, the 
Price, the Transfer mechanism, warranties, liability and indemnity assumed by 
the Transaction Parties, termination rights, as well as any potential conditions for 
the Closing and rules on how to conduct the business related to the Target 
Company or the Target Assets, which shall govern the time period between 
Signing and Closing. Moreover, the Parties will also choose the applicable law, 
which shall be applicable to the entire contract and Transaction in the Purchase 
Agreement.  
With regard to the definition of the Transaction Object, there is a substantial 
difference between Asset Deal and Share Deal: German contract laws provide for 
the basic mandatory requirement that every contract always needs to include an 
explicit definition of its object.329  
This means, in case of an Asset Deal that all assets, which shall be 
transferred as part of the Transaction, require to be named and listed. Such listing 
needs to be explicit and unambiguous, so that every third party, being not 
familiar with the details of the Target Assets and the Transaction, would still be 
able to identify the assets without any doubts. If the Parties intend to transfer not 
only one asset, but several, then all such assets require to be named and to be 
listed. Especially in case of the transfer of large numbers of equipment, contracts 
or inventory stock, such lists can become rather long. It might be advisable to 
choose a list format that can be attached to the main body of the Agreement as an 
Exhibit.  
In case of a Share Deal, the Transaction Object will be the respective 
share(s). Similar to any other assets, which are being contractually transferred, 
also those shares require to be explicitly named or to be described in the Purchase 
Agreement. For shares of a German GmbH, an identification of the shares would 
be possible, if their respective numbers from the Shareholders’ List330, which 
requires to be filed with the Commercial Register and to be updated in case of any 
                                                     
328 Cf. Kästle, F., Oberbracht, D. (2018), B.II. with template and further references.  
329 See above, Chapter 3.3.2.3 with further references.  
330 Cf. Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 40, margin no. 13 et seq. 
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changes in the ownership structure331 and which is considered to be the decisive 
source for any information regarding a GmbH’s shareholding data332, are 
mentioned.  
 
The Purchase Agreement – Warranties and Liability 
Another central aspect of each Purchase Agreement is the warranties given 
by the Parties and the liability and indemnity that might be associated therewith. 
Even though the Purchaser will have conducted a Due Diligence in most cases, 
certain commercial and legal uncertainties and risks will unavoidably exist. In 
order to cover the legal disadvantages associated therewith, the Parties are free to 
agree on a catalogue of certain warranties, which the Seller gives and assures to 
the Purchaser.333  
The legal nature of such declarations is a binding statement, like a 
guarantee, given separately from the rest of the Purchase Agreement and the legal 
effect thereof.334 Such statements, according to sec. 311 para. 1 BGB are in most 
cases directly, combined with the right to claim restitution or damage 
compensation, in case they are violated.335  
The legal consequence of a breach of a contractual duty or a warranty 
statement is called “liability”. German and European laws generally provide for a 
concept of rather broad and unlimited liability. As this is rather disadvantageous 
for the Seller, the Seller might often seek to limit its liability, which is legally 
permitted with some few exceptions: The Parties are free to limit their liability 
                                                     
331 According to sec. 40 para. 1 GmbHG.  
332 Cf. Damm, M. (2017), p. 2 et seq. with further references.  
333 See above, Chapter 3.3.2.4 with further references. 
334 Cf. Büdenbender, U. in: Dauner-Lieb, B., Langen, W. (2016), § 433 margin no. 5 
et seq. & § 453 margin no. 17 et seq.; . Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq; Korch, S. 
(2018), p. 521 et seq.; Schmitz, C. (2006), p. 561 et seq.; Westermann, H.P. in: 
MüKo BGB, § 453, margin no. 17 et seq. with further references. 
335 Cf. Mellert, C.R. (2011), p. 1664 et seq with further references.  
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towards each other for damages arising due to simple negligent behaviour336 and 
may also limit the amount of liability that arises in such situations, for example by 
agreeing on a fixed maximum amount or certain baskets of monetary 
compensation to be paid in case of a contract violation. However, they may not 
exclude or limit any liability for the injury of a person, death, fraudulent 
behaviour or certain other types of liability.337  
 
The Purchase Agreement – Structure and setup 
As the case may be, the structure of the Transaction may also necessitate 
alterations in the contractual setup: Especially for Corporate Transactions, which 
involve assets and/or shares to be transferred in several different countries, the 
Parties may choose for an “Umbrella”-type structure of their Purchase 
Agreement. This structure consists of one main agreement, in which all 
commercial essentials of the Transaction are outlined and agreed. Moreover, this 
main agreement serves as a joint basis and reference point for several different 
local transfer agreements, which serve as contractual basis for the sale, purchase 
and transfer of the assets and/or shares which are located at various different 
locations. 
In general, due to the contractual freedom, there are no mandatory setups 
or boundaries for the structure of Purchase Agreements to Corporate 
Transactions. The Parties are free to design whatever setup they deem most 
appropriate for their needs.338 
Moreover, as every individual contract should, the Purchase Agreement 
should contain some general “mechanical” wording that covers any potential 
current or future invalidities of contract clauses, as well as potential gaps and 
                                                     
336 Cf. Bücker, T., Kulenkamp, S. in: Handbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 29, 
margin no. 98 et seq.; Picot, G. in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch GmbH-Recht 
(2014), § 21, margin no. 129 et seq. with further references. 
337 Cf. Picot, G. in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch GmbH-Recht (2014), § 21, 
margin no. 129 et seq. with further references.  
338 As long as the general legal boundaries of contracting laws are respected, 
based on German law or the respective other applicable jurisdictions, such as, in 
German law, sec. 242 and sec. 138 BGB.  
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omissions in the regulatory scheme of the contract. Such a mechanical clause 
under German law is called a salvatorious clause and shall make sure that the rest 
of the Purchase Agreement is not affected by the invalidity or unenforceability of 
certain clauses therein. It will also make sure that such invalid and/or 
unenforceable clause is then replaced by a valid and enforceable clauses that 
reflects the Parties’ intention as well as legally possible.339  
 
  
                                                     
339 Cf. Kästle, F., Oberbracht, D. (2018), B.III.19; Korch, S. (2018), p. 521 et seq. 
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3.3.4. Why M&A? The importance of the economic environment for the 
success of  a Corporate Transaction 
Having taken a close look to the legal framework for the conducts of and 
decision-making within a Corporate Transaction, there is now also another factor 
worth considering for any analysis of the shape and fate of Corporate 
Transactions and the individual management behaviour related thereto: The 
macroeconomic environment, in which M&A activities take place.  
A Corproate Transaction is an extraordinary, sometimes even singular, 
event for all three participants. It takes time, thorough planning, sometimes even 
external financing and a certain level of risk appetite of the managers of the 
purchasing and selling entity. The initial decision, to either start or not start into 
proceedings that might result in a deal, is not taken in a vacuum, but always in a 
certain momentarily economic environment. This might play out either in favour 
or in disadvantage of the deal and the decisions associated thereto.  
It is generally visible that the overall M&A activities in various regions and 
on a global scale are cyclic. Whereas in certain years, the number of successfully 
closed M&A deals is exploding and the services and consulting industries 
associated therewith are booming, a significant downturn is visible for certain 
other years. This is quintessentially visible in the Figure below:   
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Figure 5: Global M&A Deal volumes vs. Global uncertainty development 2007 
until 12/2016 
 
Source: The Deloitte M&A Index 2017, Part I, p. 2, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/de/de/pages/mergers-and-acquisitions/articles/m-and-
a-index-2017.html (last check on 15 August 2018) 
 
Various external factors come into play here, such as340  
- standard interest rates for debt financing,  
- the gross domestic product (GDP) and  
- growth rates of the participants’ home turf and target markets,  
- changes in international trade barriers, for example customs and other 
tariffs and duties,  as well as 
- overall stability of the political and cultural environment of the 
participants as well and 
                                                     
340 Cf. Eisenbarth, I. (2013), p. 120 et seq. with further references.  
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- the absence of natural catastrophes manifestating in monetary 
disadvantages for the relevant regions. 
 
Such factors might play a role for the initial question, if a Corporate 
Transaction is conducted at all. Any changes to those factors might also be 
relevant for existing Corporate Transactions and might necessitate one or several 
deal participants to either urge for changes in the setup or contractual basis of the 
Corporate Transaction, or the deal might be even so deeply impacted by the 
external changes that the parties decide to pause or abandon the deal or are even 
forced to accept that the deal is not going to be successful.  
In the light of the central questions and aspects for the Research Fragment 1, 
it is important to note that any relevant changes to external factors can also 
impact the decision-making of managers, where such a free range exists based on 
the applicable legal framework. The managers might well consider such factors 
and changes in their assessment on the likelihood that the deal will be 
advantageous. It might change the personal risk-appetite of a manager, if he 
encounters changes in relevant aspects of his or his Company’s environment, 
which he either considers to be negative or at least a threat to the current status 
quo, or if such change creates an uncertainty, because the effects are not yet 
predicable.  
Allthogether, the overall question of the existence of a Corporate 
Transaction, as well as the specific decisions to be taken by the Managing 
Directors at the different stages and phases of a Corporate Transaction, might be 
influenced positively or negatively by changes in the macroeconomic 
environment of the participants. This might also have an impact on the further 
processing and the behaviour of the Management and might lead towards an 
increasingly risk-averse or risk-friendly behaviour in the context of particular 
decision-making. This might also play a role for the contracting dimension of a 
Corporate Transaction – for example, the Purchaser could demand a termination 
right or a post-Closing true up of the Purchase Price, in case of a significant 
deterioration of an external factor, such as a decline of the GDP by a certain 
percentage or the weakening of the economic outlook for the Target’s relevant 
market and customer base visible as a decline of a significant index. 
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Based on those ascpects, a theoretical impact of external economic factors to 
the Management’s decision-making in Corporate Transactions is to be considered 
as existing. The later analysis of practical real-life Case Studies below in Chapter 5 
will reveal, if such theoretical assumption can be also evidenced in reality.   
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3.4. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE MANAGEMENT 
OF THE PARTICIPATING COMPANIES IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
The description and analysis of the legal framework for (i) the existence and 
conduct of Corporations and their organs, and for (ii) the conduct of Corporate 
Transactions as well as (iii) the brief overview of potential macroeconomic 
influences to those do now allow for a comprehensive description and 
understanding of the specific legal framework, in which the Management of the 
participants executes and decides in a Corporate Transaction.  
The following description aims to destille the combined essence of the legal 
leeway, rights and duties of Managing Directors in general and of the 
requirements applicable to Corporate Transactions, from each participant’s 
perspective. This will be decisive for concluding on the Research Fragment 1, as 
depicted above in Chapter 3.1.   
 
3.4.1. Legal framework for Seller’s Management 
What are the specific phases and steps of a Corporate Transaction, in which 
the Seller’s Management is freely entitled to take a genuine management decision, 
without determination by specific legal requirements or a dictate from the 
shareholders?  
So far, there seems to be no comprehensive answer to this question visible 
in German and European academic literature. Therefore, the following 
description is a distillation of the descriptions and conclusions drawn in the 
previous parts of this Chapter 3.  
Looking at the Management of the Selling Company and the different steps 
of the Corporate Transaction, in which it is actively involved, there are some 
specific phases in which the Managing Directors can take genuine management 
decisions. 
During the early stage of the Corporate Transaction, the Seller’s 
Management has only limited influence on the decision of whether a certain part 
of the Seller’s corporate portfolio is sold or not. Typically, such a decision would 
require and de facto occur to be made by the Selling Company’s shareholders. 
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The Management might be invited by the shareholders to join such considerations 
or it might even trigger such a thought process initially, but the decision to aim 
for a sale of a certain part of the business or not is not covered by the scope of 
responsibility mentioned in sec. 43 GmbH, sec. 93 AktG and their respective 
equivalents in UK and Spanish laws.     
Once the decision to aim for a sale is made by the shareholders, the 
Corporate Transaction enters into a second stage: The establishing of a first 
contact to potential buyers. Here, the Management might well be able to make 
suggestions or facilitate contacts, but there is no specific legal right or scope 
attached thereto, by which the Management could decide on the path forward 
and the potential purchasers selection.  
However, after or in parallel to the identification of potential Purchasers, 
the phase of “Proper inspection” also requires to be well-prepared and carefully 
conducted and supervised. This is one of the first areas, where the Purchaser’s 
Management can directly influence and shape the form and fate of the deal. The 
collection of all relevant data and the assembly of the (virtual) data room for the 
Due Diligence, requires broad knowledge about the Target Company’s daily 
business activities but also a strategic mindset to select the information in a 
senseful manner and in a way that will turn out to be benefitial for the Seller – for 
example, in case the potential Purchaser is a competitor of the Target Company, 
the information made available in the data room requires to be selected with a 
view to avoid unnecessary or illegal disclosure of information, which would put 
the Target Company’s market position at risk, should the deal fail.  
As a matter of fact, the data room requires to give an open and 
comprehensive overview of the Target Company’s business activities, potential 
risks and opportunities. The sequence of disclosure can be largely determined by 
the Seller’s Management. For example, the Due Diligence can be staged with an 
increasing level of information and documents to be disclosed, e.g. upon signing 
of a Letter of Intent or after receipt of a first binding offer or else. To consider, 
which approach is most suitable in the light of the potential Purchaser, the 
Target’s attractiveness and the external market conditions at the time and in the 
industry, in which the Target conducts its business, is one of the main fields, 
which is considerably free for considerations and influence of the Seller’s 
Management.  
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Moreover, it is the Management’s obligation and interest to ensure a proper 
level of confidentiality amongst all deal participants, company-internal and 
external.  
With regard to Defining the crucial parameters for the Corproate 
Transaction during the contract negotiation phase, the Seller’s Management does 
also have various means to influence the nature and scope of the deal and is 
supposed to take various decisions. As visible in the Case Studies described and 
analysed below in Chapter 5, it is in most cases the Seller’s Management, who 
actually conducts the negotiations about the sales contract and any ancillary 
agreements. Of course, this is mostly done with a team from various internal 
departments such as Legal, Strategy and others, and often including the support 
of external advisors, the Managing Director is as a matter of corporate institution 
the ultimate decision-maker for any such “groundwork” and specific questions, 
which are not as strategic or important enough for the shareholders to resolve or 
interfere themselves.  
In many cases, the shareholders set out the overall boundaries and general 
principles, by which the Management then executes the Selling Company’s 
negotiation strategy. This leaves huge parts of the work and decisions to be taken 
during the negotiation phase to the Management’s sole discretion and 
competency. Even though such decisions are often told to be “subject to final 
shareholder approval”, the shareholders do in most cases not revert back and re—
negotiate specific clauses of the agreements, but rather check, if the key 
parameters that they had initially identified are appropriately reflected in the 
transactional agreements – those will be most likely general setup, purchase price, 
general scope of the warranties and closing conditions.  
The Management’s main guideline for the negotiation phase of a deal are, 
next to the principles set out by the shareholders, the interests of the Selling 
Entity, which they represent. As always, the Company’s Object as set out in the 
Articles of Association defines the field of possible actions and the general 
direction for managerial behaviour. The outcome of the negotations must be 
benfitial for the Selling Company, otherwise the Management would need to exit 
the Corporate Transaction. In that regard, almost every clause in the transactional 
agreements can be “tagged” with a certain scope of acceptable outcomes, which 
the Management has to identify and work towards: What is the minimum 
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purchase price that the Purchaser needs to pay in order for the deal to be 
advantageous for the Seller? Which warranties can be given without creating an 
unbearable liability exposure for the Seller? How is the development of the 
overall costs of the deal and are they still reasonably acceptable for the Selling 
Company?  
All those questions determine the room for decision-making of the Seller’s 
Management. The question, which purchase price is “acceptable” for the Selling 
Company and which scope of liability exposure is still appropriate in the light of 
the advantages which the deal brings, all those considerations are required to be 
made by the Management and result in the decisions it takes. And here again, as 
described above, the general requirement to always conduct all actions and 
decisions with the due care of a prudent businessman and in compliance with 
existing laws, is the central guideline and obligation for Managers in all 
Corporations in the European law context.341  
When it comes to real-life decision-making on specific questions, this 
guideline turns out to be of very general nature. Therefore, it leaves a 
considerable room for the Manager to influence and form the decision, as long as 
it is based on objective considerations and a reliable information basis.  
After the transaction agreements are successfully negotiated, the Seller’s 
management is most likely also heavily involved in the preparation of the actual 
handover of the Target Company. When it comes to the practical questions on 
how to separate the Target Company’s business and organisation from the 
Seller’s own sphere, the main guiding principle is again that the Seller’s 
Management has to ensure that the Selling entity can continue its own activities 
without any unacceptable interference or disadvantages. Whether this concerns 
the split of IT systems, the separation of contract directories or the contact of 
customers for information about the coming transfer, the Management will 
always have to ensure that the Selling Company’s interests are respected. But 
again, this task leaves quite some room for individualism in specific decisions, 
which have to be taken.  
Another major responsibility of the Seller’s Management is the assessment 
and potential notification of authorities, if necessary. Especially the notification of 
                                                     
341 See above, Chapter 3.2.4.  
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competition authorities might require the involvement of experts, who can advice 
on the competition law specifics and whether a notification is necessary or not. 
Again, in case there is room to argue pro or con a notification, it is the 
Management, who is obliged and entitled to take the ultimate decision and bears 
the consequences thereof. Here again, the risk appetite of the Managing Director 
might come into play. The same counts for publication requirements to 
authorities or to the public, e.g. if the Seller is listed on a stock market. Again, it is 
the Managing Director, who is responsible and takes the decision what to publish 
and when, even if the room to decide one or the other way might be rather 
limited due to the very specific nature of legal requirements set out in that regard.  
In a nutshell, the overall view to the different steps of a Corporate 
Transaction reveals that the Seller’s Management has signifant room to take 
decisions and ultimately act and shape the deal, especially during the phase of 
“Proper Inspection” and “Defining parameters”. The obligations, which limit 
their decision-making here are of rather general nature and often still allow for 
individual connotation and subjective factors in the decision-making of the 
respective Managing Directors.   
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3.4.2. Legal framework for Purchaser’s Management 
Inversely as for the Seller’s Management, also the Purchaser’s Management 
is likely to not play a decisive role in the initial phase of considering, if an 
acquisition shall be at all conducted or not. A decision of such strategic 
importance is likely to be taken by the shareholders of the Purchasing Company. 
The shareholders will then instruct their Managing Directors to conduct the steps 
towards an acquisition, in the light of particular instructions given.  
However, during the phase of “Proper inspection” of the Target Company, 
the Purchaser’s Management might play a decisive role, if they lead the project 
team, preparing the potential acquisition.  
Again lead by the general requirement to foster the Purchasing Company’s 
interests and objectives, the Managing Directors have to ensure that a sufficient 
level of information and data is collected about the Target Company, in order to 
allow for a sound and reasonable decision to either  move forward with the deal 
or not. Therefore, the Managing Director does have a strong interest to ensure 
that the Due Diligence is conducted in a thorough and detailed way and that the 
results and findings of potential interest are reported comprehensively.  
The Managing Directors do often rely on external advisors to conduct the 
Due Diligence or at least parts thereof – for example to have an external law firm 
checking the Target Company’s contracts and/or a Financial advisory firm 
assessing the financial data available in the Data Room.  
The Managing Directors will need to rely on the findings and content of the 
Due Diligence report during the further phases of the Corporate Transaction. 
Therefore, they have a strong interest to ensure that the Due Diligence is 
conducted as named – with due diligence and strong care.  
Moreover, the Due Diligence phase does also deliver the necessary data 
points for the Management to assess, if the Target Company is indeed a suitable 
acquisition candidate and a benefitial fit into the Purchasing Company’s portfolio.  
In case the Managing Directors identify any major disadvantages or 
negative surprises during the Due Diligence, they will need to take a decision to 
protect their Company’s interests, even if this means that the deal has to be 
abandoned. Typically, such decision will be ultimately taken by the shareholders, 
but it is the Managing Directors who are in the position and have the sufficient 
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level of information to identify such dealbrakers and to bring them to the 
shareholders’ attention. Again, the assessment of whether a certain aspect is to be 
classified as major obstacle to the Corporate Transaction or not, is a decision 
which the Managing Directors take in their own discretion.  
Similar to the position of the Seller’s Management, also the Purchaser’s 
Management is likely to be heavily involved in the negotiation of the 
transactional agreements. Here again, the shareholders are likely to give only 
general instructions or minimum requirements, which have to be negotiated 
towards by their Managers. In addition, the shareholders might also reserve the 
right, or be entitled by the Articles of Association, for a final approval of the 
contract drafts prior to Signing. Again, this setup leaves significant room for the 
Managing Directors to take the specific decisions on deal structure and contract 
wording.  
As the deal progresses, the Purchasing Company’s Management does 
resume several additional obligations, such as potential notification requirements 
vis-á-vis authorities or the public, as well as to assess, if the strategic focus of the 
Purchasing Company is altered by the deal in a way that makes a change or 
addition to the Company’s Object defined in the Articles of Association necessary. 
If so, the shareholders will resolve about this ultimately.  
It is also the Managing Director’s responsibility and right to adequately 
prepare the Purchasing Company’s organisation to be ready to connect and 
integrate the Target Company after the Closing of the Corporate Transaction. This 
includes very specific questions, for example the future setup and staffing of the 
Company’s corporate functions, the integration of the two Companies’ IT 
infrastructure and the overall level of integration of the Target Company going 
forward. Will there be only one legal entity in the future? Will the Target 
Company continue to exist as separate legal entity and separate organisational 
unit? Will there be a joint corporate services backbone for functions like Legal, 
Procurement, IT, HR and others? Many answers to those very practical questions 
will not be resolved upon by the shareholders, but will be upon the Managing 
Directors to decide.  
Next to the responsibilities and decision-making in the light of the 
Corporate Transaction, the Managing Directors of the Purchasing Company must 
at the same time also continue to conduct their Company’s usual business 
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activities. This might lead to an enhanced workload for the time of the Corporate 
Transaction and the Target Company’s integration post-merger and might also 
necessitate certain additional managerial tasks to be done, such as the internal 
communication to the Purchaser’s own staff, as well as retention or incentives 
planning and execution, depending on the level of integration planned post-
merger and the future setup and staffing of the Company.  
As a result to the above, the Purchaser’s Management can be seen to be 
significantly engaged in the transactional phase of “Proper inspection” and have 
an own interest that the Due Diligence of the Target Company does produce 
reliable results and deliver a realistic and comprehensive picture of the Target 
Company. Moreover, also the specific definition of the contractual parameters is 
likely to be conducted by the Managing Directors by taking own decisions on 
acceptability of clauses and constructions in the agreements.  
Another main field of responsibility for the Purchaser’s Management will be 
the post-merger integration of the Target Company into the Purchasing Company 
in a way that releases the synergies and advantages that had driven the 
shareholders’ initial decision to conduct the acquisition.  
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3.4.3. Legal framework for Target’s Management 
Whereas the Legal framework and rooms for individual decision-making of 
Managers in the Selling Company and in the Purchasing Company reveal 
similarities, the scope of possible actions for the Target Company’s Management 
significantly differs from this.  
Again, the basis for any assessment and finding of areas and scope of 
individual decision-making is the applicable legal framework that sets the stage 
and expectations for the Managing Directors legal actions and decisions. Here, the 
general principle to conduct all actions and business activities for the Company 
with the reasonable care of a prudent businessman is again central. In addition, 
the specific obligations and duties arising out of various different laws might also 
play an indirect role in the light of a Corporate Transaction. As an example, 
information duties might apply, if the Target Company is listed on a stock market 
and receives a takeover offer.  
But with a view to the different phases and stages of a Corporate 
Transaction, the Target Company’s Management has only little room to freely 
manoeuvre and decide.  
Preventive actions, which aim to preserve the Company’s independence in 
the first place are permitted, as far as they are in alignment with the overall 
strategy of the Company and to the Company’s undisputed benefit only.342 The 
same applies for defensive measures in the light of an upcoming acquisition 
attempt. Here, the question or adequacy of the measures taken and costs occurred 
will be of relevance for the assessment, if such specific actions are still considered 
to be legally covered by the Target Company’s interest and object or not.  
Such defensive measures can be for example the inititation with another 
“friendly” new investor,343 in the light of a threatened hostile takeover or the 
                                                     
342 Cf. Bücker, T., Kulenkamp, S. in: Hanbuch Managerhaftung (2017), § 29, 
margin no. 50 et seq. with further references.  
343 Cf. Risse, J., Kästle, F. (2018), “White Knight“; Schlitt, M. in: MüKo AktG (2016), 
WpÜG, § 33, margin no. 152 et seq. with further references. 
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acquisition of another entity in order to make the Target Company “too big to be 
consumed”344.  
However, preventive measures, such as the blocking or destruction of 
relevant company-related information in order to spoil the preparation and 
conduct of a Due Diligence or the abandoning of manifest business opportunities 
in order to make the Company financially less attractive, have to be considered as 
illegal actions, because they would be a violation of the Managing Directors 
fundamental duties of loyalty and care.   
More specifically, during the different stages of a Corporate Transaction, the 
Management of the Target Company is again bound by the general principle to 
act in the Company’s best interest and on a proper information basis. Therefore, 
the Managing Directors might already consider taking preparatory steps to 
enable the new ownership structure or postpone organisational changes or 
reorginsations, which were initially planned to be conducted, had the Corporate 
Transaction not occurred. Moreover, the Target Company has a clear interest to 
keep its most valuable “human capital” on board in order to continue to be able to 
successfully conduct its business activities. Financial incentives for important 
employees might be one tool to be used in order to make sure that the Company’s 
staffing after Closing is still comparable to the staffing during the intitial phase of 
Proper Inspection of the Target Company.  
Another aspect is the potential obligation of the Target Company’s 
Management to inform the Company’s contract partners, in case the deal is 
signed. Commercial contracts often include a “change-of-control” clause, 
meaning that each contracting party is obliged to inform the respective other 
party of a change of its own majority shareholding structure, and the other party 
is then entitled to either continue the contract as is or to execute an extraordinary 
termination right.345  Such clauses are of huge importance also from the 
Purchaser’s point of view, because they might result in a significant impact to the 
                                                     
344 Cf. Klemm, D., Reinhardt, W. (2010), p. 1006 et seq.; Schanz, K.-M. (2007), p. 
927 et seq. 
345 Cf. Maidl, J. (2018), p. 726 et seq. with further references.  
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Target Company’s business activities, and thereby to the market share and future 
cash flows, which the Purchaser is effectively buying.346 
One specific scenario with a view to the Target Company’s Management 
rights and duties during a Corporate Transaction is the Management Buy-Out.347 
In case the Managing Directors are not only the representative and main decision-
making instance with regard to the Company’s business activities, but at the same 
time also the Purchasers, then specific attention has to be given to the scope and 
direction of interests of the Target Company and the Purchasers and a potential 
conflict of such interests.348  
As a result, the Management of the Target Company has various areas for 
specific decision-making during a Corporate Transaction. However, in 
comparison to the Managing Directors of the Selling Company and the 
Purchasing Company, they have less means to influence the deal structure and 
outcome – due to the nature of their Company being the target of such conduct 
“only”.  
  
                                                     
346 The Management of the Purchasing Company might therefore want to secure 
its future business interests by avoiding any such termination of commercial 
agreements and might want to reach out to the Target Company’s business 
partners as early as possible already to clarify or urge them to waive such 
termination right.  
347 Cf. Baumbach, A., Hueck, A. (2017), § 35, margin no. 48 et seq.; Beisel, W. in: 
Beisel/Klumpp, Unternehmenskauf (2016), § 13 with further references.  
348 Beisel, W. in: Beisel/Klumpp, Unternehmenskauf (2016), § 13, margin no. 3 with 
further references. 
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3.5. CONCLUSION  
In this Chapter 3, the basic legal rules for Corporations in various 
jurisdictions in Europe have been described and assessed, as well as the legal 
framework and specific sequence of events of Corporate Transactions. This has 
lead to the identification of various specific areas and aspects, for which the 
Managing Directors have the power and competency to take individual decisions.  
Boundaries and scoping of such areas and aspects have been identified and 
described in the light of the institutional setup of Corporations and the specific 
role that a Corporation might have in a M&A transaction.  
 
 
Research Fragment 1: 
 
Which rights and competencies exist for the managers of Companies involved in 
Corporate Transactions, based on the specific nature of the respective Company and the 
necessary steps and phases of a Corporate Transaction in general? 
 
 
 
With a view to the Research Fragment 1, which was introduced above in 
Chapter 3.1, the conclusion can be drawn that the rights and competencies of 
Managing Directors of Corporations, which are involved in Corporate 
Transactions particularly exist in the areas and scope as depicted in the following 
table:  
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Table 2: Areas of individual decision-making of Managers in Corporate 
Transactions 
  
Transaction 
Phase 
Selling Company  Purchasing 
Company  
Target Company 
Finding Phase 
Define Intention  n.a. (shareholders’ 
decision) 
n.a. (shareholders’ 
decision) 
n.a. (shareholders’ 
decision) 
Vendor Due 
Diligence 
X n.a. X 
First Contact 
Letter of Intent X X n.a. 
Proper Inspection 
Due Diligence X X X 
Due Diligence 
Question Phase 
X X X 
Due Diligence 
Report 
n.a. X n.a. 
Defining Parameters 
Contract 
negotiations  
X X n.a. 
Executing the agreed 
Signing  n.a. (shareholders’ 
decision) 
n.a. (shareholders’ 
decision) 
n.a. 
Pre-Closing 
requirements 
X X n.a. 
Closing n.a. (shareholders’ 
decision) 
n.a. (shareholders’ 
decision) 
n.a. 
Wrap-up 
Post-merger 
integration 
n.a. X X 
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4. THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR 
AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN CORPORATE 
TRANSACTIONS 
4.1. SCIENTIFIC INTRODUCTION – RESEARCH FRAGMENT 2 
Knowing and capturing the legal framework of a Corporate Transaction is 
one basic element to answer the Research Question depicted above. However, 
laws, provisions, orders and requirements set out general standards only – in the 
mere sense of a framework, defining the scope and radius for human behaviour, 
for manoeuvres taken by individuals.  
In order to have a more detailed view and understanding of decisions, 
which are taken by Managers in Corporate Transactions, the analysis and 
understanding of this legal framework is one central element, but as such solely 
not sufficient. It does only constitute the first step.  
As a second step, the analysis will now focus not any more on the legal 
radius of possible actions, but on the analysis of behaviour of the individuals, 
who take decisions within this legal radius. Such individuals are, as set out above, 
the decision-makers in Corporate Transactions, such being (i) the individuals 
constituting the shareholders’ meeting of a corporation involved in a Corporate 
Transaction (Shareholders), as well as (ii) the individuals, who manage the daily 
activities of a corporation involved in a Corporate Transaction (Managers).  
For both such groups, there is one key word, which also opens up parts of 
the fields of scientific review and analysis, which will be part of this journey in 
this Chapter – this magic key word in called “Management”.  
But what exactly is “Management”?  
The ethymologic perspective leads back to the Latin term “manus”, 
meaning “hand” and the Italian verb “maneggiare”, meaning to conduct or lead 
something or an animal with a hand. Another linkage can be suspected to the 
latin term “mansionem agere”, meaning to conduct the household.349  
                                                     
349 Cf. Toor, S.-U.-R., Ofori, G. (2008), p. 61 et seq. 
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The concept of “management”, as to be seen close to leadership of a certain 
entity or household, can be found already back in Aristoteles’ writings, dating to 
the years 384 until 322 B.C..350 Aristoteles defined economic behaviour to be 
essentially oriented towards a goal of welfare maximisation and always led by 
ethical standards351 – not only perhaps one of the first concepts of management 
and leadership, but also of Compliance in the true sense of the word.  
Modern definitions and descriptions of “Management” are diverse and 
focus on various different aspects, such as depicting Management as a mere 
clever mastering and allocated leadership of the different assets and value of a 
business enterprise, such as human workforce, capital, market share and 
contractual relationships.352 Other definitions focus on the separation of 
Management from Leadership and find a descriptive approach in isolation of 
pure management features from the world of leadership or on the transformation 
of knowledge into value.353  
In accordance with the assessment that Management does, from the 
individual’s perspective, constitute not more and not less than a multitude of 
decisions taken in the course of time and in dependence to previous decisions 
taken and external factors,354 the close analysis of such individual decisions is of 
critical importance in order to fully develop the Research Fragment 2 and to 
answer the Research Question.  
Therefore, the following will focus on human behaviour and the fields of 
individual decision-making and actions. This will allow for a thorough 
assessment of theoretical behaviour structure and models and of actions of 
individuals within the scope of the legal framework, which was assessed to be 
existing for Corporate Transactions.
                                                     
350 Cf. Dirksmeier, C., Pirson, M. (2009), p. 417 et seq. with further references.   
351 Cf. Dirksmeier, C., Pirson, M. (2009), p. 417 et seq. with further references.   
352 See further below, Chapter 4.3 for an overview of specific Management styles 
and approaches. 
353 Cf. Drucker, P.F. (1986), p. 8 et seq.; Drucker, P.F. (2007); p. 3 et seq. with 
further references; Malik, F. (2010), p. 39 et seq. with further references. 
354 Cf. Drucker, P.F. (2007), p. 304  et seq. 
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This following assessment will include a close look to the basic assumptions 
of Behavioural Economics and Experimental Economics and will allow for an 
analysis of the nature and reasons for individual decision making with a view to 
the existing theoretical fundament, including e.g. the “Principal-Agent-Theory”, 
theories on Management styles and the critics and biases that each such theories 
and models face in real life.  
 
  
Research Fragment 2: 
Which factors are likely to influence the decisions taken by Managers in Corporate 
Transactions? 
 
 
As a complement to the assessment made above regarding Research 
Fragment 1, this Research Fragment 2 will be the second element of the theoretical 
fundament of this work. The combination of the findings made in both parts will 
then set the basis for the Research Fragment 3 and analysis of empirical data that 
is to follow in Chapter 5 below.  
Here, for the Research Fragment 2, the approach will be a descriptive 
analysis on relevant economic theories and concepts, from the general approach 
towards the more specific theoretical models and by way of combining elements 
from the fields of individual decision-making on the one hand and management 
and business organisational theories on the other hand. Only this combination 
will allow for the holistic assessment and comprehensive analysis, also in the light 
of the findings made above with regards to the legal framework for such 
individual decision-making and managerial behaviour.   
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4.2. THEORIES AND MODELS ON ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR  
Alongside the evolution of human behaviour, scientists aim to analyse and 
explain actions taken by individuals since decades.355 The academic discourse 
does meanwhile include several different approaches, most of which do not stand 
in a contradictory relation towards each other, but are more evidence of an 
ongoing development from one theoretical concept to the next level of 
complexity,356 providing each another layer of analysis and explanation than the 
previous status did inherit.  
As will be visible in the following, the theoretical approaches in this field, 
which is nowadays often described as “Behavioural Economics”357 has evolved 
from a pure theoretical model,358 being derived from ideal assumptions and 
concepts, towards models, theories and approaches, which more and more dared 
to incorporate a realistic view – or at least elements thereof – on human beings, its 
respective situative environment and individual decision-making in general.359  
With regard to decision-making in the above mentioned context of 
Corporate Transactions, the following will then also lead to a view on specific 
circumstances for this setup, as this forms the second decisive cornerstone of the 
theoretical fundament of this thesis, which is to be fact-tested by reality in the 
following Chapter 5 below.  
In general, practical scientific research in the fields of Behavioural 
Economics is mainly conducted by way of experiments in order to verify or 
falsificate  theoretical assumptions or, more exploratively, to generate new 
                                                     
355 Cf. as early as 1822: Smith, A. (1822), p. 105 et seq. & p. 125 et seq.; overview of 
more recent literature and discussion: Ashraf, N., Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G. 
(2005); Beck, H. (2014), p. 9 et seq. with further references; Chlupsa, C. (2017), p. 
22 et seq. with further references.  
356 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 9 et seq. with further references; Henrich, J., Boyd, R., 
Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R. (2001), p. 73 et seq. 
357 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 9. 
358 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 9 et seq.; Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1974), pp. 1124 et 
seq. 
359 Cf. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, 
R. (2001), p. 73 et seq. 
165 
THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR AND 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
conclusions and hypotheses about specific questions or problems concerning 
individual human behaviour. The design of such experiments has advanced over 
the years, always with the aim to receive more accurate and reliable data. 
Therefore, experiments are meant to be conducted in a well-controlled 
environment, in order to exclude any “noise”, i.e. unwanted interference or 
influences to the data.  
The theories and models described below regarding the fields of 
Behavioural Economics360 and the Principal Agent Model361 are to be considered 
as the outcome and milestone reached after various experiments with different 
design and focus. Whilst describing the theories and models as an overview of the 
current status of scientific discourse, the experiments, which have led the path 
towards such will be referenced with the respective literature in the following.  
However, at first, the focus is now first on a merely theoretical construct, 
which has to be considered as the starting point for nowadays’ discussions about 
economic behaviour of decision-makers in a corporate environment and in 
Corporate Transactions, more specifically.   
 
4.2.1.  Homo Oeconomicus 
The analysis and assessment of human behaviour and decision-making 
was traditionally always closely linked to the philosophic and psychological 
discourse in various disciplines of science.362 Against such scientific background, 
it was only logical and by nature unavoidable that human actions itself would 
one day gain a piece of central attention of scientific discourse and research.   
                                                     
360 See below Chapter 4.2.2. 
361 See below Chapter 4.2.4. 
362 Cf. Camerer, C.F. (1999), p. 10575 et seq. with further references; Frey, B., Benz, 
M. (2001) with further references; Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., 
Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R. (2001), p. 73 et seq.; Simon, H.A. (1987), p. 57 et 
seq. 
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First and foremost, academic discourse put a focus on the basic question of 
“Why?” – why do individuals behave the way they do? What do they aim for and 
what do they pursue to achieve?  
Philosophically spoken, the answer to the question of life’s meaning, being 
perhaps one of discussed and thought-through topics of philosophical 
discourse,363 is very close to the question about an individual’s motivation and 
drivers behind actions taken and behaviour shown. 
Economic behavioural theory evolved early in the 20th century364 and 
identified human beings first as being purely driven by the goal to maximize its 
individual advantages – rational, economic behaviour – therefore, this basic 
concept is being called “Homo oeconomicus”.365 
 
4.2.1.1. General concept 
The general concept of “Homo Oeconomicus” is based on the idea that all 
human action is driven by three key factors only:366  
 
(1) Unlimited rationality in every human being, 
(2) Unlimited strength of will in every human being, and 
(3) Unlimited strive for self-interest in every human being 
 
Based on this, every human being is motivated and driven by the same 
factors and, as a matter of consequence, its behaviour will always be predictable 
in every instance.367 
                                                     
363 Cf. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, 
R. (2001), p. 73 et seq. with further references to such context. 
364 Cf. Ashraf, N., Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G. (2005), p. 131 et seq.; Camerer, 
C.F., Loewenstein, G., Rabin, M. (2004), p. 3 et seq. with further references.  
365 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 1 et seq.; Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq. with 
further references; Rost, N. (2008), p. 50 et seq. 
366 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 2; Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., 
Gintis, H., McElreath, R. (2001), p. 73 et seq. 
167 
THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR AND 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
Unlimited rationality in every human being (1) is an assumption based on 
the hypothesis that every human being strives for the possible optimum in each 
and every situation. The rationality drives the human being to maximize 
individual benefits and it can therefore completely rely on its ability to always act 
rationally, without any cognitive limitations and always based on correct and 
fully available information.368 This basic assumption goes back to each 
individual’s instinctive will to survive and to find the best possible status of 
being, which humans have included in their fundamental behavioural roots for 
thousands of years already.369 
Unlimited strength of will in every human being (2) was identified as the 
second driving factor for human decision-making, meaning that human beings 
are not at all influenced by emotions, irrationalities or wrong assumptions. As a 
matter of fact, every human being – the comparison to Starship Enterprise’s Mr. 
Spock is often made in literature in this regard370 - is always able to transform its 
own will into exactly mirroring actions in reality. Every decision made, is made 
because it is rational and the individual is willing to maximize its personal 
advantages by that.371 There are no hurdles existing that would hinder the 
individual to transfer a theoretical, internal decision taken into external, real 
behaviour, based on this theoretical approach. Where does this assumption find 
its theoretical roots? Human beings have proven to have the ability to decide 
rational and rational behaviour is perceived to have proven as being the superior 
logical determination factor for actions372 – superior to emotional influences, 
                                                                                                                                                  
367 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 2; Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq. with further 
references.  
368 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 2; Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq.; Rost, N. (2008), p. 
50 et seq. with further references.  
369 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 2; Rost, N. (2008), p. 50 et seq. 
370 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 1. 
371 Cf. Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq.; Rost, N. (2008), p. 50 et seq. with 
further references.  
372 Cf. Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq. with further references.  
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which are generally hard to predict and often described as illogical and unable to 
constantly and predictably lead to the best possible outcome.373   
Unlimited strive for self-interest in every human being (3) is the third 
fundamental assumption on which the theory of Homo Oeconomicus is based.374 
This assumption mainly leads to a view of mankind consisting of self-caring 
individuals only, seeking their personal interest and wealth maximization, 
making actions in a social context non-existent. Human beings are not part of a 
collective, unless this is the most favourable way to again maximize personal 
advantages. There is no inherent wish for social actions or caring about others 
embedded in human decision making.375  
All those factors together create the theoretical model of the Homo 
Oeconomicus, the perfect rational decision-maker. Based on these factors, Homo 
Oeconomicus was said to be also the pure founding principle and reason for 
economic markets376 – individuals striving to maximize their individual benefits 
by way of interacting amongst each other and therefore sharing those specific 
assets (tangible and/or intangible), which were of minor importance to them, but 
the transfer of which to another individual could be beneficial still with a view to 
reaching the central aim of maximizing individual advantages. Markets enable 
individual participants to seek for personal benefit maximization, to trade off 
values and assets, which are of expedient benefit for them only.  
The basic idea of a rational individual was first mentioned and elaborated 
by John Kells Ingram, when he introduced the term and description of an 
“economic man” around 1888 in his academic discourse named “A History of 
                                                     
373 Cf. Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq. with further references.  
374 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 2; Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq.; Rost, N. (2008), p. 
50 et seq. with further references. 
375 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 2; Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq. with further 
references. 
376 Cf. Ashraf, N., Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G. (2005), p. 131 et seq.; Camerer, 
C.F., Loewenstein, G., Rabin, M. (2004), p. 3 et seq. with further references; Beck, 
H. (2014), p. 2; Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., 
McElreath, R. (2001), p. 73 et seq. 
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Political Economy”.377 It then took academic discussion still until 1906, before the 
term “homo oeconomicus” first appeared in economic literature.378  
 
Descriptive theory or normative ideal construction? 
It did not last long, until first sceptical questions were raised about, whether 
the “Homo Oeconomicus” was really a descriptive theoretical approach to reality, 
or whether it was rather a normative construction, depicting an ideal model that 
was never actually to be seen and met in reality.379  
Those supporters of the idea of a descriptive theory often drew comparisons 
to nature sciences, e.g. physics, where assumptions and concepts were often 
developed as pure theory, hard or impossible to verify in reality in the fields.380 
Moreover, they held the argument that there were multiple examples for human 
behaviour in reality, which was reflecting all aspects of the theoretical description 
of Homo Oeconomicus.381 As an  economic agent, Homo Oeconomicus was often 
seen in reality as a participant in the various different markets existing due to 
human decision-making.382   
In contrast to this, another assessment of the concept was also frequently 
stated: the Homo Oeconomicus was often perceived and understood not as a 
descriptive theory, aiming to translate reality into a theoretical concept, but more 
as a normative construction. Supporters of this approach explained that the 
Homo Oeconomicus was the perfect theoretical model, the ideal human being, 
which in theory was derived from logical conclusions, but was not at all present 
in reality.383 In fact, no existence of a pure and full Homo Oeconomicus seems to 
be ever reported in academic literature.384  
                                                     
377 Cf. Ingram, J.K., Scott, W.A. (1919), p. 105 et seq.  
378 Cf. Pareto, V. (1919), p. 15. 
379 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 2 et seq. 
380 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 8 et seq.; Rost, N. (2008), p. 50 et seq. 
381 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 7 et seq. 
382 Cf. Camerer, C.F., Loewenstein, G., Rabin, M. (2004), p. 3 et seq. with further 
references; Beck, H. (2014), p. 8 et seq. 
383 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 7 et seq.; Kirchgässner, G. (2013), p. 13 et seq. 
384 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 7 et seq. 
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Of course, this approach raised immediate discussions and concerns – the 
scientific value of a theoretical model, which would never be proven or even 
traced in reality, was questioned in the academic discourse.385 What was the 
added value of the Homo Oeconomicus concept? Supporters of the theory stated 
that, even though only a normative construction, elements and certain aspects of 
behaviour of the Homo Oeconomicus were traceable in numerous aspects and 
examples of human behaviour.386 Moreover, it was held that the concept of the 
Homo Oeconomicus did in fact create a reference point, a baseline assumption for 
other disciplines, such as economic policies,387 for example, which were not able 
to exist without such basic assumptions, may they be completely correct or not.  
 
4.2.1.2. Critical review 
Despite the early discussions about the nature of the Homo Oeconomicus 
being rather a concept of descriptive theoretical nature or a normative approach 
to picture the “perfect man”, the concept was always subject to critical comments. 
Some of those comments focused on the concept’s descriptive nature only, some 
other critical review also challenged the Homo Oeconomicus as a normative 
approach.  
As a matter of fact, reality shows that human beings do not always act 
rational, but that they nevertheless tend to do so from time to time. Reality proofs 
the Homo Oeconomicus to be at least not real in all instances. Even though 
human beings often achieve tremendous success, are able to solve highly critical 
tasks, make inventions and push developments, which appear to be of 
extraordinary scope and dimension, human beings at the same time often 
struggle with completing easy tasks, having often an obvious advantage, even in 
a short-term view.  
                                                     
385 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 7 et seq; Rost, N. (2008), p. 50 et seq. with further 
references.  
386 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 8 et seq. 
387 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 2 et seq.; Rost, N. (2008), p. 50 et seq. 
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Beck388 gives the illustrious example of human beings being able to fly to the 
moon, to make developments in neurosciences, to execute breakthrough thinking 
on a considerable complex level, whereas at the same time, simple tasks like 
personal time management, management of individual capacities and the like 
appear to be tremendous challenges in which human beings often fail. Why is this 
the case? And how do those real examples connect with the theory of the Homo 
Oeconomicus?  
The answer is given on a multifold layer: Human beings are generally 
rational, but at the same time they do not always act rational. Their rationality is 
challenged by emotional aspects, by external and internal factors that bias the 
strict execution of rational behaviour.389  
This is the intersection, where the theoretical concept of the Homo 
Oeconomicus, which clearly has a huge scientific and strategic importance and 
value, requires to be combined with the individual’s situative environment, 
which appears to play a role in the light of individual decision making: this 
expanded view on an individual as being generally equipped with the 
fundamental ability to act rational, whereas at the same time being intergrated in 
a reality that triggers quick solutions and situative thinking, which does not 
always take full advantage of this general ability. This is, where the scientific 
research and academic discourse named “Behavioural Economics” comes into 
play.  
 
4.2.2. Behavioural Economics 
The criticism that was brought up against the theory of “Homo 
Oeconomicus” is directly connected with another scientific field of discourse and 
consideration: If human beings prove to not always act rationally, the question is, 
                                                     
388 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), Preface.  
389 Kahneman describes this two-fold approach of human behaviour as “System I” 
and “System II”, which generally control actions and decision-making: 
Kahneman, D. (2011), p. 19 et seq. & p. 89 et seq. 
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what reasons do exist that prevent them from such rational decision making. 
What does trigger “irrational” decisions to be taken?  
Over more than the last fourty (40) years, economic scientists have 
examined and discussed this question in various different aspects and 
perspectives.390 The outcome so far is, at least, a status quo of a discussion which 
is neither yet fully explored, nor to be further elaborated without the direct view 
also to the changing external environment, in which human actions and decisions 
are taken.  
As mentioned before, the critical discourse about the “Homo Oeconomicus” 
has led to the creation of a new layer, a new level of discussion, such being closely 
linked to the original theoretical concept and being often named and described as 
the “Behavioural Economics”.391 The current status of this discussion is to be 
described and analysed in the following, always in consideration of the central 
Research Topic of this thesis and therefore with a view to human beings’ actual 
decision making in Corporate Transactions.  
 
4.2.2.1. Heuristics and biases and the Prospect Theory  
In essence, the concept of “Homo Oeconomicus” was mainly criticized for 
not matching with reality. The assumption of a human being as behaving always 
and completely rational, only directed by the strength of his/her own will and 
being only driven to optimize its own benefits, critics alleged that this was simply 
not the behaviour that human beings showed in the real outside world. Therefore, 
the claim was often made that the “Homo Oeconomicus” theory was proven to be 
wrong by reality.392  
                                                     
390 It all started with: Kahneman D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq.; further 
overview provided by: Beck, H. (2014), p. 9 et seq.; Camerer, C.F. (1999), p. 10575 
et seq.; Camerer, C.F., Loewenstein, G., Rabin, M. (2004), p. 3 et seq.; 
Mullainathan, S., Thaler, R.H. (2000) with further references. 
391 See above, Chapter 4.2.1. 
392 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 9 et seq. 
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However, defenders of the “Homo Oeconomicus” model on the other hand 
hold that indeed their model was a theoretical approach only.393 They argued that 
it was the description of an “ideal” decision-maker and that the assumption was 
made under “ideal” circumstances, such being a bias-free environment for each 
action and decision taken. Similar to physical or chemical experiments taking 
place in a scientific laboratory where any real and unforeseeable external factors 
could be excluded, also the “Homo Oecomomicus” was only the theoretical 
model, not claiming to be fully existing with every aspect in the daily lives and 
decision-makings of human beings.394 
Critics therefore claimed that another layer required to be added to the 
study of human actions and decision-making: The Homo Oeconomicus had to be 
brought into a reality-check and had to face the existing external factors of real 
life.395  
In order to determine the influence and importance of external factors for 
human decision-making, the scientific discourse led to a clustering of such factors 
in accordance with the impact or result they would produce in the behaviour of 
the human being.396 Therefore, the academic discussion in the fields of 
“Behavioural Economics” does not only focus on the general assumption that the 
“outside world” might have an impact on each individual’s behaviour, but 
instead took a closer look and discussion for the different types of heuristics397 
and biases, which were to be observed in reality and in experiments, which aim to 
depict and rebuild such reality.  
However, not all human actions and decisions, also not in the “real world”, 
are biased or influenced by a heuristic reaction of the actor. The question, if a 
                                                     
393 See above, Chapter 4.2.1.2 with further references.  
394 See above, Chapter 4.2.1.2 with further references. 
395 See above, Chapter 4.2.1.2; cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 9 et seq. with further 
references.  
396 Cf. Mullainathan, S., Thaler, R.H. (2000) with further references; Beck, H. 
(2014), p. 9 et seq. with further references. 
397 Camerer, C.F. (1999), p. 10575 et seq.; Camerer, C.F., Loewenstein, G., Rabin, M. 
(2004), p. 3 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq.; 
Mullainathan, S., Thaler, R.H. (2000) with further references. 
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decision-making is determined all or in parts by a bias or not, is again one that 
can be answered only on the individual level: this depends on the individual, 
who is acting, his psychological setup and structure, as well as on the specific 
circumstances of the particular situation, in which an action or decision is to 
occur. Therefore, the entire scientific discourse about “Behavioural Economics” is 
not positioned and not aiming to find the recipe or key that is perfect and 
captured for each and every human action and decision that takes, place, but this 
academic discipline aims for a rich and realistic discourse about all the multiple 
possible factors and influences, which might well come into play for specific 
situations. Nevertheless, such specific situations would still require an individual 
assessment to explain human behaviour.  
In that regard, “Behavioural Economics” has so far led to the development 
of a “tool box” of possible explanations and analyses, which might prove well to 
fit and set in certain specific situations. A tool box with potentially helpful 
explanations, but not the full description and solution of the entire world of 
human activity and decision making. 
The scientific research and experiments, which have led to the discovery 
and formulation of such heurstics and biases over the years, has been significantly 
driven by the work conducted by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Their 
research, did not only allow for the formulation and definition of the specific 
heuristics and biases, which will be described in the following, but did also result 
in the formulation of a basic theory that closely ties in to the rational and 
reasoning of such individual heuristics and biases: the Prospect Theory.  
In a nutshell, this theory is the descriptive result of various experiments 
conducted by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky398 (and other to follow their 
initial work later399) and aims to describe the behaviour of individuals in 
situations in which a decision has to be taken, revealing the general risk aversion 
of individuals and that future prospect and current risk are not valuated equally 
                                                     
398 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 101 et seq. with further references; Kahneman, D., 
Tversky, A. (1979), p. 263 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1984), p. 342 et seq. 
399 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 101 et seq. with further references.  
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in case of uncertain conditions.400 The basic assumption is the individuals’ striving 
to maximize own profits, but not at all costs, but rather in close consideration of 
the risks that might manifestate otherwise. Individuals will thereby evaluate the 
likelihood of occurrence of the possible alternatives in a subjective way, 
influenced by their own current position and risk aversion.401   
Prospect theory aims to provide a theoretical instrument to predict human 
decision making behaviour by way of calculation of the factors and subjective 
probabilities.402  
In 2002, Kahneman was awarded with the Nobel Prize for Economics for his 
work and research on the Prospect Theory and the fields of Heuristics and 
biases.403   
The following shall provide a thorough overview of the specifics of such 
biases, by which reality interferes and influences human decision-making. This 
shall then serve as basis for a more detailed investigation of managers’ decision-
making in the M&A Transaction scenarios painted above.  
 
4.2.2.2. Availability Bias 
“We believe only, what we see” – this could be an easy statement that 
serves well in explaining the rationale behind what is often called to be an 
                                                     
400 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 101 et seq. with further references; Kahneman, D., 
Tversky, A. (1979), p. 263 et seq. 
401 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 101 et seq. with further references; Kahneman, D., 
Tversky, A. (1979), p. 263 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1984), p. 342 et seq. 
402 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 101 et seq. with further references; Kahneman, D. (2011), 
p. 278 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1979), p. 263 et seq.; Kahneman, D., 
Tversky, A. (1984), p. 342 et seq. 
403 Press note of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences on the awarding of the 
Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel to Daniel 
Kahneman, dated 9 October 2002 available via 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2002/ 
press.html; last check on 14 August 2018.  
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“availability bias”.404 The basic assumption behind is that individuals will well 
remember situations, events or factors, which they have experienced on their own 
already and will  
When being asked, whether the occurrence of a specific situation, event or 
factor is likely or not, their assessment of the likelihood will be influenced by the 
individual’s respective own experience. If he/she has experienced such a 
situation, event or such a factor already personally, then this fact is likely to 
overlay an objective assessment of the likelihood of its occurrence and might well 
lead to a biased, because objectively influenced, assessment. Various experiments 
have proven human beings’ tendency to the “overprediction” of the likelihood of 
its occurrence.  
Economists have traced and evidenced this bias alongside various 
experiments and studies405. They have identified personal experience to be not the 
only factor, by which remembrance can deteriorate an objective assessment. One 
more element of importance is also the question, at what point in thime this 
personal experience was made. The more recently is was made, the more vital is it 
still and that in itself constitutes another element to influence the assessment. 
Moreover, the question, if a certain experience was made personally or reported 
only, will also bias the assessment of its general and objective likelihood. If a 
certain event happened recently, perhaps even multiple times already and to the 
individual itself, this is likely to influence his/her assessment in a subjective way. 
In essence, the individual’s reasoning behind this would be probably along the 
following lines: “It that has happened to me, then it must have happened to many 
others already”.    
                                                     
404 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 38 et seq. with further references; Folkes, V.S. (1988), p. 
13 et seq.; Kahneman, D. (2011), p. 129 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1973), 
p. 207 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq. - Kahneman 
promoted the abbreviation “WYSIATI“ – What you see is all there is“ as a brief 
explanation of his concept of Availability as a bias to human decision-making: 
Kahneman, D. (2011), p. 129 et seq. 
405 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 38 et seq. with further references; Kahneman, D., 
Tversky, A. (1973), p. 207 et seq. 
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With a view to managerial decision-making in Corporate Transactions, this 
bias is likely to occur in two aspects:406  
First and foremost, past experiences of Managers might impact their view 
and assessment of a current Corporate Transaction. For example, certain aspects 
that used to be roadblocks or problems in past transactions, are likely to be 
considered by the respective Manager as major aspects also in any following 
transaction, although an objective assessment of the current deal setup and 
constitution might not support this view.   
Managerial decisions might therefore be taken in the behavioural pattern of 
concluding that the specific feature or situation is comparable to a past 
experience. Such perceived comparability might lead to inappropriate decisions 
taken, because they are based not on an objective assessment of the current 
situation, but rather on a misunderstood or overly hasty assessment in the light of 
a similar, but not identical, past experience.  
Another angle, by which the Availability Bias might find its way into a 
Corporate Transaction could be general availability of data and information 
throughout the lifetime of the Corporate Transaction itself. Hence, no 
remembrance of past deals and situations is likely to influence the Manager’s 
behaviour in this regard, but rather the information that he had encountered and 
learned at an earlier stage of the very same Corporate Transaction. The most 
important phase for information collection and learnings about the Target 
Company’s setup and thereby necessary particularities for the structure of the 
Corporate Transaction, is the phase of “Proper Inspection”, which includes the 
Due Diligence of the information made available.  
Here, the Purchaser’s Management might learn facts and information that it 
considers to give an all-embracing picture of the Target Company. As described 
above, this is the original and pure goal of a Due Diligence, to come to a sound 
and proper knowledge level about the Target Company. However, in case certain 
facts cannot be made available at the early stage of “Proper Inspection”, e.g. due 
to such information being relevant in the light of competition and antitrust laws, 
or even because such information is sensitive to time and does change throughout 
                                                     
406 Cf. also Dhir, S., Mital, A. (2012), p. 59 et seq. with further references; 
Langevoort, D.C. (2011) with further references.  
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the further steps and progressing of the deal, then the initial learning of this 
information might still lead to a biased consideration of any such later changes.  
Therefore, the Availability Bias could occur during a Corporate Transaction, 
related to information learned at a rather early phase and influence managerial 
actions at a later stage of the same Corporate Transaction.   
 
4.2.2.3. Confirmation Bias 
Experiments and analysis with regard to human behaviour and decision-
making have revealed another potential bias, which might be of relevance in 
various situations: The so-called “Confirmation Bias”.407 
This behavioural pattern is connected to human beings’ often-perceived 
struggle to adapt to changes and to accept a transformational process of 
surrounding factors.408 Now, when asked to value a certain outcome or factor, 
humans often tend to allow the thought that this factor, outcome or new 
development does actually support an earlier view, position or argumentation 
line that they had already developed. In simple words: Humans want to be 
proven to be correct - individuals tend to believe that their previous opinion is 
supported by new facts, then to accustom to the fact that a new fact would actual 
require us to give up our previously held position or opinion.409 Confirming facts 
are over-valued, whereas facts to challenge or counter-evidence an existing 
thought position, are likely to be considered with too little impact and 
importance.410  
                                                     
407 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 47 et seq. with further reference; Doherty, M.E., Mynatt, 
C.R., Tweney, R.D., Schiavo, M.D. (1979), p. 111 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, 
A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq.; Klayman, J. (1995), p. 385 et seq.; Nickerson, R.S. (1998), 
p. 175 et seq. 
408 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 47 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et 
seq.; Nickerson, R.S. (1998), p. 175 et seq. 
409 Cf. Nickerson, R.S. (1998), p. 175 et seq. 
410 Cf. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq. 
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As such preference to seek and find a confirmation strongly appears to 
exist,411 human beings tend to also incorrectly allocate certain results or facts into 
the category of supporting a position or opinion, even though this might not be 
exactly correct. This is, what scientists in Behavioural Economics do call a 
“Confirmation Bias”. A certain factor is erroneously assessed to support a 
previously taken position or opinion.412  
The risk that a certain circumstance or development is falsely categorized as 
confirming an earlier assessment, might also manifest in the scenario of a 
Corporate Transaction. As a general shortcut used for judgements made by 
humans, also Managing Directors might be influenced in such a way.413 An earlier 
assessment made is perceived to be confirmed by facts or develpments occurring 
at a later stage of the transaction. Such risk might lead to improper decision-
making, eventually even disadvantageous for the Manager’s own position or that 
one of his Company. To effectively prevent such disadvantages, a general 
awareness of the respective Manager is necessary that things like these can 
happen – also to him. If that awareness is given, the introduction of e.g. a four-
eyes-principle can be an effective tool to mitigate such risks by having 
considerations checked and openly discussed by two knowledgable individuals at 
least.  
Nevertheless, in reality such a risk mitigation instance is likely not to be 
used, also due to politicial reasons: A Managing Director who is competent to 
take strategic decisions during a Corporate Transaction is likely to receive only 
“political” feedback, when sharing his thoughts and considerations, unless from 
managerial peers, who view themselves as equal partners and not further down 
in the hierarchy.  
 
                                                     
411 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 47 et seq. with further reference; Doherty, M.E., Mynatt, 
C.R., Tweney, R.D., Schiavo, M.D. (1979), p. 111 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, 
A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq.; Nickerson, R.S. (1998), p. 175 et seq. 
412 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 47 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et 
seq. 
413 Cf. Dhir, S., Mital, A. (2012), p. 59 et seq. 
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4.2.2.4. Overconfidence 
Human beings have a natural tendency of being confident about their own 
skills and talent, especially if they had experienced earlier events that made them 
believe or reason that this was the case.414  Even if that might not always seem 
obvious for everyone, confidence in one’s own skills is an inevitable requirement 
for each human being to be able to stay alive and to function within scenarios 
he/she does face.  
However, confidence is of different level for each individual and the scale 
can vary significantly, even for human beings who face comparable situations.  
Based on such general results proven by early studies and assessments,415 
scientists in the fields of “Behavioural Economics” have identified this natural 
tendency to overconfidence to be another potential bias, which might deteriorate 
objective and efficient human decision-making.416  This bias might apply to 
various factors and abilities, which individuals assess themselves to have the 
skillset to rely on – some of the most prominent examples would be 
communication skills, time management, physical abilities, just to name a few.417  
In case a human-being does overrate the quality of its own skills and talent 
for a certain ability, then this might mislead him/her also on the predication of the 
most likely outcome of applying such skills and might base any other action on 
faulty, because overly positive, predictions. Especially in situations, where 
interaction between individuals takes place and one individual needs to rely on 
an action taken or a factor influenced by another human being, this might lead to 
problems and inefficient results, if the passive individual had trusted the active 
                                                     
414 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 58 et seq.; Kahneman, D. (2011), p. 199 et seq.; 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., 
Tversky, A. (2008), p. 287 et seq. 
415 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 58 et seq.; Kahneman, D. (2011), p. 199 et seq.; Kahneman, 
D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq ; Oskamp, S. (1965), p. 265 et seq.; Russo, J.E., 
Schoemaker, P.J.H. (1992) with further references.  
416 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 58 et seq.; Oskamp, S. (1965), p. 265 et seq.; Russo, J.E., 
Schoemaker, P.J.H. (1992) with further references.  
417 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 58 et seq.; Oskamp, S. (1965), p. 265 et seq. 
181 
THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR AND 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
individual’s assessment of its own skills and those turn out to be based on 
groundless overconfidence.  
The bias of being overly confident in own skills and learnings is relevant in 
a Corporate Transaction as well. The research that has been conducted in that 
regard so far, has lead to the same conclusion.418 The reason for this appears to be 
closely connected to personality and main character traits of many Managers: To 
make a way into an influential position with decision-making power in a multi-
national Company, such individuals are likely to show certain personality aspects 
which might at the same time also expose them to the bias of Overconfidence. 
Strong belief in own skills, the ability to win argumentations and to lead and 
persuade others, scientific research has proven those characteristics to be found 
with individuals in management functions more often than usual.419  
Moreover, an overly strong trust in own abilities and skills is often also 
linked to a certain management style, which will be further assessed and 
described below in Chapter 4.3.2.  
In concreto, the Overconfidence Bias might lead to unrealistic expectations 
for the timing and outcome of contract negotiations in a Corproate Transaction, 
for example. Managers might simply overestimate their negotiation skills and the 
results they will be able to produce during a negotiation. Another risk associated 
thereto is an improper assessment of risks associated to failure.  
A CEO who believes that he will succeed in all relevant aspects of the 
contract negotiations of a Corporate Transaction might not be properly prepared 
to also accept and finance a purchase price that is higher than he initially 
expected. Also, strategic considerations of the Purchasing Company’s 
Management might be biased by individual Overconfidence and might result in 
an acquisition of a Target Company that does either not enhance or support such 
strategy or accelerate the failure of a strategic direction. For example, the strategic 
aim to transform a regionally successful company into a global player, might not 
necessarily turn out to be successful, only because of an acquisition conducted in 
                                                     
418 Cf. Dhir, S., Mital, A. (2012), p. 59 et seq. with further references; Langevoort, 
D.C. (2011) with further references. 
419 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 58 et seq.; Dhir, S., Mital, A. (2012), p. 59 et seq. with 
further references. 
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another region, if the Purchasing Company itself is not yet fit for its integration 
and or the cultural and organisational challenges, which come along the path of 
globalisation.  
Therefore, the bias of Overconfidence is likely to be of significance in the 
context of decision-making in Corporate Transactions.  
 
4.2.2.5. Hindsight bias 
Human beings are skilled with the enormous ability to remember past 
events and experiences. This forms the most basic precondition and basis for the 
development and re-shaping of individual behaviour over time, which is called 
“experience”. It is not only the pure ability to remember, but also the ability to 
adjust current behaviour based on learnings made by past events. Experience is a 
process of remembering and learning.  
However, the process of remembering does not always go an objective 
path. Memories can become subjective, can change over time and can be 
influenced by later events, behaviours and reflections.420 This “adjustment” of 
memories, this hidden or unconscious modification can cause another bias for 
human decision-making: the so-called “hindsight bias”. If the outcome of a 
certain situation or scenario is known and memorized, then this is likely to 
become a relevant factor in the decision-making in comparable situations or 
scenarios thereafter.421  
This bias can manifestate in various different ways, as for example the 
effect, which is often described as “Knew it all along”422: Once the individual has 
knowledge about the outcome of a particular event, he will likely tend to believe 
that he anticipated this outcome from the very beginning on. Experiments have 
given evidence that such a retroactive and hypothetic design is often caused and 
                                                     
420 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 69 et seq.; Hawkins, S.A., Hastie, R. (1990), p. 311 et seq. 
with further references.  
421 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 69 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et 
seq. 
422 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 69 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et 
seq. 
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likely to create a biased memory of the individual’s own thought and decision 
process prior to experiencing the actual outcome.423  
Another likely way for this bias to occur is the so-called “outcome effect”, 
which, in fact, describes the observation made in various experimental studies 
that a human being tends to overestimate the likelihood of other individuals in 
prediction an outcome of a situation correctly, if he himself had been proven right 
in his prediction before. A similar bias could also occur with regard to the 
prediction of the likelihood of a certain outcome for a situation, if oneself had 
been proven correct in the prediction of an outcome to a similar event 
previously.424  
The actual varieties in which the Hindsight Bias can occur and influence a 
decision can also be transplanted into Corporate Transaction scenarios. In case 
that decision-makers experience and undergo situations, which are in some or all 
ways similar to events they had previously experienced, the Hindsight Bias might 
influence the actual decision-making in the situation. This might lead to false 
decisions, based on biased memories or the overassessment of the likelihood of a 
certain outcome. One potential scenario might be for example that a decision-
maker overestimates the likelihood that his decision will turn out to be beneficial 
to the company, only because he had made positive experiences in similar 
situations in the past. This might lead to a biased risk-assessment, taking into 
account past experiences which might create an unjustified confidence in taking 
a/the right decision.  
Here again, this specific bias is likely to play a role also in the context of 
Corporate Transactions and decision-making of Managers associated therewith. 
The experience and learning from Corporate Transactions conducted in the past 
can set the stage for improper or indistinct assessment of current situations in a 
“new” Corporate Transaction.  
As an example, the Hindsight Bias might lead to an improper risk 
assessment in a current Corporate Transaction, based on the biased hindsight to a 
part Corporate Transaction, where a certain risk did not manifestate. Past success 
                                                     
423 Cf. Fischhoff, B. (2007), p. 10 et seq. with further references.  
424 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 69 et seq.; Hawkins, S.A., Hastie, R. (1990), p. 311 et seq. 
with further references. 
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might be visible and remembered overly clear and glorious and this might affect 
the current risk disposition, time management or expectations for the negotiations 
of a contract.   
 
4.2.2.6. Anchoring 
An individual’s view of the world does always depend on the respective 
individual’s current position and perspective.425 This is true also for opinions and 
for assessments made by Managers. Their existing knowledge and experience is 
what they build on for any actions they take and also for any predictions, 
assessments or evaluations they make.426 The reason for this is rather simple: A 
human being’s brain will make him rely on memories and past actions, as this 
process is called “experience”, built and developed automatically over the years 
throughout our lives.427  
Nevertheless, as depicted above,428 the process of remembering past events, 
decisions and thought processes is not always happening in an objective and 
realistic way, but memories are subjective and often vary from the actual past 
events, they are biased.429 
When is a bias likely to occur and to influence behaviour? Whenever an 
action or decision is to be made, which contains or appears to have similarities or 
parallel factors to situations or decisions, which the individual did already make 
and manage at an earlier occasion. During the process of assessing and thinking 
about a specific situation or challenge, individuals do automatically scan their 
memories for similar events in the past.  
                                                     
425 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 145 et seq. with further references.  
426 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 145 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et 
seq. 
427 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 145 et seq.; Furnham, A., Hua Chu, B. (2011), p. 35 et seq. 
with further references. 
428 Cf. above Chapter 4.2.2.5 with further references.   
429 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 145 et seq. 
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In experiments and assessments, Tversky and Kahneman430 collected data 
that the Anchoring Effect is significantly visible in situations, in which prices or 
conditions are negotiated or estimated. Experiments showed that the price, which 
was mentioned at first, was most likely to serve as an anchor in the later 
assessment of price suitability. Especially, whenever an assessment or decision 
has to be made, human beings have proven to be willing to rely on frames, base 
assumptions or similar past events.431  
Especially in advertisement and marketing, the Anchoring Effect is often 
used as a tool to influence human behaviour and the perception of certain pricing 
or special offers.432 Experiments have e.g. also proven school teachers to being 
open for influencing by past results and grades, when they are about to make 
their own assessment of a pupil’s performance.433 
Based on such examples, it is apparent that the Anchoring Effect can occur 
in two different ways: (1) A person can be influenced in a decision or statement 
scenario by previous experiences, by connecting a present situation, faulty or for 
good reasons, with an earlier experience made or outcome received or (2) the 
circumstances of the specific present situation can provide an anchor that 
influences the decision taken, e.g. the first price offer can determine the value 
assessment that the individual bases its own price finding and justification on.  
For both alternatives, the influence of the Anchoring Effect can turn out to 
be either advantageous or disadvantageous for the individual. However, both 
ways, the actual decision taken is biased. Not stating that such influence does 
occur in every decision taken by individuals, but if a certain experience or fact 
serves as anchor, then the respective decision is influenced by a factor, which is 
subjective and potentially hard or impossible to predict or to logically account for.  
                                                     
430 Cf. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq. 
431 Cf. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq.; Orr, D., Guthrie, C. (2006), 
p. 597 et seq. with further references.  
432 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 147; Furnham, A., Hua Chu, B. (2011), p. 35 et seq. with 
further references; Orr, D., Guthrie, C. (2006), p. 597 et seq. with further 
references.  
433 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 147 et seq. with further references.  
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The question if and how an Anchoring Effect might influence a particular 
situation or assessment, might depend on various different factors, most of which 
are subjectively embedded in the sphere of the individual decision-maker: 
adjusting a decision or prediction on the basis of experiences collected in the past 
is only possible, if the individual does have any such experience from previous 
events, which it may recall and deem suitable as an anchoring fact. If an 
individual is confronted with an unprecedenced situation, where no linkage or 
assumed linkage to earlier events can be found, then no anchoring is possible.    
Moreover, experiments give rise to the fact that the Anchoring Effect is 
more likely to occur, if the anchor element is a numeric figure or number, which 
is easier to be remembered than another fact or word.434 This strengthens the 
assumption that only those types of data can serve as a strong anchor, which are 
rather easy to be recognized and which derive from a category of facts, which is 
comparable to earlier collected data.  
With a view to Corporate Transactions, the Anchoring Effect can have an 
influence on decisions taken and assumptions made in both ways described 
above: The existence of characteristic anchoring facts can either be experiences, 
which influence an decision-makers actions during a Corporate Transaction or 
can also be the occurrence of certain facts or information elements in the 
respective present situation, which frame or adjust an assessment, which is to be 
made.  
Therefore,  the Anchoring Effect is likely to occur during the early stages of 
a Corporate Transaction, hence, during the “Proper Inspection” of the Target 
Company by the Purchaser and/or during the negotiation of the contractual basis 
of the Corporate Transaction. In both such stages, the Anchoring Effect can lead 
to disadvantageous positions or faulty assumptions of the respective party’s 
Management.  
  
                                                     
434 Cf. Furnham, A., Hua Chu, B. (2011), p. 35 et seq. with further references; 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974), p. 1124 et seq. 
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4.2.2.7. Framing 
Another potentially influencing factor for decisions and actions might arise 
from formulation of the problem statement or question itself: Even though the 
content might be the same, responses or results might vary due to the nature of 
phrasing a question or problem-statement. Experiments show that the wording of 
a question or proposal is likely to influence the answers given and the actions 
derived from it.435 
This factor is another element that might influence, bias, the answer given, 
decision taken or action executed on an individual situation basis. It might have 
an impact on the result and might therewith trigger a consequence, bring a 
Corporate Transaction forward into an unpredicted or illogical direction. In real 
life the most well-known example of this influence factor is the usage of so-called 
“leading questions”, whereby the wording of the question itself implies and 
influences the choice and articulation of a specific answer thereto.436   
However, the influence of the “framing” of a question or problem statement 
might not always be direct, but can be also rather consequential, indirect. This 
phenomenon might especially occur, if the framing and wording of a question 
would merely strengthen or exclude only certain argumentation lines, aspects or a 
general direction for the decision. In that case, the setup would not be a clear 
suggestive question, but rather the implicit setting of a frame for a decision or 
answer, in which different variances of answers or actions are still open to be 
found.  
Literature regarding the “Framing Effect” does mainly distinguish between 
different types of framing: (1) attributive framing, (2) risky goal framing and (3) 
goal framing.437 
Attributive framing is the intentional usage of explicitly positive or negative 
descriptions and attributes for particular object or problem-statement. Both such 
                                                     
435 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 153 et seq. with further references.  
436 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 153 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1981), p. 453 et 
seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1986), p. 5251 et seq. 
437 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 153 et seq. with further references.  
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descriptions are in obvious opposition to each other and cannot both be chosen at 
the same time in a decision making or opinion statement. In general, individuals 
have proven in experiments to more tend to agree with the positive description, 
as if they “wanted to believe” in the positive aspect in everything.438  
Risky goal framing does mainly refer to the risk aversion that the majority 
of the individuals has and shows, whenever a specific earning is set out to be 
expected. Here again, it depends on the formulation and wording, if individuals 
will decide to take a risk or whether they aim to secure a benefit or expected 
earning. In case the description of a question or problem-statement refers mainly 
to the potential losses and threats, then the individuals are more likely to take a 
risky approach, risking to face the losses and manifestation of the threats which 
were described. If, however, the description of the decision to be taken does 
mainly focus on the potential advantages and benefits, then the decision-maker is 
more likely to act risk-adverse, aiming to secure the benefit and to minimize the 
existing threats.439   
The third type is Goal Framing. Here again, the basic assumption is that 
individuals aim to avoid negative consequences and the manifestation of risks.440  
With a view to Management behaviour and decision-making in Corporate 
Transactions, the Framing Effect might play a role in the light of the Proper 
Inspection of the Target Company, e.g. with regard to the way how questions are 
formulated in order to receive further information beyond the content of the Data 
Room during the Due Diligence.  
 
4.2.2.8. Status Quo Bias 
In addition to the above mentioned biasses, there is also another influencing 
factor, which experiments have revealed in practice: Human beings have shown 
                                                     
438 Cf. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1986), p. 5251 et seq.; Levin, I.P., Schneider, 
S.L., Gaeth, G.J. (1998), p. 149 et seq. with further references.  
439 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 153 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1986), p. 5251 et 
seq. 
440 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 153 et seq. 
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in experiments to be sceptical and negative towards change.441 If they are allowed 
to chose between either keeping an existing status or changing it, they prefer to 
preserve the existing status instead of facing changes to it.  
A very illustrative and often cited example for the Status Quo Bias is an 
experiment in which an individual is confronted with receiving a certain amount 
of money as heir, such money being currently invested in a certain type of 
investment.442 The investment was made by the individual’s uncle, a person 
known to him. The individual is now asked to invest the money again with the 
choice of either investing it in a different way or re-investing it similar to what the 
uncle had invested in previously (e.g. a certain type of stock shares). In the vast 
majority of the cases, the individuals choose to invest the money similar to uncle’s 
previous investment.  
In contrary to this behaviour, if no information about the uncle‘s previous 
investment had been revealed, but the heir had simply received the amount in 
cash, then no preference for either types of investment was visible. 
Another common example for the Status Quo Bias is the phenomenon that 
an elected person, who is currently in charge of a political function, e.g. president 
or minister, is very likely to have a higher chance of being re-elected than his 
opponent to be newly elected.443 As always, there are exceptions to this rule,which 
more proves to be a major likelihood, but of course not a set prediction. Various 
other factors might also influence a politican’s chances of being re-elected, such as 
its current popularity or un-popularity and external factors such as unforseens 
events and the profile of the respective opponent.444  
However, both such experiments are practical examples of the theoretical 
finding that individuals often show a strong tendency to preserve the existing and 
to face changes and transformations in a rather sceptical way.    
Another important factor in the individual’s process of decision-making is 
often also the aspect of time: If a current status has been unchanged already for a 
                                                     
441 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 163 et seq. with further references.  
442 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 164; Samuelson, W., Zeckhauser, R. (1988), p. 7 et seq. 
with further references.  
443 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 163 et seq. with further references;  
444 Cf. Samuelson, W., Zeckhauser, R. (1988), p. 7 et seq. with further references.  
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rather long time (there is no objective definition to „long“ in this regard, but this 
would be again determined by the particularities of the respective scenario), then 
the individual is more likely to have a tendency to preserve this status, whereas a 
status, which is existing only for a reasonably short time so far, often appears not 
to have a strong effect on the individual’s decision.445 The longer a Status Quo 
exists, the more likely it is that the individual will aim to preserve it and 
therewith bias a decision scenario with it.   
The academic discourse considers various different reasons and 
explanations for the Status Quo Bias. A linkage to the Prospect Theory is drawn 
via findings that individuals have a strong aversion towards loosing existing 
properties.446 Any change of the status quo can have a negative effect to such 
properties and is therefore considered as a risk of loosing, of weakening the 
individual’s current position. Even though changes do also contain the possibility 
to improve an existing position, the risk of loss is in most cases valuated higher 
than the manifestation of a positive risk in an improvement. During its process of 
decision making, the individual will consider all (likely) outcomes of the different 
options and therewith undergo a valuation and risk consideratiaon proecess. As a 
matter of fact, the more complex a decision scenario is, the more complex the 
valuation and risk consideration process has to be.  
Based on the Prospect Theory’s aspect of risk aversion, also the complexity 
of the decision scenario itself is likely to have an impact on the decision taken. 
Should the individual consider the complexity of the scenario to be detrimental or 
risky to its goal of taking the „best“ or most appropriate decision (which is to be 
viewed from a subjective standpoint, of course), then the individual is even more 
likely to take a conservative, risk-minimalizing position. Complexity increases 
uncertainty, the residual level of the unknown, which in itself is considered to be 
a negative risk.  
Another explanation approach does focus on the individual’s aversion of 
regret.447 Individuals have proven in experiments to calculate and consider the 
                                                     
445 Cf. Samuelson, W., Zeckhauser, R. (1988), p. 7 et seq. with further references.  
446 For details and references regarding the Prospect Theory see above, Chapter 
4.2.2.1. 
447 Cf. Loomes, G., Sudgen, R. (1982), p. 805 et seq with further references.  
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regret they might possibly feel, if a decision turns out to be made „wrong“448 and 
would be reluctant to face a regret. Regret is considered to be a cost, a negative 
consequence that an individual would seek to avoid, if ever possible.449 If now the 
current status is considered to be of high value and little risk, then any change 
thereto inherits the risk that the individual might regret the decision taken 
afterwards, if the the situation turns out to have worsened after the decision 
manifestates.  
In the scenario of decision-making in Corporate Transactions, the Status  
Quo Bias is likely to occur in different types and stages:  
The Management of the Target Company is likely to be exposed to the 
Status Quo Bias and therefore to negatively view and reject the potentially 
upcoming change of ownership. As described above in Chapter 3.4.3, the Target 
Company’s Management does have certain effective instruments to either delay, 
complicate or even prevent the Corporate Transaction from successful 
completion. Therefore, a strong motivation to preserve the Status Quo at their end 
might pose a significant risk to the entire transactional efforts of Seller and 
Purchaser, still within the legal boundaries and limitations describred above.  
Especially with regard to the post-merger integration of the Target 
Company into the Purchasing Company’s organisational structure, economic 
success should be seen as a process of constant transformation, which requires a 
mind-set and willingness to change. One of the main challengedes for the 
Management of the Purchasing Company will be, to identify this and to 
successfully overcome or prevent this rejection of change.  
For the Purchasing Company, the Status Quo Bias might lead to an 
improper integration of the Target Company post the Closing. In case the 
Management and staff of the Purchasing Company view their pre-transactional 
Status as strong and successful, this might put at risk the potential for positive 
developments and synergies of the Corporate Transaction. The economic value of 
the acquisition might then be partially lost due to improper confidence and 
Overconfidence in the Purchasing Company’s Status Quo.  
                                                     
448 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 168 with further references.  
449 Cf. Loomes, G., Sudgen, R. (1982), p. 805 et seq with further references.  
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For the Selling Entity, the Status Quo Bias might come into play already 
prior to the actual transaction. A general scepticism towards changes and towards 
definite decisions that lead the path towards change, might result in an improper 
delay of the decision to sell the Target Company. Economic disadvantages of 
selling too late might be e.g. a cooling-down of the relevant market atmosphere 
that leads to a lower Selling Price for the Target Company.  
Moreover, it is important to be aware of the fact that the Status Quo Bias 
might not only occur in the major decision making of the Management, but that 
this might also impact decisions taken in the companies on lower levels in the 
decision hierachy and thereby might jeopardize the success of the Transaction in 
the end.  
 
4.2.2.9. Endowment effect 
In contrast to most of the biasses and effects mentioned, above, experiments 
have also revealed another phenomenon, which is sets a different perspective for 
influencing human behaviour and decision making450: A human being tends to 
evaluate an asset, which it holds in ist ownership as more precious than such 
asset might actually, objectively, be.451 The objective value is biassed by the 
subjective view of the individual that derives from the fact of personal ownership. 
This perspective differs from other biasses mentioned above, because it is linked 
mainly to an objective fact – the ownership in a certain asset. The bias then 
derives from this fact on a second level only, which is the question of adequate 
valuation of this asset.  
This effect, often described as „Endowment Effect“452, becomes apparent e.g. 
in situations, in which an individual negotiates to resell the asset: The price, for 
which the individual might be willing to sell the asset often shows to be 
significantly higher than the objective market value of the asset. Such subjective 
                                                     
450 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 170 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., Thaler, R. (1991), 
p. 193 et seq. with further references.  
451 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 170.  
452 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 170 et seq.; Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., Thaler, R. (1991), 
p. 193. 
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effects might be softened or circumvented by market and price scale research of 
the individual in advance. But still then, the inidividual might still feel that 
market prices appear to him to be too low in the light of his perceived, subjective 
value for the asset. This might then even influence the individual’s decision, if to 
sell the asset at all.  
The Endowment Effect ties in with elements of the basic economic theory: 
The valuation factor of an object and the owner’s subjective base price and 
willingness to negotiate in order to facilitate a match between market and 
demand.453  
Why is the Endowment Effect taking place and influencing human 
behaviour and asset valuation in experminetal practice? 
The root cause discussions again go back to elements of the Prosepect 
Theory: Human beings experience losses and disadvantages as more significant 
and more costly than success and benefits.454 Therefore, the loss of an asset must 
be consequentially also reimbursed with a higher price than the objectively 
reasonable, as it includes a „subjective loss“ component in pricing.  
An additional contributing factor might also be the fact that the individual 
has chosen this specific asset over other assets in the acquisition process and has 
therewith made the decision for this very asset. In order to verify and reason this 
decision also retroactively, it comes as a natural reaction to valuate the asset as 
more precious and superior to other assets, which were available and/or 
comparable at the time of the acquisition. Here, the reason and explanation of this 
effect might reveal a connection to the Confirmation Bias, as described above.455 
The individual would again, also in the pricing and valuation of an asset, seek for 
a confirmation of its earlier decision to chose and acquire exactly this one asset.  
However, the reasonable line of differentiating between an over-pricing due 
to the Endowment Effect and a strategically high first offer is hard to draw in 
practice. Pricing, especially the first pricing offer made by the Seller, will most 
likely also include a strategic element to gain a most suitable starting point for the 
price negotiations. Therefore, the Endowment Effect should be considered and 
                                                     
453 Cf. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., Thaler, R. (1991), p. 193 with further references.  
454 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 173; Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., Thaler, R. (1991), p. 193. 
455 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.3.  
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taken into account in the analysis of pricing and decision-making scenarios, but 
should not be interpreted as the main driving factor of human behaviour as such, 
because there are most likely other aspects influencing the decision or price 
determination at the same time as well. The theoretic discussion and experimental 
science around the Endowment Effect456 should not be minoritzed, but should be, 
same as for all categories and forms of biasses, only seen as one reference point, 
one possible element of theoretical explanation of a practical phenomenon and 
not as the ultimate conclusion.  
Taking the theoretical concept and explanations of the Endowment Effect 
into consideration, this bias might also be relevant in Corporate Transactions:  
With a view to the Selling Company’s Management, the Endowment Effect 
might result in an over-estimation of the value of the Target Company. The Seller 
might not be considering an objectively reasonable price, but might instead be 
seeking for a “loss reimbursement” and a compensation that is considered to be 
adequate to the prior investments made in the Target Company. This is relevant 
especially in Private Equity constellations, where the Selling Company seeks for a 
return on its investment and does have a very clear view of what was originally 
paied for the acquisition of the Target Company.   
With regard to the Purchasing Company, the Endowment Effect should be 
considered as one element that is likely to play a role in the intial pricing 
considerations of the Seller. The Purchaser should not consider the pricing 
considerations made and communicated by the Seller to be of purely objective 
nature, but should well take into account what has been descibred above: the 
Seller is likely to put the price tag on its own investments and not on the objective 
value of the Target Company. Therefore, the Purchasing Company’s Management 
is well-advised to verify offers, pricing and calculations made by the Seller 
thouroughly and to conduct an objective valuation of the Target Company, if 
possible. If and once the Purchaser is able to locate and quantify the existence of 
an Endowment Effect on the Seller’s side, this can play out as a strong argument 
in the purchase price discussions.  
                                                     
456 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 170 et seq.; Kahneman, D. (2011), p. 289 et seq.;  
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., Thaler, R. (1991), p. 193. 
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For the Target Company, there should be a general awareness that its owner 
might not objectively valuate it, but might rather consider own costs and 
investments as the actual value of the Target Company. In the light of the 
information and data collection for the Due Diligence, this might be of relevance 
for the nature and scope of the documents and data produced to substantiate the 
Seller’s pricing expectations.  
 
4.2.2.10. Mental accounting 
Next to the effects and biasses mentioned above, the concept of Behavioural 
Economics does also include a theoretical model that seeks to explain the process 
of evaluating and human decision-making – this concept is often described as 
Mental Accounting.457  
As a quintessence from the above described effects and biasses, it can be 
stated that Behavioural Economics have moved away from the pure concept of 
the Homo Oeconomicus458. Behavioural Economics rather accepts the Homo 
Oeconomicus as a theoretical concept, depicting the ideal human decision-maker 
in theory, but then takes a further step to bring this theoretical ideal into reality 
and accepting the biasses and effects, by which reality interferes into such. 
One central element that is inherint in all the effects and biasses mentioned 
above is the element of an individual economic approach of the human being to 
every decision-making scenario in reality.459 All such biasses and effects show the 
aim of a human being to draw interconnections between present decisions to be 
taken and past events and experiences. The individual seeks to connect past and 
present by a learning curve, letting past events influence present behaviour.  
The past value of a presently existing asset influences the individual’s 
current valuation thereof (Endowment Effect),460 the individual evaluates his own 
present abilities too optimistic, based on past experiences and a lack of negative 
                                                     
457 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 178 et seq. with further references.  
458 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.1.  
459 Cf. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1984), p. 342 et seq.  
460 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.9.  
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experiences in the past (Overconfidence),461 the individual has experienced a 
certain good or category of goods to be available in the past and therewith comes 
to the conclusion that a change thereof, a shortage of this good or category of 
goods is rather unlikely to occur in present or future (Availability Bias),462 just to 
give a view examples, where human beings draw connections, make learnings – 
such being correct or false, but still existing – from past to present or future 
events. These learnings, this gain of experience, however, is, as experiments 
show463, not leading to a perfection of human decision-making. It is not constantly 
improving the decisions made in their quality and is not leading the human being 
towards becoming a perfect decision-maker that takes into account each and 
every aspect, significant or little, in its process of finding the „correct“ decision.  
On the contrary, the constant learning curve and gain of experiences in 
decision scenarios leads towards more efficiency in future decisions. Human 
beings develop an ability of not becoming the perfect decision-maker, the pure 
Homo Oeconomicus, but to become the most efficient decision-maker, by making 
use of past experiences, drawing conclusions and making assumptions and 
decisions based on likelihood only.464 By that, human beings trade off the 
possibility to always make the best possible decision against the gain of spending 
the optimum resources and mental capacities on a certain subject matter. This 
allows to make parallel decisions and to spend mental capacities on different 
subjects, not exactly at the same time, but in a short sequence.  
Whatever factors bias a decision-making process from the decider’s 
subjective position, is one element that the decider does account for mentally and 
the efficiency of which he does calculate mentally, according to the concept of the 
so-called „Mental Accounting“ aspect of the theoretical construction of 
Behavioural Economics.465  
                                                     
461 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.4. 
462 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.2. 
463 Cf. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1984), p. 342 et seq.  
464 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 178 et seq.; Thaler, R. (1985), p. 199 et seq.; Thaler, R. 
(1999), p. 183 et seq. with further references.  
465 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 178 et seq.; Thaler, R. (1985), p. 199 et seq.; Thaler, R. 
(1999), p. 183 et seq. with further references.  
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In brief, the concept of Mental Accounting describes a human being’s 
tendency to categorize available options, potential consequences and aspects with 
regard to a certain aspect or problem statement that requires a decision. 
Categorization herewith serves as a way to summarize and therewith simplify the 
process of considering different aspects relevant to the decision at hand.  
The categorization itself is done in accordance with a priorization pattern, 
which is mainly based on individual experiences and past learnings. Therewith, 
the mental account created for a specific decision to be made, serves as a frame, as 
a structure that interconnects the necessities of the current scenario with past 
experiences and abstracted learnings therefrom. Categorization serves as the main 
basis for efficiency in that regard and makes every decision scenario become part 
of a sequence, an interwoven network of decisions and experiences.  
Moreover, Mental Accounts are not only a tool to solve individual 
scenarios, but similarily also contributes to the individual’s banking of risks and 
advantages, costs and benefits. Any such information is the basic setup of this 
account.  
Typically, Mental Accounting is not only the manifestation of Behavioural 
Economists, the reality-updated version of the Homo Oeconomicus, but with its 
general approach of efficiency maximisation does also come a certain element of 
abstraction and generalisation, which often leads to a lack or disregarding of 
specific details of the respective individual scenarios.466 Efficiency comes at a cost. 
There is a certain, minor but existing, likelihood that the negative risk does 
manifestate in a cost, i.e. a disadvantage. This negative risk is the cost for the 
ability to take a considerably easy and quick decision and forms the delta 
between the individual according to Behavioural Economics and the Homo 
Oeconomicus. The latter would, by the investment of more time and 
consideration decrease such negative risk to zero.  
As depicted above, Behavioural Economics and Mental Accounting 
provides for a bypass, an efficient short-route, at the cost of the ultimate accuracy 
                                                     
466 Cf. Beck, H. (2014), p. 178 et seq. with further references.  
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and a reasonable and linear increase of the negative risk in decision-making,467 
also in scenarios associated to a Corporate Transaction.      
 
4.2.2.11. Critical review 
Taking the various aspects about the concepts of biases and heuristics and 
their particular meaning and importance on Corporate Transactions into a critical 
review, it is to be concluded that, although rationality appears to be the starting 
point and general behavioural pattern for human beings and their decision 
making in general, each decision taken has to be considered in its respective 
context. Theories and models of Behaviroural Economics have found their way 
into the fields of M&A and Corporate Transactions as well, thus, so far, 
apparently only with a specific view to particular heuristics and biases, but not in 
the broader context of the decision-maker’s overall management style and 
personality.  
In the light of the legal framework and natural process of a Corproate 
Transaction, the following biases appear to be of specific relevance:  
 
(i) Availability Bias,  
(ii) Overconfidence,  
(iii) Hindsight Bias,  
(iv) Anchoring Effect, and  
(v) Status Quo Bias.  
 
Whereas the Prospect Theory provides for the fundament and theoretical 
background of most of those biases, here, especially the specific nature and 
manifestation in reality is of relevance. Can such biases influence the decision-
making of Managers in Corporate Transactions? In the light of the Research 
                                                     
467 Cf. Thaler, R. (1985), p. 199 et seq.; Thaler, R. (1999), p. 183 et seq. with further 
references. 
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Fragment 2 and the overall Research Question of this work, those aspects are to 
be considered further, whereas the theoretical legal background is valid and 
important, but not to be closely re-confirmed with the empirical data analysis. 
 The Research Question makes it necessary to generate new hypotheses 
and assumptions, rather than to verify existing theories. Those merely serve as the 
overall playground for the analysis that will follow.  
Specific focus will need to be drawn to the empirical data search for 
occurrence of the above mentioned biases in Corporate Transactions and the 
comparative analysis, whether decisions that were taken by Managers in the Case 
Studies, were of pure rational nature or whether also subjective and context-
driven biases played a role in conjunction with the individual managers’ overall 
strategy and management style. If we cannot find a Homo Oeconomicus in 
reality, whom to we then find instead? 
 
4.2.3. The theoretic modelling of Principal-Agent scenarios 
4.2.3.1. General concept 
In addition to the influence that the above-depicted heuristics and biases 
might have on the individual decision-making of Managers in Corporate 
Transactions, also the so-called “Principal-Agent-Model” can serve as another 
theoretical element to understand and decipher the underlying drivers for such 
behaviour.  
The Principal-Agent-Model aims to describe the potential problems which 
might arise in constellations, in which one individual performs a certain task 
(agent) upon instruction of another individual (principal) and delivers possible 
solutions to such problems.468 It is a widely used theoretical basis for the analysis 
                                                     
468 Cf. Akerlof, G. A. (1970), p. 488 et seq.; Grossman, S. J., Hart, O. D. (1983), p. 7 
et seq.; Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976), p. 305 et seq.; Ross, S. A. (1973), p. 134 et 
seq. with further references.  
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and conduct of interpersonal relationships in a hierarchic environment.469  
 
Figure 5: Principal-Agent-Model 
 
 
 
Typical examples of principal-agent relationships are the relationship 
between an employer and its employees, between a party to a litigation court 
proceeding and its lawyer and also the relationship between a Managing Director 
and the owners of the Company, which he represents (unless the Managing 
Director is an owner of shares in the Company at the same time as well).470  
As such, the model was developed in the 1970s, mainly by Jensen and 
Meckling,471 as part of the scientific fields of the New Institutional Economics.472  
                                                     
469 Cf. Alparslan, A. (2006), p. 13 et seq.; Jost, P.-J. (2001), p. 11 et seq. with further 
references.  
470 Cf. Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), p. 57 et seq.; Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976), p. 305 
et seq. 
471 Cf. Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976), p. 305 et seq.  
472 Cf. Erlei, M., Leschke, M., Sauerland, D. (2016), p. 67 et seq. with further 
references; Wenger, E., Terberger, E. (1988), p. 506 et seq. with further references.  
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The Principal-Agent-Model works with some general assumptions on human 
behaviour, such being in particular:473  
 
(i) individuals always aim for maximization of their own profits; 
(ii) individuals are opportunistic and therefore will use every available 
opportunity for the maximization of their own profits; 
(iii) in hierarchic relationships, information is not equally available to 
everyone; and 
(iv) individuals have different risk-taking profiles, such being either neutral 
towards risks, risk-averse or risk-friendly.  
 
With a view to the above description of the theories regarding the Homo 
Oeconomicus, Prospect Theory and the heuristics and biases, which might 
determine human behaviour, such assumptions seem to derive from the same 
theoretical sphere: Also here, the basis of the Principal-Agent-Model is the model 
of a rational human being, which is striving for maximization of personal benefits 
and which wheighs and considers different elements, such as also the risk of a 
negative outcome, during the process of acting and taking decisions.  
The assumption number (i) shows a connection between the Principal-
Agent-Model and the concept of the Homo Oeconomicus474, as well as towards 
the Prospect Theory475. The latter can be also found as an underlying concept in 
the assumption number (ii). Whereas assumption number (iii) incorporates a 
practical and fact-based element into the basis of the modelling, assumption 
number (iv) does interconnect with certain elements of the concept of heuristics 
and biases,476 in particular the individual reliance on experience and individual 
                                                     
473 Cf. Alparslan, A. (2006), p. 13 et seq.; Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), p. 57 et seq; Jost, 
P.-J. (2001), p. 11 et seq. with further references.  
474 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.1. 
475 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2. 
476 Cf.  above, Chapter 4.2.2.  
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character traits leading towards a general risk-aversion, risk-friendliness or risk-
neutrality.  
Based on these assumptions, the following theoretical problems are 
identified to likely occur in Principal-Agent scenarios:477  
(i) Hidden characteristics of the agent 
(ii) Information asymmetries between principal and agent, as well as  
(iii) Hidden actions and moral hazard of the agent. 
 
Hidden characteristics of the agent are those, which have remained 
unknown to the principal until after the concluding of the contract, which serves 
as a binding legal basis of the instruction of the agent to perform a certain task on 
behalf of the principal.478 Those pose a specific risk to the principal, as they might 
be disadvantageous or even destructive in the light of the principal’s interest. The 
principal might even have chosen another agent, had he known the hidden 
characteristics prior to contract signature. Hidden characteristics are therefore 
often considered to be the outcome of an adverse selection process of the agent.479  
In practice, the principal will aim to reduce the risk of such negative 
surprises by conducting an exhaustive selection process. In case of principal-agent 
scenarios of employer and employee, this might be for example the conduct of a 
series of interviews with the applicant for a certain position or the hosting of an 
assessment center, in order to get to know the characteristics of the applicants and 
to avoid negative surprises later.  
With regards to potential information asymmetries between principal and 
agent, the structural disadvantage for the principal is that he is likely to be less 
                                                     
477 Cf. Alparslan, A. (2006), p. 13 et seq.; Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), p. 57 et seq; Jost, 
P.-J. (2001), p. 11 et seq. with further references. 
478 Cf. Alparslan, A. (2006), p. 13 et seq. with further references.  
479 Cf. Alparslan, A. (2006), p. 13 et seq.; Jost, P.-J. (2001), p. 11 et seq. with further 
references.  
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informed about the performance and actual development of the task than the 
agent. The agent is closer to the events than the principal.  
However, information asymmetries can exist between principal and agent 
both ways, even at the same time: Whereas the principal is likely to be more 
knowledgeable and experienced regarding the general context and environment, 
in which the task he has given to the agent has to be performed – e.g. an employer 
typically has more knowledge about the company’s history and overall business 
structure than a new-entry employee in low- or mid-level function – the agent on 
the other hand is likely to receive a more detailed overview of the specific 
circumstances of the task that he performs. For both such information 
differentials, the surplus of information vis-á-vis the respective other party can 
play out as a strong advantage and open the possibility to realize own advantages 
or maximize own profits.480  As to be discussed in more detail later, the 
availability of information and asymmetries in such between the parties are of 
significant relevance in the fields of Corporate Transactions.  
Another potential problem in the relationship between principal and agent 
can be hidden actions of the agent, which might result in a so-called “moral 
hazard”. The specific risk for the principal is that the intial instruction given is not 
fully performed or that the agent otherwise uses his position to conduct 
additional actions in his own interest.481  
More specifically, this can be for example, an employee or Managing 
Director of a Company, who uses Company-own assets for private purposes, e.g 
printing invitation letters for a birthday party or taking office inventory for 
private use. The keyword “moral hazard” is often used in this context to describe 
the fact that the agent hereby violates ethical – sometimes also mandatory legal – 
rules or standards, which might apply without explicit mentioning in the 
environment, in which the performance of the instructed task is done.482   
                                                     
480 Cf. Alparslan, A. (2006), p. 13 et seq. Erlei, M., Leschke, M., Sauerland, D. 
(2016), p. 67 et seq. with further references; Wenger, E., Terberger, E. (1988), p. 506 
et seq. with further references. 
481 Cf. Alparslan, A. (2006), p. 13 et seq. Erlei, M., Leschke, M., Sauerland, D. 
(2016), p. 67 et seq. with further references. 
482 Cf. Holmström, B. (1979), p. 74 et seq. with further references.  
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With a view to those problems, which can possibly occur in principal-
agent scenarios, various potential solutions and preventive actions have been 
discussed in the scientific literature over time.483 Already when first developing 
and describing the model in the 1970s, some of those solutions were discussed as 
being an integral part of the model itself.484 The potential solutions can be 
categorized as follows:  
 
(i) Control mechanisms  
(ii) Deleveraging information asymmetries 
(iii) Corporate Culture and reputation 
(iv) Incentives to rightful behaviour of the agent and sanctions for 
misconduct 
 
As visible, these solutions aim to address the problems stated above from 
different angles. Whereas control and monitoring mechanisms target the 
limitation or even exclusion of hidden actions of the agent prior and after signing 
the instruction contract, the deleveraging of information asymmetries is 
considered as a helpful aim for the principal to structurally enhance the level of 
influence on the agent and to thereby even prevent hidden actions and moral 
hazard.  
The existence of a strong and positive Corporate Culture and an open 
leadership on values of structural importance – such as for example Compliance, 
open feedback culture, high ethical standards regarding loyalty, honesty and trust 
in a Company – can also contribute to the reduction of potential problems 
between principals and agents. The main rationale here is to strengthen the focus 
and awareness of common interests, which principal and agent share in general. 
                                                     
483 Cf. Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), p. 57 et seq.; Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976), p. 305 
et seq. 
484 Cf. Akerlof, G. A. (1970), p. 488 et seq.; Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976), p. 305 
et seq.; Ross, S. A. (1973), p. 134 et seq. 
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Also, the positive reputation of the company as an employer might be a joint 
interest of employer and employee and might therefore be an aspect that reduces 
the risk of hidden actions or moral hazard, if the agent would otherwise risk to 
deteriorate such reputation.  
The most important, thus also most complicated, solution and/or 
preventive measure for the avoidance of obstacles in the principal-agent 
relationship is the installation of effective incentives, which strongly motivate the 
agent to show the behaviour and performance that the principal wishes for.485  
Based on the assumption that the agent will always strive to 
opportunistically maximize its own benefits, an incentive makes use of this 
character trait and instrumentalizes it for the purposes of the principal. An 
effective incentive can be a win-win constellation for principal and agent: the 
principal can be more certain to see his instructions followed and his task 
performed in compliance thereto and the agent gains a direct and personal 
advantage by doing so.486  
Incentives align the interests of principal and agent. However, they always 
come at a cost for the principal487 – often being the monetary reward that he 
promised to the agent for the due fulfilment of a certain task. Complementary to 
an effective system of incentives, the principal might also consider the 
introduction of a regime of effective sanctions for case of misconduct or non-
alignment with the instructions. Here, sanctions serve a preventive function and 
decrease the attractiveness for the agent to follow own goals and paths offside the 
given instructions.  
As a first conclusion of the above, the problems depicted in the Principal-
Agent-Model can be effectively addressed by the principal by application of 
specific instruments for (i) monitoring and information collection and for (ii) 
aligning interests and motivations between principal and agent. What typically 
goes alongside with those instruments, is the aim to strongly build a reliable level 
                                                     
485 Cf. Akerlof, G. A. (1970), p. 488 et seq.; Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), p. 57 et seq.; 
Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976), p. 305 et seq. 
486 Cf. Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), p. 57 et seq.; Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976), p. 305 
et seq. 
487 Cf. Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976), p. 305 et seq. 
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of trust between principal and agent, especially important in longer-term 
relationships.   
 
4.2.3.2. Specific aspects in Corporate Transactions 
Taking now a more specific view onto the Principal-Agent-Model in the 
context of Corporate Transactions, there are several aspects to be considered:  
First, the Principal-Agent-Model is generally suitable to be applied onto the 
relationship between a company’s shareholders and its Managing Directors, i.e. a 
scenario where ownership and control over a Company are separated.488  
Second, the above described problems and risks can occur in the context of 
a Corporate Transaction in various forms, because there are numerous different 
constellations of principal-agent relationships within the course of a Corporate 
Transaction. Such constellations can be, amongst others, as follows:  
  
                                                     
488 Cf. above, Chapter 3.2.2. 
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Figure 6: Examples of Principal-Agent constellations in a Corproate Transaction 
 
 
 
 
Due to the nature of a Corporation as being a separate legal entity,489 every 
Company has ownership and control executed separately, i.e. by separate organs, 
namely the shareholders’ meeting and the Management, except for decisions and 
questions or overall strategic relevance.490 Therefore, the problems and 
discrepancies between principal and agent can theoretically occur within every 
single participating company in a Corporate Transaction. In fact, not only 
shareholders and Management can be defined to be in a principal-agent 
                                                     
489 Cf. above, Chapter 3.2.2. 
490 For details see above, Chapter 3.2.2. 
Selling Company
•Internal: Shareholders - Management
•Internal: Supervisory Board - Management
•Internal: Management - subordinated staff
•External - information availability: Selling Company - Purchasing Company 
Purchasing Company
•Internal: Shareholders - Management
•Internal: Supervisory Board - Management
•Internal: Management - subordinated staff
Target Company
•Internal: Shareholders - Management
•Internal: Supervisory Board - Management 
•Internal: Management - subordinated staff
•External - information availability: Target Company - Selling Company
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constellation, but also the Supervisory Board does act as a principal in the fields 
of its competencies.   
Moreover, the principal-agent constellation is of special importance 
between the Target Company and the Selling Company. The Selling Company as 
the (major) shareholder of the Target Company is likely to have deviating 
interests with regard to the conduct and outcome of a Corporate Transaction – 
whereas the Selling Company is likely to be most interested in achieving a high 
purchase price and only limited liability risks and in a smooth and seamless 
transfer of the ownership in the Target Company, the Target Company itself 
might be mostly interested in preserving its legal integrity and keeping focus on 
the company’s business object and organisational unity, also after the Closing of 
the deal. The Selling Company’s management is well-advised to consider those 
deviating interests and to potentially reduce negative effects by setting effective 
incentives, as far as possible. Such might be, for example, bonus or premium 
payments for key employees and management of the Target Company linked to 
the Signing and/or Closing of the deal or linked to certain specific tasks, which 
have to be conducted in order to foster the success of the Corporate Transaction. 
In this context, bonus payments to senior managers of the Target Company are 
often described as “golden parachutes”,491 which make them land softly on the 
grounds of a successful deal, with or without an ongoing employment contract 
post-Closing.  
Next to those constellations of principals and agents, also the relationship 
between the participating companies’ Managements and external stakeholders in 
the Corporate Transaction can imply elements of principal-agent scenarios. 
Namely, the relationship between the Management and its external advisors can 
contain elements of agency, same for the relationship between authorities, such as 
the Cartel authorities, which have the power to instruct the Management to give 
certain information or to comply with certain conditions in order to gain merger 
clearance.  
Another element of strategic importance might be the implementation of an 
effective monitoring and control system during the Corporate Transaction, in 
order to reduce information asymmetries in existing principal-agent 
                                                     
491 Cf. Gran, A. (2008), p. 1409 et seq. 
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constellations. This aspect will be further described below in Chapter 4.4.1 of this 
work.  
 Both elements,  
(i) the implementation of effective control systems in order to reduce the 
risk of moral hazard by way of e.g. strict report outs in close-meshed 
structures, as well as  
(ii) the intelligent setting of incentives,  
do come at a cost in a Corporate Transaction. The overall transactional costs are 
likely to increase significantly, if, for example, huge signing bonuses are promised 
to the Management of the participating companies. Irrespective of the specific 
responsibility for such costs, the participants will aim to “price in” those factors 
into their financial rationale and strategic negotiation in the course of the deal. 
Overall, each participating company and each individual Managing Director 
involved in a Corporate Transaction will only work towards the deal’s successful 
Closing, if the entire project is still calculated to be ultimately benefitial from his 
respective perspective.  
 
4.2.4. Conclusion 
In a nutshell, the Principal-Agent-Model is of significant importance for 
Corporate Transactions. The model’s general assumptions are to be considered to 
exist also in the light of M&A activities and the problems identified as a result 
thereof, are likely to be also traced later in the empirical data analysis of the Case 
Studies in Chapter 5.  
What appears to be of outstanding importance for the success of a 
Corporate Transaction in the light of the theories depicted above, is the intelligent 
and effective introduction of incentives and a clear focus on the reduction of 
information asymmetries between the different stakeholders in a transaction.  
As a conclusion, the Principal-Agent-Model does introduce a realistic view 
to existing relationships, setups and typical problems in hierarchic constellations. 
Therefore, this model and the specifics and details it conveys, can be considered 
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as a benefitial element of the theoretical fundament for the analysis of Manager’s 
individual decision-making in Corporate Transactions.  
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4.3. THEORIES ON MANAGEMENT STYLES AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR 
DECISION-MAKING IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS  
Where Behavioural Economics and the Principal-Agent-Model teach us 
about the general outline of human behaviour and influencing factors to decision-
making, also in the context of Company Management and Corporate Transactions 
in particular, there is also another set of Economic theories, which specifically 
focus on the particularities of the nature and profession of Managers: The 
theoretical description and modelling of Management theories and individual 
Manager’s stylistic approaches to manage and organize the corporate structure of 
a company.  
 
4.3.1. Overview of existing Management theories  
At first, a general differentiation in Economic sciences is made between 
theories concerncing “Management” and theories and models concerning 
“Management Styles”.  
Whereas theories concerning Management aim to develop and describe the 
overall organisational approach within a Company, theories and models 
concerning the style of a Manager aim to address the personal dimension of a 
Manager of a Corporation.  
First theories regarding Management of Companies have been discussed 
already back in the 1920s, when questions regarding the organisation and 
administration of large business enterprises came along with the increasing 
industrialization and first approaches to serial production in the automotive 
industry.492 Since then, numerous theories have been developed and discussed, 
whereas the following four approaches are commonly considered to be of leading 
importance in the academic discourse:493  
                                                     
492 Cf. the major publication in this context: Taylor, F.W. (1903).  
493 Cf. above, Chapter 4.1 with further references and additional to that: Gulick, L. 
(1965), p. 7 et seq.; Jung, R.H., Bruck, J., Quarg, S. (2018), p. 13 et seq. with further 
references.  
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(i) Scientific Management Theory494:  
This is often described to be the classical management theory, 
developed by F.W. Taylor in the early 1920s. In general, this theory 
describes Management as a process of constant monitoring and 
assessment of the Company in all its different aspects and organisational 
divisions. The Manager observes the organisation, collects data and is 
thereby able to measure the Company’s current status and identify areas 
for enhancing efficiency and profitability of the Company. Also, the 
constant collection of data and measurement of key performance 
indicators (KPIs) allows for a standardized approach to performance 
management and the introduction of a performance-oriented system of 
rewards and sanctions.495   
(ii) Bureaucratic Management Theory496:  
Based on the classical management theory developed by F.W. 
Taylor, the Bureaucratic Management Theory developed by M. Weber 
does not only focus on the enhancing of efficiency and profitability, but 
applies a systematic and hierarchic approach to the organisation and 
management of human beings and their roles within the Company.497  
(iii) Human Relations Theory498:  
Whereas the first two theories focus mainly on the organisational 
structure of the Company as a profit-oriented enterprise, the Human 
Relations Theory puts the human being, i.e. the employee into the center 
                                                     
494 Cf. Ebbinghaus, A. (1984), p. 1 et seq.; Schulte-Zurhausen, M. (2010), p. 9 et 
seq.; Taylor, F.W. (1911); Shafritz, J.M., Ott, J.S., Jang, Y.S. in: Shafritz/Ott/Jang 
(2015), p. 66 et seq. with further references; Volpert, W., Vahrekamp, R. (1977), p. 
XII et seq. with further references.  
495 Cf.  Steinmann, H., Schreyögg, G., Koch, J. (2005), p. 531 et seq. 
496 Cf. Shafritz, J.M., Ott, J.S., Jang, Y.S. in: Shafritz/Ott/Jang (2015), p. 78 et seq. 
with further references.  
497 Cf. Shafritz, J.M., Ott, J.S., Jang, Y.S. in: Shafritz/Ott/Jang (2015), p. 78 et seq. 
with further references. 
498 Cf. Shafritz, J.M., Ott, J.S., Jang, Y.S. in: Shafritz/Ott/Jang (2015), p. 126 et seq. 
with further references. 
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of Management actions. The needs and relationships between the 
individuals are perceived to be of central relevance for the economic 
success of the Company and therefore the main focus of the 
Management.499   
(iv) Systems Theory500:  
The Systems Theory describes a holistic approach towards the 
management of systems in general, including also Company Management. 
The Manager’s main function is considered to be the alignment of all 
different elements of the Company and the balancing of their interests and 
needs alongside with the joint objective of economic success.501    
 
All such Management theories are based on the assumption that the internal 
organisation of every company can be split into (i) a strategic body, (ii) an 
administrative body, as well as (iii) an operational body.502  
Whereas the operational body creates value for the company by producing 
tangible and/or intangible goods in compliance with the Company’s business 
object, the administrative body serves as the organisational heart of the enterprise 
and the strategic body sets out the general strategic direction of the Company and 
takes decisions of overarching importance.  
  
                                                     
499 Cf. Shafritz, J.M., Ott, J.S., Jang, Y.S. in: Shafritz/Ott/Jang (2015), p. 126 et seq. 
with further references. 
500 Cf. Diesner, T. (2015), p. 140 et seq.; Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 41 with further 
references. 
501 Cf. Diesner, T. (2015), p. 140 et seq.; Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 41 with further 
references. 
502 Cf. Shafritz, J.M., Ott, J.S., Jang, Y.S. in: Shafritz/Ott/Jang (2015), p. 314 et seq.  
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Figure 7: Organisational divisions of a Company 
 
 
 
 
Being positioned at the top of the organisational pyramid, the Management 
of a Company acts in clear execution of the overall strategy. As such is mainly 
determined by the Company’s Object defined in the Articles of Association503 and 
by fundamental decisions, which have to be taken by the Company’s 
shareholders,504 the Management is the vital instance to translate the overall object 
and vision of the Company into specific day-to-day business activities.505  
However, the specific way in which a Manager conducts this function, 
depends on his individual Management Style and is directly linked to its 
personality. This way of managing, of conducting strategic actions for the 
company is closely linked also to the respective managers’ way of considering 
and evaluating risks and of taking decisions.  
As being located at the intersection between Economic Sciences and 
Psychology, the theories around specific Management styles have developed into 
the direction of three main types of Management styles, each consisting of various 
different sub-types and specifics: Managers’ actions and behaviour can be 
categorized as being either  
 
                                                     
503 Cf. above, Chapter 3.2.2. 
504 Cf. above, Chapter 3.2.2 and Chapter 3.2.3.   
505 Cf. above, Chapter 3.2.2 and Chapter 3.2.4.  
Strategy
Administration
Operations
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(i) autocratic,  
(ii) democratic or according to the approach of  
(iii) laissez-faire.506   
 
The main characteristic of an autocratic management style is the Manager’s 
constant aim to gain and exercise full control over his organisation. Decision-
making is centralized towards the function of the Manager itself, no 
diversification or delegation of authorities or responsibilities takes place. If the 
Management of a Company consists of several Managing Directors, an autocratic 
management style can either lead to a centralized organisation of the respective 
Managers’ own fields of competence only – for example, a Managing Director, 
who is in charge for Human Resources would organize this function alongside his 
autocratic management and decision-making style.  
As an alternative, an autocratic management style can also lead to a 
respective streamlining amongst the Managang Directors, especially if the 
autocratic personality is actually the Chairman of the Management. 
Autocratic Managers are likely to organize their Company’s structure in a 
hierarchic and top-down manner, with clear reporting lines and explicitly defined 
functions and competencies. Autocratic Managers are likely to have a vast and 
detailed knowledge about the Company and tend to force their organisation to 
involve and inform them on all kinds of matters.507 Variations of this Management 
style can be an authorative approach,508 a persuasive approach509 or a paternalistic 
approach.510 Whereas the first of those does not tolerate any discussions or 
interference, Managers acting alongside the second approach do care and rely on 
feedback and appreciation of their staff, but aim to achieve it by way of 
persuading them to agree.511 Managers, who show a paternalistic approach will 
                                                     
506 Cf. Lewin, K., Lippitt, R., White, K. (1939), p. 271 et seq.; Staehle, W.H. (1999), 
p. 328 et seq. with further references.   
507 Cf. Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 328 et seq. and p. 698 et seq. 
508 Cf. Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 328 et seq. with further references.   
509 Cf. Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 328 et seq. with further references.   
510 Cf. Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 328 et seq. with further references.   
511 Cf. Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 328 et seq. with further references.   
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typically not validly consider othe opinions, but merely see a need to solve and 
decide on their own for the overall benefit of the organisation.512  
Autocratic management styles are often conducted by individuals, who 
have a strong or even egoistic personality, an overwhelming trust in the own 
skillset and a strong urge to control their surroundings. Hence, their behaviour 
and decision-making are likely to be biased by Overconfidence, Framing and 
Anchoring Effects as well as a Status Quo Bias, in case these Managers are 
confronted with a need for change or transformation that was not inititated by 
them, but imposed onto their fields of responsibility.  
In contrast thereto, a democratic Management  style does strongly rely on 
cooperation, open communication and participation as basic elements of a 
Company’s management. Here, the Manager takes the role of an active moderator 
of different views and functions and ultimately decides based on a consideration 
of the different aspects which have been identified and brought up by the 
organisation. Whereas this Management style is likely to lead to a high level of 
acceptance of the respective Manager within the organisation, the decision-
making process itself might be much more time-consuming and still not immune 
against individual heuristics and biases.  
The third approach to Managerial Behaviour is the so-called “laissez-faire” 
style. Here, the Manager does not even take an active role as moderator or 
decision-maker, but rather trusts that the organisation itself will progress into the 
right direction and solve occurring problems or questions.513 This approach might 
lead to stagnation, if problems and questions remain unsolved and strategic 
decisions are not actively taken. Economic success turns out to become more an 
accidental development than the result of planful strategic decision-making.  
 
4.3.2. Critical review 
With regards to the existing theories concerning Management types and 
styles, the ongoing scientific research and discourse reveals that overall 
                                                     
512 Cf. Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 328 et seq. with further references.   
513 Cf. Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 357 et seq. and p. 459 et seq. with further references.  
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categorization of Management styles as either autocratic, democratic or according 
to the approach of laissez-faire are not to be seen as separate alternatives.  
Research and experiments reveal that Managers tend to combine elements 
from the different categories.514  As an example, a Manager can show democratic 
and cooperative behaviour with regards to certain responsibilities or aspects of 
the Company, but rather follow an autocratic and controlling style for certain 
other elements or projects.  
Therefore, a strict application of the different categories of Management 
styles might be misleading and not appropriate to real-life scenarios. Hence, the 
existence of those categories allows for a more structured analysis and discussion 
of specific features and characteristics of Management behaviour with regards to 
decision-making and corporate strategy execution.  
 
4.3.3. Application and relevance in Corporate Transactions 
The general criticism outlined above in Chapter 4.3.2 does hold true also in 
the light of Corporate Transactions. Due to the importance of such projects in the 
Company’s dimension, as well as on an individual professional level for the 
respective Manager, such Manager might behave and decide differently from the 
style he would apply to day-to-day standard business operations. A Corporate 
Transaction brings along unique opportunities and risks, not only for the 
participating companies but likewise also for their respective Managers.  
This can impact the Managers’ decision-making style. For example, 
Managers might act more risk-averse in the light of the liability threats associated 
with a Corporate Transaction and the enhanced level of direct control and 
interference of the shareholders. Contrasting to that, Managers might also become 
more open to take risks, being enchanted by an efficient set of incentives placed 
by their shareholders.  
It does depend on the specific circumstances of a Corporate Transaction to 
determine, in which way the personal Management style of the involved 
                                                     
514 Cf. Staehle, W.H. (1999), p. 348 et seq. 
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Managers does influence their decision-making. However, it is likely that an 
influence does in fact turn out to exist. This will be one of the aspects to be 
analysed further in Chapter 5 during the empirical data analysis.  
 
4.3.4. Conclusion 
Overall, it can be concluded that the theories regarding Managers’ 
individual style of acting and executing corporate strategy are likely to be of 
relevance for managerial decision-making, also in the context of Corporate 
Transactions.  
The close linkage to other economic theories and models, such as the 
theories of Behavioural Economics,515 will allow for an enhanced analysis of 
empirical data and is likely to result in findings and assumptions, which can 
depict the reality of managerial decision-making in Corporate Transactions in a 
holistic and comprehensive way.  
All such theoretical elements described and analysed above are 
complementary to each other and together form a theoretical fundament, which is 
robust and does reflect the widespread variety of relevant aspects for the analysis 
of individual Managers’ decision-making in Corporate Transactions.  
  
                                                     
515 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2. 
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4.4. CORPORATE TRANSACTION SPECIFICS REVIEWED – INFORMATION, 
COMPLEXITY AND DEFINITENESS OF MANAGERIAL DECISIONS  
The following sub-chapters describe specific problems and circumstances, 
which, based on the analysis of relevant theories and models made in this 
Chapter 4 so far, are considered to be of relevance in Corporate Transactions. 
Those will be additional contributors to the overall conclusions made in Chapter 
4.5 below.  
 
4.4.1. Information – availability, costs, value and asymmetries  
Corporate Transactions are the sale and acquisition of information and 
expectancies. Having the purchase price often being based on a valuation of the 
Target Company that quintessentially considers the expected future earnings as 
the main element of the Company’s price tag (so- called Discounted Cash Flow 
method of company valuation516), information is of key relevance for a Corporate 
Transaction.  
This holds true for every step and phase of a Corproate Transaction: 
Without sufficient information, the Seller cannot build any intention ot sell the 
Target Company517 and the Purchaser will not be interested in the deal at all.  
During the later stages,518 information serve as key motivation for the 
Purchaser (i.e. knowing that the Target is a suitable fit for his own corporate 
strategy) and for the Seller the key argument to positively market the Target 
Company. The level of information available is of central importance for the 
contract negotiations,519 especially the level and catalogue of warranties given by 
                                                     
516 Cf. for a general overview and understanding of the Discounted Cash Flow 
method of corporate valuation: Copeland, T., Koller, T., Murrin, J. (2002), Part II; 
Drukarczyk, J., Schüler, A. (2016), p. 237 et seq. with further references; 
Kruschwitz, L., Loeffler, A. (2006) with further references.  
517 Cf. above, Chapter 3.3.2.1. 
518 Cf. above, Chapter 3.3.2.2 until Chapter 3.3.2.6. 
519 Cf. above, Chapter. 3.3.2.4. 
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the parties and for the purchase price, which the Purchaser is willing to pay and 
the Seller is willing to accept.  
And for the Target Company, information about its own business conduct 
and financial status is at the same time the insurance police to its own separate 
legal existence and preservable display of its own uniqueness that it wishes to 
keep secret to a large extend.  
Clearly, the participants in a Corporate Transaction all have a different 
perspective towards the strategic value of the relevant information and aim for 
diverging interests. 
For the Seller, information about the Target Company is the basis for its 
decision to aim for a sale and at the same time the main strategic instrument 
towards the Purchasing Company. The Seller decides, which information is 
released and shared at what point in time and in what format. To do so, an open 
and comprehensive flow of information from the Target Company towards the 
Selling Company is of huge importance for the Selling Company. Equally 
important is the full control over the flow of information towards the potential 
Purchaser.  
For the Purchasing Company, information about the Target Company is the 
basis for every decision-making in the context of a Corporate Transaction, may it 
be the structural decisions to initiate and/or continue negotiations or the 
discussions about the content of the transactional agreements with the Seller.520 
The entire assessment, if the deal is likely to bring added value to the Purchaser is 
based on the information available about the Target Company and about the 
Purchaser’s negotiation counterpart, i.e. the Selling Company.  
The Target Company is the central element of importance in the deal.521 Its 
Management has access to all relevant information. Full cooperation on their side 
is of huge interest for the Selling Company and if the Target Company’s 
Management is aware of its own strategic relevance, it might use this position and 
                                                     
520 Cf. above, Chapter 3.3.2. 
521 In case of a Share Deal – in the alternative case of the conduct of an Asset Deal, 
no Target Company will be existing, but only a Selling Company and a 
Purchasing Company – cf. above, Chapter 3.3.1. 
221 
THEORETICAL FUNDAMENT - INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR AND 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
seek for a maximization of its own benefits, either momentarily or with a view to 
the future after the Corporate Transaction.  
As visible, asymmetries in the availability of information are existing in a 
Corporate Transaction. Even though the Due Diligence, which is conducted 
during the phase of “Proper Inspection”522 does typically reveal a broad fact basis 
about the Target Company, this will not lead to a equalization of the information 
levels of Seller, Purchaser and Target Company. The Target Company is closest to 
the information, the Seller is strongly motivated to control the information flow 
and the Purchaser wishes for a broad disclosure of all relevant information and 
can use its strategic position vis-á-vis the Seller to achieve this.  
The respective level and form of the information asymmetries determines 
the strategic negotiation positions of Seller and Purchaser. For example, if the 
Purchaser has information about pending law suits or liability claims, which the 
Target Company is currently facing, he might well instrumentalize the 
knowledge about this negative aspect in the negotiations and require the Seller to 
accept a reduction of the purchase price or to give additional legal comfort by 
way of additional warranties.  
In a Corporate Transaction, every lack of information leads to an increased 
level of uncertainty, which has to be considered as a potential economic risk and 
thereby have an effect on the purchase price. Thereby, information, information 
availability and information asymmetries between the participants are to be 
considered as a central precondition for the decision-making of Managers during 
the entire lifetime of a Corporate Transaction and from every participants’ point 
of view.  
The above considerations mostly derive from the theoretical background 
described and analysed before. They will become a part of the empirical data 
analysis later.  
 
 
                                                     
522 Cf. above, Chapter 3.3.2.3.  
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4.4.2. The inevitable level of complexities – increased uncertainty as basis for 
individual decisions 
As depicted above, information decrease uncertainty in a Corporate 
Transaction. However, uncertainty about the specific economic risks associated 
with the conduct of a Corporate Transaction does not only derive from a (partial) 
lack of information, but is also the result of other factors.  
For all participants, the conduct of a Corporate Transaction, irrespective of 
the availability of relevant information, is typically a project of extraordinary or 
even unique, nature, which is usually far away from the participants’ daily 
business activities.523  
The successful conduct of such a project requires an organised approach 
with regard to its leadership, as well as to the actual administration of sub-
projects, tasks, relationships between the parties and the management of the 
respective stakeholders’ expectations.524 In a nutshell, a successful management of 
a M&A project requires to keep the following three aspects in close consideration 
and successful management:525  
 
(i) project steps and tasks; 
(ii) people and stakeholders;  
(iii)   adherence to timeline or external drivers and limitations to the project 
timing. 
 
Whether the Project Manager of a respective participant in a Corporate 
Transaction is the respective Company’s Managing Director himself, or if the 
latter has decided to instruct and supervise a separate individual with the 
                                                     
523 Except for Private Equity investors, which have the acquistion, administration 
and exit of their portfolio companies as business object.  
524 Cf. Meckl, R. (2004), p. 455 et seq. with further references;Junni, P., Sarala, M. 
in: Cooper, C.L., Finkelstein, S. (2014), p. 181 et seq. with further references.  
525 Cf. Meckl, R. (2004), p. 455 et seq. 
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conduct of this position, the key decisions for the project will always have to be 
taken by the Managing Director(s) of the Company.526  
In any case, the above mentioned aspects of managing a Corproate 
Transaction as a project each contain a substantial amount of complexity, which 
the Management is required to wisely navigate.  
Another element of complexity is the existing uncertainty with regard to the 
behaviour and potential strategy of the other participants in the Corporate 
Transaction. Whereby the Management typically has a good set of experiences on 
the expectations and strategic approach of its Company’s shareholders, the 
behaviour of the other participants will be mostly unknown to him. However, in 
order to develop and execute a successful strategy towards the maximization of 
the Company’s benefits, the Managing Director will have to consider and aim to 
predict potential strategies and behaviour of the other participants.  
Will the Target Company’s Management try to block its Company’s sale? 
Will the Purchasing Company’s shareholders interefere with its Managements 
negotiations and acceptance of certain clauses of the Purchase Agreement? Such 
questions are likely to be of relevance for the strategic considerations of the 
Seller’s management and thereby, for the decisions it takes during the different 
phases of the deal.  
Whereas the above described factors can be considered as “internal” aspects 
of the management of a Corporate Transaction, which all arise from the internal 
sphere of the project’s participants and the interactions and negotiations between 
them, there is another sphere of aspects, which are to be considered for the 
successful management of a Corporate Transaction, most importantly for the 
Selling Company and the Purchasing Company, but indirectly relevant also for 
the Target Company: the Managers also have to conduct and consider additional 
factors, requirements and influences from the “external sphere”.  
Such are, for example, the application for and receipt of clearance from 
competition authorities, which are legally required to be involved, but also the 
                                                     
526 See above, Chapter 3.2.4 for the general responsibility of the Managing 
Directors to conduct and execute the Company’s position in a Corporate 
Transaction.  
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behaviour of other stakeholders, such as the Target Company’s customers and/or 
vendors.  
To manage the expectations and various different sub-tasks of those 
stakeholders in a way which is ultimately benefitial for the respective participant, 
is another structural layer of complexity and a key responsibility of the Managing 
Director(s).  
In a nutshell, the conduct of a Corporate Transactions can be generally 
considered to be one of the most complex projects that a Managing Director can 
be instructed to execute. In order to be successful, general skills and instruments 
for Project Management are important, but a clear focus on the overall goal of 
maximizing benefits for the respective Company will set the compass for the 
numerous individual decisions, which the Managing Director will have to take 
during the lifetime of the deal and with regard to all its various aspects and sub-
projects.  
In the light of the above mentioned theories on economic behaviour of 
individuals,527 the high level of complexity and the unique character of a 
Corporate Transaction for the involved Managers should not be underestimated. 
Individual biases, such as Overconfidence528 might lead to inappropriate 
estimations of a Managing Director with regard to timing or his ability to 
multitask on the various different workstreams, which have to be aligned and 
fostered in parallel. The Availability Bias529 might lead to an improper neglection 
of questions, which remain unanswered after the Due Diligence phase or a partial 
disregard of aspects, which are not apparent at first sight.  
Also with a view to the specifics and problems arising out of the principal 
agent constellation between the respective Managing Director and various 
different stakeholders, the high level of project complexity can result in an 
increased risk of information asymmetries, which give room to hidden actions of 
the Managing Director or open the path towards the strive for individual benefit 
maximization instead of pursuing the Company’s interests.  
                                                     
527 Cf above, Chapter 4.2.2. 
528 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.4. 
529 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.2. 
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Therefore, the high level of complexity of M&A projects can make the 
installation of effective control and incentive mechanisms by the respective 
principals in the various constellations even more important.  
 
4.4.3. Acceptance and reversibility of decisions 
As described above,530 the process of individual decision-making is, on an 
abstract level, the selection of one option out of several alternatives. The goal for 
every decision is to identify and chose the respective option, which allows for a 
maximization of the benefits and brings the biggest step into the direction of the 
defined goal. In reality, decisions are often based on a sound, but not all-
embracing information basis and often also taken under time pressure and/or the 
factual pressure of organisational or “political” circumstances.  
Especially in Corporate Transactions, Managing Directors are often 
required to decide quickly, with a lack of time for an all-encompassing 
consideration and valuation of all potential influences and risks. As depicted 
above, taking business risks and risky decisions that might turn out to be 
disadvantageous for the Company, are legally permitted, as long as the decision 
is taken on an appropriate information basis.531   
On this path, decisions lead to consequences which are often not completely 
reversible. Whether the outcome is positive or negative in the light of the overall 
goal to pursue, the decision-maker will be bear the responsibility. Taking into 
account that Managing Directors, who take decisions in the context of a Corporate 
Transaction, are in most cases acting as agent, instructed by the principal, i.e. the 
Company’s shareholders, this responsibility might lead to severe negative 
personal consequences, including the risk of termination of the managerial service 
contract.  
Here again, information appears to be of central importance: If the Manager 
takes decisions on an appropriately strong information basis, the risk of negative 
                                                     
530 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.1. and Chapter 4.2.2. 
531 Cf. above, regarding the Business Judgement Rule: Chapter 3.2.2.2, Chapter 
3.2.2.3 and Chapter 3.2.3 
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consequences for the Company is reduced significantly. Also, the threat of 
negative personal consequences is reduced likewise.  
This allows again for the conclusion that the principals are well-advised to 
incentify their decision-making agents to collect and assess all relevant 
information and to then take appropriate decisions with adequate timing. 
Principals should thereby also take into account, any data points they might have 
with regard to their agent’s individual tendency to manifest any biases or 
heuristics, which could impact the outcome of his decision-making process.   
Again, the theoretical findings of the Principal-Agent-Model532 and the 
theories from the fields of Behavioural Eonomics533 turn out to be of huge 
importance in the context of managerial decision-making in Corporate 
Transactions.    
                                                     
532 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.3. 
533 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2. 
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4.5. CONCLUSION - THEORETICAL FINDINGS COMBINED: THE BASIS FOR  
MANAGER’S DECISION-MAKING IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS  
The legal corridors and areas for original decision-making of Managing 
Directors are already identified above and thereby constitue the Research 
Fragment 1.534 The then-following above description and discussion of Economic 
theories and models concerning human behaviour and decision-making now give 
way to a concluding assessment of the factors, which influence Managing 
Directors in the process of making decisions during a Corporate Transaction, 
especially in the fields described above as outcome of Research Fragment 1. 
Thereby, the findings made in relation to the Research Fragment 2 are the second 
element to the overall theoretical fundament of this work.  
 
  
Research Fragment 2: 
Which factors are likely to influence the decisions taken by Managers in Corporate 
Transactions? 
 
 
The above described theories reveal a set of several different aspects, which 
appear to be of relevant nature for the decision-making of Managing Directors in 
Corporate Transactions. Moreover, those aspects are connected to each other and 
therewith form a network of potential influencing factors. 
In particular, there are influencing factors to managerial decision-making to 
be found in and as a combination of the following areas of Economic Theories:  
(i) Specific Heuristics from the fields of Behavioural Economics 
(ii) Aspects to be found in the Principal-Agent Model 
(iii) Aspects regarding the subjective style of Management  
To some certain extent, the effect or likelihood of occurrence of those factors 
is in itself influenced by certain particular aspects of Corporate Transactions, as 
concluded here in the following:  
                                                     
534 Cf. above, Chapter 3.5. 
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Table 3: Overview of influencing factors to particular steps & participants in 
Corporate Transactions, based on economic theories 
 
# Influence factor 
= description/name 
When?  
= phase of the 
Corporate 
Transaction 
Who? 
= participant of 
the Corporate 
Transaction  
Connection to 
other influence 
factors? 
1. Availability Bias Proper 
Inspection 
Seller 
Purchaser 
Target 
Incentives to 
certain 
managerial 
behaviour 
2. Overconfidence Defining 
Parameters 
Seller  
Purchaser 
Individual 
Management 
style 
3. Hindsight Bias Defining 
Parameters 
Seller 
Purchaser  
Target 
Individual 
Management 
style  
4. Anchoring Proper 
Inspection & 
Defining 
Parameters 
Seller 
Purchaser 
Individual 
Management 
style 
5. Status Quo Bias Defining 
Parameters 
Target Overconfidence 
Incentives to 
certain 
managerial 
behaviour 
6. Level of 
shareholders’ 
control  
All Seller 
Purchaser 
Target 
Overconfidence 
7. Incentives to certain 
managerial 
behaviour 
Proper 
inspection & 
Defining 
Parameters 
Seller  
Purchaser 
Target 
n/a 
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# Influence factor 
= description/name 
When?  
= phase of the 
Corporate 
Transaction 
Who? 
= participant of 
the Corporate 
Transaction  
Connection to 
other influence 
factors? 
8. Individual 
Management style 
All Seller  
Purchaser 
Target 
Incentives to 
certain 
managerial 
behaviour 
9. Objective context: 
availability of 
relevant information  
Proper 
inspection & 
Defining 
Parameters 
Seller 
Purchaser 
Target 
Availability Bias 
Incentives to 
certain 
managerial 
behaviour 
10. Objective context: 
complexity of 
Corporate 
Transaction 
Defining 
Parameters 
Seller 
Purchaser 
Individual 
management 
style 
 
As the above table depicts, certain influence factors occur only during one 
or several specifc phase of a Corporate Transaction and are also dependant on the 
respective participants.  
 
Availability Bias 
 The Availability Bias can influence Management decision-making in a 
Corporate Transaction in two ways, as analysed above.535 Both such potential 
influences,  
(i) the over-valuation of occurrences and particularities from past 
transactions, and  
(ii) general managerial experience and also the overrating of 
available information without sufficiently questioning, if 
further data should be relevant,  
                                                     
535 Cf. above Chapter 4.2.2.2. 
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can possibly occur and interfere to decisions of Managers of all three participants 
of the Corporate Transaction – Seller, Purchaser and Target Company. Whereas 
Management of the Target Company is likely to be exposed to biased decision-
making regarding the experience from past transaction or managerial activities in 
general, the Management of the Selling Company and of the Purchasing 
Company are likely to be also exposed to consider the available information as 
constituting the entire horizon of available data. In case they base their decisions 
solely on the data available, information, which was initially not considered to be 
relevant or which occurred only at a later point in time during the deal, will not 
be adequately considered as valid component of the information basis for their 
decision-making.  
Shareholders, who consider this bias to be likely to occur as a risk to the 
transaction, can aim to limit this effect by setting specific incentives or sanctions 
as preventive actions. Such incentives could be for example the promise of a 
bonus payment to the Purchasing Company’s Management for the delivery of a 
comprehensive Due Diligence Report that the shareholders consider to be all-
embracing regarding its information basis and content.  
An alternative for the Seller’s Management and the Target’s Management, 
the shareholders could ask the Managers to explicitly confirm the Company’s 
compliance with any warranty or representation given in the Purchase 
Agreement regarding the full disclosure of all relevant information about the 
Target Company. Such might have a disciplinary effect for the Managers with 
regards to ensuring that the information basis of the deal is strong and 
thourougly collected.  
Such measures to potentially limit the occurrence of the Availability Bias 
show the direct connection to the Principal-Agent-Modell and its toolbox of 
solutions to align the interests of principal and agent – here, such are first and 
foremost a benefitial and strong information basis for the Corporate Transaction.  
 
Overconfidence 
As a second result of the analysis of the Economic Theories conducted 
above,536 also the Bias of so-called Overconfidence has to be considered as a factor 
                                                     
536 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.4.  
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that might potentially influence Managers’ decisions in Corporate Transactions. 
This applies specifically to Managers of the Selling Company and of the 
Purchasing Company, because these are the two active parties in the course of a 
Corporate Transaction, who will negotiate and thereby stage and form the deal. 
Here, a specific risk for negative effects due to Overconfidence occurs particularly 
in the phase of “Defining Parameters”, i.e. during the drafting and negotiation of 
the relevant agreements for the Corporate Transaction.  
Examples for the occurrence of this bias were given above,537 hence, the 
interconnected analysis of Economic theories and models above reveals that a 
Manager’s structural tendency to act overly confident might be closely linked to a 
merely autocratic management style in general. Connecting elements of both 
concepts are the strong reliance on hierarchic organisational and reporting 
structures, a preference for individual decisions over democratic consortium 
decisions and a personality that generally focuses and circles mainly on issues 
concerning himself instead of acting altruistic or for the sole benefit of others.  
 
Hindsight Bias 
Similar to the connection between Overconfidence and the individual 
Manager’s style, the Hindsight Bias538 might also have its root cause in the 
individual’s general approach towards managing an organisation. The risk of an 
overly positive remembrance of past events is apparent for Managers in all three 
positionso of a Corporate Transaction, however, also here, an autocratic 
management style might serve as explanation for a strong Hindsight Bias and at 
the same time be also further strengthened by the autocratic style.  
An autocratic Manager with a strong self-confidence might well remember 
past events even more glorified than a balanced or doubtful personality, and 
might at the same time also receive little or no feedback from within his 
organisation, which would allow for a different or more objective view to the 
past. Autocractic leaders in hierarchic organisations receive only “policitical” 
feedback, in most cases no open challenge or criticism, except from equally strong 
peers.  
                                                     
537 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.4. 
538 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.5. 
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Anchoring Effects 
Also the Anchoring Effect might be of influence to a Manager’s decision-
making in the context of a Corporate Transaction. And also here, a connection 
towards other Economic theories can be observed, again furthering the existence 
of a network of interconnected influence factors to 539Management decision-
making.  
Being merely a false categorization of a specific situation or circumstance, 
the Anchoring Effect might again be either caused by and/or also fuelled further 
by the Manager’s individual management style and the therewith connected level 
and quality of feedback and open discourse that the Manager in able and willing 
to engage in.   
The occurrence of an Anchoring Effect in the course of a Corporate 
Transaction is likely to influence the decisions taken by Managers of the Selling 
Company and/or the Purchasing Company, which are both shaping the overall 
direction and nature of the Corporate Transaction. This is likely to happen 
especially during the contract negotiations, where all relevant issues and 
questions for the deal are discussed and either stipulated and agreed in writing or 
considered to be non-constructive for the ongoing process of the Corporate 
Transaction.  
 
Status Quo Bias 
Even the Status Quo Bias, which is most likely to occur for the Target 
Company’s Management and to be of relevance for its general opinion towards 
the Corporate Transaction, should be considered always in close connection to 
other factors of importance for the Manager’s individual behaviour, such as, 
especially Overconfidence and the Manager’s individual approach towards 
Management in general. Here again, a strong personality with an autocratic 
management approach is likely not only to be influenced by his own 
Overconfidence and thereby trap into a Hindsight Bias regarding past events, but 
                                                     
539 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.2.6.  
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at the same time also likely to over-valuate its current position and reject changes  
– i.e. the Status Quo Bias. 
 
Individual Management style 
As visible above, the overall approach to managing a Company is likely to 
also have an impact on the occurrence of specific biases for an individual 
Manager. This connection is caused by the fact that individual heuristics and 
biases to not occur only situative or due to circumstances, but are one component 
of a “bigger picture” of the individual Manager’s overall personality and 
character traits visible in professional management positions.  
Therefore, an assessment of individual managerial decisions and decision-
making should always take the Manager’s individual style into consideration and 
base potential outcomes on a theoretical fundament that comprises of both, the 
specific theories around individual decision-making, as well as the general 
approach and style of professional company managements.  
 
Level of shareholders’ control 
The manifestation of individual heuristics and biases of a Manager and the 
fact that those directly influence a decision, which the respective Manager takes in 
the name and on behalf of the Company is of particular interest for the 
shareholders. As depicted by the Principal-Agent-Model and its application to 
those constellations in the corporate world,540 the principal has certain 
instruments to prevent the deviation of managerial behaviour from the general 
interests of the shareholder. However, even if the Manager will always take 
certain decisions in a Corporate Transaction in his own discretion, he is directed 
and motivated by factors, such as individual heuristics and biases and his general 
Management style. Knowing this risk and proactively setting incentives and/or 
sanctions to direct the Manager’s interest is the free discretion and decision of the 
shareholders and principals in such scenarios.  
Therefore, an appropriate level of control and information imposed upon 
the Management by the shareholders is of key relevance for the moderation of 
                                                     
540 Cf. above, Chapter 4.2.3. 
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such principal-agent relationship. With a view to the later assessment of real-life 
Corporate Transactions and managerial decision-making behaviour therein, the 
specific behaviour of the shareholders will be one particular element to be 
analysed and which is likely to influence the intensity and quantity of influencing 
elements to the Managers’ decision-making behaviour.  
 
Incentives to certain managerial behaviour 
In close connection to the shareholders’ level of control and information, 
also the setting and existence of inventives and/or sanctions can have a direct 
consequence on subjective factors, which might influence managerial decision-
making.  
The effect that such incentives can have on a Manager will much depend on his 
overall Management style and personal character trait. It might well be that a 
specific Manager is very open to show the intended behaviour upon setting of 
effective incentives by his principal. However, an overly strong personality, 
managing a company with a clear view to his ow benefit maximiziation and 
considering the company to be merely a vehicle thereto and a Corporate 
Transaction a welcoming opportunity to gain even further personal advantages, 
might not easily change his overall approach or alter his specific decision-making 
behaviour, if not for a very good reason, i.e. a very strong incentive, such as a 
high premium payment or similar benefits.  
Overall, it can be concluded that the interpersonal relationship between 
principal and agent is of strong importance for the existence and intensity of 
individual heurstics, biases and specific features of general managerial behaviour. 
Shareholders, who act passively, can give way to an extended radius of 
individual decision-making of a Manager in his own interest, as far as legal 
boundaries permit.  
 
Objective context  
As also depicted above, Managers’ decision-making and the factors, which 
influence it, do not occur alongside the same logic for every Corporate 
Transaction. They depend on the specifics of the respective deal and on its 
objective context. Here, the availability of information and its allocation amongst 
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the deal participants is of huge importance, same as the general level of 
complexity, which might urge the respective Manager to either consider its 
decisions even more thoroughly or might lead to a mental and managerial 
overload, leading to inappropriate decision-making of the Manager.  
 As a consequence, the objective context of a Corporate Transaction should 
also be well-considered, whenever Managers’ decision-making behaviour is 
practically assessed.  
 
The above findings constitute the quintessence of Research Fragment 2. In 
addition and in synopsis with Research Fragment 1, the theoretical fundament for 
the answer to this work’s Research Question is now complete and can therefore 
form the basis for the search and generation of assumptions and hypothesis by 
way of an empirical data analysis. 
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5. EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS – ACTIONS AND DECISIONS 
OF MANAGERS IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS IN 
PRACTICE  
5.1. SCIENTIFIC INTRODUCTION – RESEARCH FRAGMENT 3 
In the above Chapters, the theoretical fundament of actions and decisions of 
managers in Corporate Transactions has been described and analysed, from the 
legal and the economic angle. The analysis of the legal framework of management 
behaviour in Corporate Transaction has revealed certain areas and phases of a 
Corporate Transaction, where decision-making of the Management is legally 
permitted and necessary for the progress of the Corporate Transaction.  
Those phases are namely  
(1) the phase of “Proper Inspection” of the Transaction Target 
Company, in which the Management of all three participants are in 
a position to subjectively influence the further transactional process 
with high impact and  
(2) the phase of “Defining Parameters”, in which mostly the 
Management of Seller and Purchaser can influence the form and 
fate of the Corporate Transaction by their own actions and 
decisions.  
 
After that, the analysis of the economic framework of Managers’ decision-
making has lead to the theoretical conclusion that Management decisions, which 
are taken in the course of a Corporate Transaction, can be influenced by subjective 
factors, such as  
(1) the individual strategy and style of the Manager, who is involved 
in the Corporate Transaction either on the side of the Seller, 
Purchaser or Target Company, and 
(2) heuristics and/or biases, which influence the decision-making 
process of the individual, who manages, but also 
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(3) the relationship between the manager and his/her shareholder as a 
principal by nature of the equity holding structure in the legal 
entity. 
 
However, these theoretical findings and analyses do not yet deliver any hint 
or evidence of what reality looks like. They constitute the “should-be” scenario of 
pure theory, but not the “this-is-it” revelation that only empirical data can bring. 
Therefore, the following passages of this work will focus on empricial data with 
the aim to connect the findings and know-how from the theoretical fundament in 
the above Chapters with facts from reality, which will then allow for the 
generation and construction of a set of robust hypotheses and assumptions. 
This view into reality and the collection and analysis of empirical data 
constitutes the third Research Fragment of this Thesis. It will complement the first 
two Research Fragments with a look into reality. In order for this work to 
constitue an embracing scientific analysis of the Research Question, the inclusion 
of empirical data and an analysis of this empirical data is an inevitable element.  
 
 
Research Fragment 3:  
 
Are the  theoretical findings made in Research Fragment 1 and Research Fragment 2 to be 
found in reality?  
 
 
 
The empirical data collection and analysis will focus on a search for 
evidence not only for the theories of Management Strategies or Behavioural 
Economics or other single-theory approaches, but will be an analysis based on the 
combination of such, with a specific view to the conclusions made on the legal 
framework of Management behaviour in Corporate Transactions. By that, this 
work does create a novum, fill a gap in scientific research, which has been existing 
until now.  
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The set of hypotheses and assumptions generated based on the empirical 
data collection and analysis might contribute to setting the stage for a more 
holistic interpretation of Management behaviour in the future, not only focussing 
on either the legal requirements and framework of a Corproate Transaction or 
Management strategies or Behavioural Economics. It is the combination of those 
theoretical concepts, which contributes to a more thorough and enhanced 
interpretation and understanding of Managers’, i.e. individuals’, behaviour in 
M&A scenarios.  
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5.2. RESEARCH PLAN 
5.2.1. Research Strategy 
The following data collection and analysis has been conducted on real 
Corporate Transactions, i.e. M&A deals, which have taken place during the last 
years. The data available about those Corporate Transactions is drawn from 
different information sources and for each case, the data collection and analysis 
process will be described alongside the findings in the light of the theoretical 
fundament developed above in the previous Chapters of this work. Each set of 
data collected regarding one real Corporate Transaction will be described as 
“Case Study” throughout the description and analysis of such. A set of five such 
Case Studies forms the scope of the empirical research.  
Each of the five Case Studies is selected alongside the parameters described 
below in Chapter “5.2.2 Research Methodology” in order to ensure sufficient 
quality of the data to allow for a valid and reliable analysis and interpretation.  
Why to choose this Research Strategy? Why should a data collection via 
research on such Case Studies be considered as preferreable to other means and 
instruments of data collection, such as e.g. expert interviews, questionnaires or 
biographical research on managing individuals involved in Corporate 
Transactions?  
Different factors come into play for the consideration, which data collection 
approach to take for the specific subject matter of this work’s Research Question:  
(1) objectivity and accurateness of the data,  
(2) the aim for an encompassing nature of the data sets, as well as  
(3) the general availability of the data  
are of relevance here. First and foremost the data to be collected has to be of 
accurate nature, without faulty or fictional elements. Therefore, the data collection 
approach should be focusing on evidence-based information only and restrict 
subjective elements, such as personal opinions of the data transporters or fictional 
additions without realistic grounding. This factor will also be important for the 
quality control elements in the data interpretation conducted at a later stage of 
this work.  
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Moreover, Corporate Transactions are a staged process, which is conducted 
by the participants over a certain period of time. Therefore, relevant data 
regarding Corporate Transactions will comprise of various data points, if the 
entire Corporate Transaction is concerned and not only one specific element or 
time thereof. As an ongoing process, data regarding each phase, each participant 
and the overall timespan is available. The data collection process for this work 
was conducted with the aim to collect data sets that include all those elements, in 
order to have a valid and substantial fact base for the research to be done on those 
data points in the light of the theoretical fundaments drawn above in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4.  
Moreover, the general availability of data regarding Corproate Transactions 
is also of relevance. Whereas the existence of a Corproate Transaction in most 
cases becomes public knowledge at some point in time (often retrospectively, 
once the deal is signed or closed), the detailed information concerning the 
considerations of the participants, the decisions taken and the outcome of the 
different phases and negotiations often remains secret, due to confidentiality 
agreements between the parties and often driven also by the aim not to make 
certain facts or information available to the participants’ respective competitors or 
the public in general. 
The conduct of questionnaire-based interviews of participants in Corporate 
Transactions has been considered as an alternative option for the generation of 
empirical data as well.541 Especially, because this approach had been choosen and 
executed for research in the fields of Behavioural Economics, also with a view to 
Mergers & Acquistions in general.542 However, this work here aims to analyse the 
way in which not only heuristics and biases determine Management behaviour in 
the light of the existing legal framework of Corporate Transactions, but also to 
look beyond to the context of Management Theories and the relationship between 
the respective Manager and his/her principal. Production of data on those 
integrated elements, which always constitute a very personal and reflective 
perspective of the acting individual manager, interviews and direct 
communication with the involved individuals inherits the risk of subjective 
                                                     
541 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 308 et seq. 
542 Cf. Langevoort, D.C. (2011), paper no. 10 with further references.  
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reporting and the inability to self-reflect in an abstract objective way.543 Whereas 
such risks in data collection can be mitigated to some extend by specific means of 
data categorization and interpretation, the risk here for this specific Research 
Question of highly integrated nature, is very high that the data collected by way 
of interviews of participants would be too subjective and/or not sufficiently 
reflective to allow for a comprehensive and in-depth analysis in the light of the 
Research Question.  
Another alternative would be the conduct of interviews not with 
participants, but with experts,544 who have been involved in Corporate 
Transactions and could therefore report on the Management behaviour and 
decision making, as well as on the structure and specifics of the respective deal. 
However, those experts would only be in a position to report data, if they had 
been directly involved in the respective Corporate Transaction themselves. As 
such, they would always have played a specific and active role, for example as an 
advisor to one of the participants. And as such, the same risks would exist as 
described above for the data collection from interviewing the participants: the 
data sets to be received might be too subjective and not at all open for objective 
analysis, because they derive from an individual, who is not able to abstractly 
report and reflect about his/her own behaviour.  
Based on those considerations, the most appropriate approach for the 
collection of suitable data appears to be the collection of data from “outside” the 
specific Corporate Transaction. The approach to do so is by collecting a variety of 
data points from reliable sources available and the assortment of this data 
towards a “deal biography” for each Case Study.545 Emphasis is taken towards the 
availability of reliable data concerning factors like especially the applicable 
jurisdiction(s), general structure of the deal, ownership structure of the 
participants, decisions taken by the management, content of transactional 
                                                     
543 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 325 et seq. describes the advantages of non-
reactive methods of qualitative data analysis against interviews.  
544 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 308 et seq. 
545 Such data collection was conducted based on the methodology described in: 
Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 325 et seq. 
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agreements as well as the management strategy of the respective managers 
involved.  
The approach of data collection by way of real-life M&A Case Studies 
allows for an inductive approach546 for the empirical analysis. Observations of real 
Corporate Transactions allow, in the light of the theoretical fundament developed 
above, to draw conclusions in the form of hypotheses and assumptions regarding 
individual Managers’ behaviour in Corporate Transaction scenarios. This will be 
the final and comprehensive step towards answering the Research Question of 
this work.  
 
5.2.2. Research Methodology  
The execution of the Research Strategy described above in Chapter 5.2.1 is 
conducted based on the methodolgy of a qualitative data analysis. The answer to 
the Research Question requires the generation of hypotheses on how individual 
Management behaviour is determined in the light of the existing and applicable 
legal framework of a Corporate Transaction. Inductive analytical progress, which 
aims towards the generation and definition of hypotheses is often conducted by 
way of qualitative data analysis547 and there are strong arguments for that.  
Qualitative data analysis aims to interprete and reveal the latent data 
content of material, taking into account also the respective context of the data 
material and the acting subjective’s perspective.548 This allows to consider various 
pieces of material and information in different format and nature at the same time 
and delivers a comprehensive analytical outcome, whereas the generation of 
hypotheses can be one of those.549 Here, sets of information material of different 
                                                     
546 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 30 et seq. and p. 300 et seq.; Mayring, P. 
(2010), p. 22 et seq. with further references.  
547 Cf. Jensen, O. in: Mayring, P., Gläser-Zikuda, M. (2005), p. 255 et seq. with 
further references.  
548 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 329; Mayring, P. (2016), p. 46 et seq. 
549 Cf. Mayring, P. (2016), p. 41 et seq.; Mayring, P. in: Mayring, P., Gläser-Zikuda, 
M. (2005), p. 7 et seq.  
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formats are available for every Case Study via different information sources. 
Those sets form the “biographical data”550 of the respective Corporate 
Transactions. 
Another argument to support the approach of qualitative data analysis for 
the generation of reliable hypotheses on robust empirical and theoretical grounds 
is the flexibility, those approaches offer, with regard to the possible reconstruction 
of the target individuals’ perspective and the understanding and analysis 
thereof:551 the path via the Research Fragments towards finding the answer to the 
Research Question of this work does necessitate an interpretative, hermeneutical 
view into the reality of Corporate Transactions by using various sets of available 
data points for the respective Case Studies. Here, qualitative data analysis allows 
for drawing such conclusions and explanations in an explorative any open way, 
still sensefully structured and logically grounded in order to produce an outcome 
of high academic reliability.  
Moreover, there is also one more specific argument in favour of using 
qualitative data analysis here instead of quantitative analytical instruments: the 
world of M&A, of Corporate Transactions is a world, in which not all types of 
data can be produced in large numbers. For example, the number of managers, 
who are actively involved in cross-border Corporate Transactions is likely to be 
smaller than e.g. the number of consumers for many products or e.g. the number 
of people who take the subway to go to work every morning.  
Also, the number of reliable data points available regarding Purchase 
Agreements of Corporate Transactions is rather limited, due to the above 
described wish of the participants, to keep such information confidential. Also 
with a view to the actual process and individual decision-making during 
Corporate Transactions, the information available is to be considered as rather 
restricted in volume, even when considering various different sources, such like 
                                                     
550 Such term is typically used in the context of data available concerning 
individuals, but also well describes the nature of the data collections here: cf. 
Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 325 et seq.; Mayring, P. (2010), p. 52 et seq. with 
further references.  
551 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 301 et seq. 
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press releases and corporate communication, participants interviews, as well as 
indirect information sources via internet and else.  
Nevertheless, the data collected for the means of this work and analysed in 
the following Chapters, is objective, robust and substantial enough to be 
considered as reliable as well as at the same time externally valid and therewith 
fit to allow for a generation of hypotheses of general value and relevance.552 
Objectivity of both, the input data as well as the interpretation thereof is 
ensured by the sourcing of primary, direct data whenever available and by 
conducting the interpretation alongside structured categories, which are 
described in more detail below in Chapter 5.3. Regarding the objectivity of the 
sourced information, indirect information sources are only considered, if 
additional value is likely to be brought into the interpretation and if such 
information still suffices the quality standards set out in the following.  
Same as for quantitative data analysis, also qualitative data analysis has to 
live up to the standard of validity – internally and externally.553 Therefore, the 
analysis of the collected data will include an assessment of the internal and 
external validity as well, meaning that the data requires to be logical, free from 
contradictions and errors in itself (internal validity554) and at the same time 
suitable to build the basis of generalisation and universal value (external 
validity555).  
Within the fields of qualitative data analysis, the tools to process the data 
collected in the following will be (1) a qualitative content analysis according to the 
principles developed by Mayring,556 in combination with (2) the approach of the 
                                                     
552 Such requirements to the data chosen as a basis for any kind of empirical data 
analysis are considered to be of central relevance: cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 
329 and p. 53; Mayring, P. (2010), p. 22 et seq. 
553 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 327 et seq.  
554 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 327 et seq.; Mayring, P. (2010), p. 116 et seq. 
555 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 327 et seq.; Mayring, P. (2010), p. 116 et seq.  
556 Mayring, P. in: Mayring, P., Gläser-Zikuda, M. (2005), p. 7 et seq. 
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so-called “Grounded Theory” developed by the “Chicago School” in the 1960s.557 
Why are those tools most suitable here?  
The nature and formats of the data sets available as Case Studies are diverse 
with regard to context and content. Here, Mayring’s qualitative content analysis 
allows for a dedicated interpretation, whereas the Grounded Theory allows for a 
constructive inclusion of the respective data set’s context into the assessment.   
 
5.2.3. Research Design  
The empirical data collection was conducted mainly by way of internet and 
newspaper research for direct and indirect data regarding Corproate 
Transactions. As a first step, the search parameters were directed to identifying 
Corporate Transactions in general and to detecting cases, which took place during 
the last years. A search back until the 1990s was conducted.  
As a second step, the search was elaborated towards cross-border Corporate 
Transactions only and to those, where the managing individuals were not at the 
same time also the majority shareholders of the Company.  
In order to ensure a high level of completeness of the data sets, only 
Corporate Transactions were considered as potential case studies, for which data 
was available for all phases of the Transaction process and capturing the 
perspective of all three particpants of the Corporate Transaction. Another filter 
was then to identify those Corporate Transactions, where data also included the 
fields of the involved managers behaviour and decision-making. Therefore, both, 
primary sources, such as press notes, transaction agreements, interviews of the 
acting managers themselves as well as secondary sources, such as press articles, 
interviews and statements from other involved individuals and outside experts 
was considered.  
This distillation of available data points towards comprehensive data sets 
led to the finding of the following five Case Studies:  
                                                     
557 Cf. Bortz, J., Döring, N. (2005), p. 304 et seq. &  p. 332 et seq; Charmaz, K. 
(2006), p. 123 et seq.; Cho, J.Y., Lee, E.-H. (2014), p. 1 et seq. with further 
references.  
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Case Study 1: Vodafone plc – Mannesmann AG 
The acquisition of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone plc dated 1999 
 
Case Study 2: ABN Amro – RFS Holding  
The acquisition of ABN Amro Holding N.V. by the RFS Holdings B.V., 
constituting a consortium of RBS Bank, Fortis Bank and Banco Santander  
dated 2007 
 
Case Study 3: Daimler AG – Chrysler Corporation 
The acquisition of Chrysler Corporation by Daimler-Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft dated 1998 
 
Case Study 4: Bayer AG – Monsanto Company 
The acquisition of Monsanto Company by Bayer AG dated 2018 
 
Case Study 5: Banco Santander  – Banco Popular España S.A. 
The acquisition of Banco Popular España S.A. by Banco Santander dated 
2017 
 
As visible now, those selected Case Studies all constitute cross-border 
transaction, with one exemption of Case Study 5, which has a Spanish domestic 
scope only. Also, those Case Studies mainly include corporations, such being 
legal entities set up under European national jurisdictions (Germany, UK, Spain). 
This selection of empirical data sets available as Case Studies in the course of 
answering the Research Question has also set the stage for the focus and scope of 
the descriptive analysis of the legal framework above in Chapter 3. Key 
jurisdictions described therein were selected based on the availability of these 
Case Studies in order to be able to support the empirical research with the most 
appropriate theoretical legal fundament.  
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With regard to the data management, all collected data was stored 
electronically in suitable data formats, such as pdf or jpeg documents, in order to 
allow for an easy analysis and further processing of such data.   
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5.3. DATA – COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
5.3.1. Data Collection per each Case Study 
In the following, a brief summary of each Case Study will be provided, 
same as an abstract overview of the documents and sources found and analysed. 
Based on such “Case Biography”, a categorization and coding of the data will 
follow and lead the path towards the interpretation and analysis.  
 
5.3.1.1. Case Study 1 – Vodafone/Mannesmann 
Case Biography558 
The acquisition of the majority of shares of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone 
Airtouch plc is well-documented, due to the fact that the acquisition included the 
attempt of a hostile takeover by Vodafone Airtouch plc via the German stock 
market.  
In 1999, Mannesmann AG was a German stock corporation, listed as one of 
the most valuable companies in the German stock market index “DAX”. Its 
business units included a variety of industrial activities, such as pipe 
manufacturing (known as “Mannesmann Röhrenwerke”), manufacturing and sale 
of steel products (a Mannesmann group company known as “VDO”), cranes and 
others, but also telecommunications, in particular mobile telecommunications 
technology and consumer markets, including, for example the hosting and 
management of Germany’s mobile communications network “D2”. Since May 
1999, Dr Klaus Esser represented and managed the company as Chief Executive 
Officer (“Vorstandsvorsitzender”). 
In autumn 1999, Mannesmann AG had negotiated and succeeded in the 
acquisition of the majority of shares of the UK-based telecommunications 
provider Orange plc. With that, Mannesmann AG announced to continue its 
                                                     
558 All information depicted in this Case Biography have been derived from the 
Information and Documents, depicted below. This general reference serves in lieu 
of specific references to each data point, which forms a part of the analysis of this 
Case Study 1.  
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strategy to expand business in the telecommunications sector with a European-
wide focus. After Mannesmann AG’s announcement of the takeover of Orange on 
13 October 1999, rumours spread that Vodafone Airtouch plc was interested in 
acquiring the majority of shares in Mannesmann AG.  
On 14 November 1999, Vodafone Airtouch plc published an offer to take 
over publicly traded shares in Mannesmann AG with an overall volume of circa 
EUR 100 billion. Mannesmann AG’s management rejected the offer and told their 
shareholders in public that the offer was completely inappropriate, compared to 
the positive growth outlook that Mannesmann AG had for the coming years. 
Following the publication of the offer, the value of the shares of Mannesmann AG 
were rising significantly at the German stock markets. On 19 November 1999, 
Vodafone Airtouch plc even inceased its offer.  
What followed were several weeks, during which Vodafone Airtouch plc 
tried to attract and convince Mannesmann AG’s shareholders to accept their offer 
by way of intensive marketing campaigns, roadshows and press statements. The 
management of Mannesmann AG was still objecting the offer and therefore 
promoted against the offer, aiming to convince their shareholders that 
Mannesmann AG would be better off without Vodafone Airtouch plc, continuing 
to exist as a separate legal entity, stand-alone with focus on its current expansion 
strategy. While Vodafone Airtouch plc publicly stated that Mannesmann AG 
would exaggerate the risks associated with the takeover offer and thereby 
threaten away its shareholders, rumours spread that Mannesmann AG was also 
approaching other companies in the telecommunications sector, in order to form 
an alliance or to conduct another takeover that would make it impossible for 
Vodafone Airtouch plc to succeed with its takeover attempt.  
Mannesmann AG entered into separate talks about strategic cooperations 
with Bertelsmann – a German media company -, with the French media and 
telecommunicatios company Vivendi and with AOL Europe, with the aim to 
thereby repel the threat of the hostile takeover by Vodafone Airtouch plc. Talks 
with AOL Europe were close to be final, but then ended suddenly early in 2000. 
Also the negotiations with Vivendi were close to signature, when they also 
suddenly ended on 30 January 2000. Still on that same day, Vivendi then 
announced to enter into a Joint Venture with Vodafone Airtouch plc, in case the 
latter would acquire more than 50% of the shares of Mannesmann AG. 
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Reportedly, throughout all the talks and negotiations to competing 
telecommunication companies, it became obvious that management decisions in 
Mannesmann AG were solely to be taken by its CEO Dr Klaus Esser and that 
other company representatives had no authority to enter into binding decisions 
during negotiations. 
On 31 January 2000, the chairman of Mannesmann AG’s Supervisory Board 
promised to Dr Klaus Esser to keep his driver, secretary and a company office for 
lifetime. 
While Mannesmann AG’s CEO Dr Klaus Esser spent much time in talks and 
discussions with their shareholders, he always aimed to convince them that 
Mannesmann AG would be more successful, if they continued as a separate legal 
entity and not be taken over by Vodafone Airtouch plc. However, on 02 February 
2000, the representative of one of Mannesmann AG’s largest shareholders 
Hutchinson Whampoa, strongly argued towards Dr Klaus Esser to agree to the 
takeover offer made by Vodafone Airtouch plc. Late on 03 February 2000, Dr 
Klaus Esser talked directly to Chris Gent, Chief Executive Officer of Vodafone 
Airtouch plc and they both agreed to arrange for a friendly takeover of the 
majority of shares in Mannesmann AG by Vodafone Airtouch plc.  
After their verbal agreement was made, a formal transaction agreement was 
negotiated by the teams of each party’s consultants in the days thereafter.  
As part of the transaction agreements, Dr Klaus Esser is appointed as Vice 
Chief Executive Director of Vodafone Airtouch plc, a position that he will only 
have until 31 July 2000.  
Prior to the closing of the Corporate Transaction, Dr Klaus Esser and 
members of his management team are rewarded by Mannesmann AG with 
substantial bonus payments, such amounting to EUR Million 15 for Dr Klaus 
Esser alone. Additional bonus payments are agreed and made later, in connection 
to his early retirement from the position of Vice Chief Exuective Officer of 
Vodafone Airtouch plc. Overall, Dr Klaus Esser receives around EUR Million 30 
as extraordinary payments next to his usual salary in connection with the 
takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone Airtouch plc. 
Based on the high amount of bonus payments, Dr Klaus Esser and members 
of the Supervisory Board, who also received high bonus payments, get into the 
252 
 
ANNE SCHRÖER-CONIGLIELLO 
focus of the German criminal investigations authorities. The public prosecutor in 
Düsseldorf brings an action against Dr Klaus Esser and others, accusing them of 
embezzlement (Untreue) to the disadvantage and contradiction the interests of 
Mannesmann AG. During those court proceedings, Dr Klaus Esser appears and 
states in court, always insisting on the lawfulness of all payments received and 
that he had always acted solely motivated by the interests and well-being of 
Mannesmann AG. 
After the takeover is agreed, Mannesmann AG ceases to exist as a separate 
legal entity, but is partly integrated into the Vodafone Airtouch group of 
companies and partly – mainly the industrial business units of Mannesmann AG 
– sold to other companies.  
 
Table 4: Case Study 1 - Analysed documents and information 
 
# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
1. Written court 
decision 
 
Detailed legal assessment of 
actions and statements 
made by Dr Klaus Esser 
and members of 
Mannesmann AG’s 
supervisory board and 
other corporate functions. 
www.bundesgeri
chtshof.de 
(search: Court 
Decision date 21 
December 2005, 
no.3 StR 470/04) 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
1 
2. Written court 
decision 
 
Detailed description of the 
chronology of events of the 
takeover of Mannesmann 
AG by Vodafone Airtouch 
plc and the statements 
made by Dr Klaus Esser 
www.justiz.nrw.
de (search: Court 
decision dated 22 
July 2004, no. XIV 
5/03) 
Last check on: 15 
1 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
and other members of the 
management and 
Supervisory Board during 
that period, same as a brief 
overview of Mannesmann 
AG’s company history and 
a legal assessment of the 
criminal allegations raised 
by the public prosecutor.  
 
August 2018 
3. Written press 
note of 
German 
Federal High 
Court of 
Justice 
 
Brief statement that the 
German Federal High Court 
of Justice has suspended the 
verdict of of acquittal ruled 
by the Local Court of 
Düsseldorf.  
 
www.bundesgeri
chtshof.de 
(search: Press 
note no. 179/2005) 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
1 
4. Written press 
note of 
European 
Commission 
 
Brief statement about the 
announcement and main 
arguments for the legal 
assessment of the 
acquisition of the majority 
of shares in Mannesmann 
AG by Vodafone Airtouch 
plc in the light of European 
merger control and 
competition laws.  
 
www.ec.europa.e
u/competition 
(search: Press 
release dated 12 
April 2000, no. 
IP/00/373)  
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
1 
5. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper article 
published by Deutsche 
Welle, reporting the 
chronology of events of the 
www.dw.com/de
/die-schlacht-um-
mannesmann/ 
Last check on: x15 
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
takeover.  August 2018 
 
6. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper article 
published by Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung, reporting the 
chronology of events of the 
takeover. 
www.sueddeutsc
he.de/wirtschaft/2
.220/mannesman
n-die-
uebernahmeschla
cht.html 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
7. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper articled 
published by Manager 
Magazin on the criminal 
investigations on Dr Klaus 
Esser. 
www.manager-
magazin.de/unter
nehmen/karriere/
a-122119.html 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
8. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper article 
published by Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung on the 
bonus payment made to Dr 
Klaus Esser. 
www.faz.net/aktu
ell/wirtschaft/ma
nnesmann-
prozess-16-
millionen-fuer-
esser-aus-
mitleid.html 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
2 
9. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper note 
published by Der 
Tagesspiegel on citation of 
interview with Dr Klaus 
www.tagesspiege
l.de/wirtschaft 
(search: 
“Mannesmann-
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
Esser regarding likelihood 
to succeed against 
Vodafone Airtouch plc in 
the takeover battle.   
 
Chef Klaus Esser 
gibt sich 
siegessicher”) 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
10. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper article 
published by Manager 
Magazin on review of 
takeover agreement. 
www.manager-
magazin.de/unter
nehmen/artikel/a-
339489.html 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
11. Newspaper 
article 
 
English newspaper article 
published by Euromoney 
regarding the takeover as a 
success story for Vodafone 
Airtouch plc.  
www.euromoney
.com/article 
(search: 
“Vodafone 
takeover of 
Mannesmann the 
bid that couldn’t 
fail?”) 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
12. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper article 
published by Manager 
Magazin on the chronology 
of the takeover. 
www.manager-
magazin.de/unter
nehmen/artikel/a-
242161.html 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
13. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper article 
published by Die Welt 
regarding the takeover and 
the fall of the “Deutschland-
AG” 
www.welt.de/wir
tschaft/article 
(search: “Wie ein 
Brite die 
Deutschland-AG 
sprengte“) 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
14. Newspaper 
article 
 
English newspaper article 
published by The 
Economist on influence of 
the Mannesmann AG 
acquisition by Vodafone 
Airtouch plc on the 
development of the 
telecommunications market 
in Europe. 
 
www.economist.c
om (search: 
“Vodafone-
Mannesmann – 
What’s next?”) 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
2 
15. Newspaper 
article 
 
German newspaper article 
published by Manager 
Magazin regarding 
preventive measures during 
takeover battle and 
roadshows. 
www.manager-
magazin.de/finan
zen/artikel/a-
54348.html 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
16. Newspaper 
article 
German newspaper article 
published by Heise Online 
on takeover chronology. 
 
www.heise.de/-
24006 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
17. Newspaper 
article 
German newspaper article 
published by Kolnische 
Rundschau on interviews 
with Dr Klaus Esser, Klaus 
Zwickel and Dr Josef 
Ackermann. 
 
www.rundschau-
online.de/zitate-
11206432 
Last check on: 15 
August 2018 
 
2 
 
5.3.1.2. Case Study 2 – RFS Holdings B.V./ABN Amro Holding N.V. 
Case Biography559 
In comparison to Case Study 1, this Corporate Transaction sequence of 
events is much more brief: During the timeframe of February 2007 until July 2007, 
RFS Holdings B.V. did successfully offer and negotiate the acquisition of the 
majority of shares of the Dutch banking group ABN Amro Holding N.V. .  
RFS Holdings B.V. itself was a consortium of three banking institutions, 
such being (1) the Royal Bank of Scotland, (2) Fortis Bank and (3) Santander Bank, 
who had joined forces in order to execute the takeover of ABN Amros Holding 
N.V. by way of a jointly held legal entity.  
As a publicly traded and listed stock corporation, ABN Amro Holding N.V. 
was targeted to be sold to Barclays Bank at the time, when RFS Holdings B.V. 
published their bid to acquire the majority in shares. Their bid directly competed 
with the offer made by Barclays Bank and was attractive to ABN Amro Holding 
N.V.’s shareholders, because of the higher value offered for each share. 
                                                     
559 All information depicted in this Case Biography have been derived from the 
Information and Documents, depicted below. This general reference serves in lieu 
of specific references to each data point, which forms a part of the analysis of this 
Case Study 2. 
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Because of the ongoing negotiations for the sale of ABN Amro Holding N.V. 
to Barclays Bank, the consortium members pressed the preparatory steps of the 
envisaged Corproate Transaction to be conducted very quickly and thereby 
conducted only a very limited inspection of the target company, with a high-level 
Due Diligence based on a small information basis only. The main external 
advisors, who were engaged to support RFS Holdings B.V. during the 
transactional process were mainly remunerated with success fees.  
In April 2007, the majority of ABN Amro’s shareholders decided in favour 
of the offer made by RFS Holdings B.V. and abandoned the offer made earlier by 
Barclays Bank.   
 
Table 5: Case Study 2 - Analysed documents and information  
 
# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
1. Offer 
Memorandum 
 
Public takeover offer made by 
RFS Holdings B.V. for the 
purchase of shares in ABN 
Amro Holding N.V. including 
details around the economic 
nature of the offer and outlook 
towards the post-merger 
integration and deal structure 
dated 20 July 2007. 
 
http://files.sh
areholder.co
m/download
s/rbs/1119557
641x0x262634
/01f747c3-
ec22-467f-
88e6-
44d3edc4d85
1/offer_mem
orandum_pre
ference_share
s.pdf 
 
Last Check: 
15 August 
2018 
1 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
 
2. Official 
investigation 
report on the 
failure of Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
 
Detailed report issued by the 
Financial Services Authority 
Board (“FSA”) on the failure of 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
including an analysis of the 
takeover of ABN Amro 
Holding N.V. by RFS Holdings 
B.V., which was partially held 
by Royal Bank of Scotland.  
 
https://www.
fca.org.uk/pu
blication/cor
porate/fsa-
rbs.pdf  
Last check: 
15 August 
2018 
1 
3.  Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
by Thomson Reuters with 
citatios and interview of ABN 
Amro Holding N.V.’s CEO 
Rijkman Groenink on merger 
offers.  
www.thomso
nreuters.com 
(search: 
“ABN CEO 
says merger 
with Barclays 
is better”) 
Last check: 
15 August 
2018 
 
2 
4. Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
by CNBC on the launch of the 
bid for ABN Amro Holding 
N.V. by RBS lead consortium 
and conditions of the bid.  
www.cnbc.co
m (search: 
“RBS 
Consortium 
Launches 
$95.7 Billion 
Bid for ABN 
Amro”) 
Last check: 
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
15 August 
2018 
 
5.  Newspaper 
article 
English newspaper article 
published by Finance on IPO 
conducted by ABN Amro in 
November 2015 included 
review of takeover by RFS 
Holdings B.V. in 2007.  
 
www.en.fina
nce.sia-
partners.com 
(search: “The 
ABN AMRO 
story 
continues; 
IPO set for 
November 
20th 2015”) 
Last check: 
15 August 
2018 
 
2 
6. Newspaper 
article 
English newspaper article 
published by Business Today 
on RBS role in the takeover of 
ABN Amro Holding N.V., the 
FSA report and the limited 
conduct of a Due Diligence 
and role of external advisors 
during the transaction.   
 
www.busine
sstoday.com 
(search: “RBS 
‘gamble’ on 
ABN Amro 
deal: FSA”)  
Last check: 
15 August 
2018 
2 
7.  Newspaper 
article 
English newspaper article 
published by BBC News on the 
takeover of ABN Amro 
Holding N.V. by RBS and 
other consortium members. 
www.news.
bbc.co.uk/g
o/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/busine
ss/7033176.s
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
tm 
Last check: 
15 August 
2018 
 
8. Newspaper 
article 
English newspaper article 
published by Market Watch on 
the chronology of the takeover. 
www.market
watch.com 
(search: 
“Timeline of 
the battle for 
ABN Amro”) 
Last check: 
15 August 
2018 
 
2 
 
5.3.1.3. Case Study 3 – Daimler/Chrysler 
Case Biography560 
Often described as “marriage in heaven” and named a “merger of equals”, 
the Corporate Transaction which is hereby described as Case Study 3, is the 
takeover of Chrysler Corporation by Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, dated May 
1998.  
The Chief Executive Officer of Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, Jürgen 
Schrempp, and Chrysler Corporation’s Chief Executive Officer, Robert Eaton, had 
                                                     
560 All information depicted in this Case Biography have been derived from the 
Information and Documents, depicted below. This general reference serves in lieu 
of specific references to each data point, which forms a part of the analysis of this 
Case Study 3. 
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announced that their companies would merge to become the new 
DaimlerChrysler group to manufacture cars on a global scale and with strong 
market presence in North America and Europe on 07 May 1998. Whilst the 
Business Combination Agreement that was signed between the Parties did 
already reveal a clear dominance of Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft in the 
partnership, the Corporate Transaction was still promoted as a “merger of 
equals”. 
Only years after the Closing of this deal, in an interview given on 30 
October 2000, Jürgen Schrempp would reveal in an interview that he had not seen 
nor planned the merger to be “of equals” from the start, but that he had simply 
conducted a strategic approach to convince the shareholders of Chrysler 
Corporation to agree to the deal.  
The two car manufacturers were both strong and important players in their 
respective regional markets, Chrysler mainly in North America and Daimler 
mainly in Europe, but Daimler aimed to become a global player in the 
Automotive sector. Various acquisitions and joint ventures had complemented to 
this strategy already and the merger with Chrysler was now another important 
milestone to that. 
Whereas the Corporate Transaction itself did not include public hostile 
actions or measures to prevent the takeover, one specific particularity of this deal 
is the independence, by which Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft’s Chief Executive 
Officer Jürgen Schrempp executed on the strategic approach of a global expansion 
of the company and thereby structurally shaped and changed the company, in his 
sole competence as top manager. Even though the shareholders resolved on the 
merger with Chrysler Corporations after the main outlines of the deal were 
negotiated already in a shareholders’ meeting on 18 September 1998, Jürgen 
Schrempp did openly communicate this to be his very own vision.  
Whereas the transaction steps leading towards the Signing and public 
announcement of the deal were conducted by all particpants without major 
disruptions, the deal turned out to be of negative nature and economic 
disadvantage for Purchaser and Target Company in the years after the Closing. 
Analysis has revealed a lack of post-merger integration and deviating company 
cultures as one of the main reasons, why Daimler sold most of its shares in 
Chrysler again in October 2007, after years of restructuring the newly merged 
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company and facing severe financial losses. The DaimlerChrysler group was 
unwinded again and Daimler re-named into Daimler  Aktiengesellschaft, 
focussing on its key brands and areas of luxury car manufacturing again.  
On 27 November 2000, one of the most important shareholders of 
DaimlerChrysler, the investor Kirk Kekorian, files a lawsuit against 
DaimlerChrysler, alleging the company’s Chief Executive Officer Jürgen 
Schrempp to have betrayed the shareholders and not told the truth regarding the 
merger.  
The years after the merger in 1998 were for DaimlerChrysler mostly marked 
by financial results, which did not at all match with the promises and plans made 
by Jürgen Schrempp. As a result thereof, he announced his resignation as Chief 
Executive Officer on 28 July 2005. 
 
Table 6: Case Study 3 - Analysed documents and information 
 
# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
1. Transaction 
agreement 
Business Combination 
Agreement entered into by 
Daimler-Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft AG and 
Chrysler Corporation 
regarding the merger of the 
two groups of companies and 
the future structure of the 
combined group.  
 
https://www.s
ec.gov/Archive
s/edgar/data/7
91269/0000950
123-98-
004713.txt 
Last Check: 25 
July 2018 
1 
2. Press note Press note issued by the 
European Commission 
regarding the approval of the 
merger procedure between 
http://ec.europ
a.eu/competiti
on/mergers/cas
es/decisions/m
1 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
Daimler-Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft and 
Chrysler Corporation.  
 
1204_en.pdf 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
3. Investor 
Relations report  
Report outlining milestones 
in the history of Daimler-
Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 
pubslihed by the company 
itself.  
https://www.d
aimler.com/ko
nzern/tradition
/geschichte/199
5-2007.html 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
2 
4. Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
in German by BrandEins 
regarding Jürgen Schrempp 
and his role in the merger of 
Daimler-Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft and 
Chrysler Corporation.  
 
https://www.b
randeins.de/m
agazine/brand-
eins-
wirtschaftsma
gazin/2007/spit
zenkraefte/pru
egelknabe-
rambo 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
2 
5. Newspaper 
article  
Newspaper article published 
in German by Manager 
Magazin regarding the 
chronology of the merger 
between Daimler-Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft and 
Chrysler Corporation.  
www.manager
-
magazin.de/un
ternehmen/arti
kel/a-
105209.html 
Last check on: 
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
25 July 2018 
 
6. Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
in English by Harvard 
Business Review on the 
chronology of events and 
reasons why the merger of 
Daimler-Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft and 
Chrysler Corporation turned 
out to be unsuccessful.  
 
https://hbr.org/
2007/05/why-
the-
daimlerchrysle
r-merger 
Last check on: 
25 July 2018 
2 
7. Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
in English by Financial Times 
citing an interview made 
with Jürgen Schrempp.  
 
https://www.ft
.com/content/3
645b436-8c23-
11d9-a895-
00000e2511c8 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
2 
8. Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
in English by Tagesspiegel 
regarding the consequences 
of the interview given earlier 
by Jürgen Schrempp to 
Financial Times.  
https://www.ta
gesspiegel.de/
wirtschaft/dai
mler-chrysler-
die-
moeglichen-
rechtsfolgen-
eines-
interviews/182
316.html 
Last check: 25 
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
July 2018 
 
9. Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
in German by Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung regarding the 
chronology of the merger and 
its aftermath.  
 
https://www.s
ueddeutsche.d
e/wirtschaft/ge
scheiterte-
fusion-von-
daimler-und-
chrysler-pleite-
nach-lehrbuch-
1.1666592 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
2 
10.  Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
by Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung in German 
delivering an interview made 
with Jürgen Schrempp 
http://www.fa
z.net/aktuell/w
irtschaft/doku
mente-ein-
schachspieler-
redet-
111763.html#v
oid 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
2 
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5.3.1.4. Case Study 4 – Bayer/Monsanto 
Case Biography561 
The announcement was made in September 2016: The German Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft, known as inventor of Aspirin and other well-established 
pharmaceuticals and meanwhile one of the largest and most profitable global 
players in the Life Sciences sector, will acquire Monsanto Company, the crop and 
seeds specialist from St. Louis, USA.  
However, even if the announcement was made and the Merger Agreement 
was signed, the particpants knew and expected the timeframe between Signing 
and Closing to be long in this case. This was mainly due to the fact that the 
acquisition triggered notification and approval requirements for competition law 
authorities in various different countries and regions, including Europe, the 
United States of America, Brazil and others. In the light of those hurdles, which 
were to be overcome, the Merger Agreement did include an obligation for Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft, to pay a “Antitrust Break-Up Fee”, in the amount of USD 2 
billion in case one of the competent cartel authorities would not approve and 
permit the acquisition. Later than expected, in June 2018, the US cartel authorities 
finally agreed on a compromise with Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, permitting the 
Closure of the acquisition subject to various conditions: Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 
will divest from certain parts of its business units, especially in the fields of crop 
science activities and crop protection products, in an amount of approximately 
USD 9 billion, mainly by selling those business units to one of its key competitors 
in the global markets – BASF Aktiengesellschaft.  
The Signing of the Merger Agreement followed an inspection phase, which 
was reported to be brief and not all-embracing, which was mainly argued to be 
the case because of the public nature of the Bayer’s acquisition offer made via the 
stock markets.  
                                                     
561 All information depicted in this Case Biography have been derived from the 
Information and Documents, depicted below. This general reference serves in lieu 
of specific references to each data point, which forms a part of the analysis of this 
Case Study 4. 
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Financing of the transaction’s purchase price of approximately USD 66 
billion was planned to be a mixture of equity expenditure of Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft by way of a capital increase via the stock markets and of debt 
financing, based on loan constructions given by a variety of different banks, 
including Bank of America and JP Morgan.  
Bayer’s Chief Executive Officer Werner Baumann described the acquisition 
as a key milestone to execute against Bayer Aktiengesellschaft’s strategy of 
constant growth and profitability in the company’s three different sectors, being 
Pharma, Consumer Health and Crop Sciences. Bayer’s management also 
expressed clear expectations regarding synergies and growth rates, which the 
acquisition would release for the advantage of Bayer within a short- and mid-
term perspective. Werner Baumann, same as Bayer Aktiengesellschaft’s 
Management Board Member for agriculture, Liam Conden, also both announced 
that Bayer Aktiengesellschaft would not continue to promote or use the brand 
name “Monsanto”, but would strengthen the Bayer trademark portfolio instead.  
Since years, the trademark “Monsanto” had been again and again gathering 
media attention with various scandals and negative press connotation regarding 
negative side effects of the company’s products, such as, most prominently, the 
weed killer Glyphosat, which is in discussion to be banned from usage within the 
European Union. As of the time of drafting this work, the Closing of the 
acquisition is still in progress. Future will tell, if the expected synergies and 
growth rates will become reality or not.  
 
Table 7: Case Study 4 - Analysed documents and information  
 
# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirec
t Data 
Source 
(2) 
1. Transaction 
Agreement 
Merger Agreement and Plan of 
Merger between Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft and 
https://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edg
ar/data/1110783/0
1 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirec
t Data 
Source 
(2) 
Monsanto Company regarding 
the acquisition of all shares in 
Monsanto Company by Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft and the 
particularities regarding such 
acquisition, such as warranties, 
Closing Conditions and 
organisational measures to 
integrate the Target Company 
into the Purchaser’s corporate 
structure.  
 
0011931251671491
5/d234658dex21.h
tm 
Last check on: 25 
July 2018 
2. Press note Press statement released by 
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft and 
Monsanto Company regarding 
the acquisition of the latter by 
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 
expected financial 
developments and outline of 
the acquisition’s structure and 
Closing conditions. 
 
https://media.bay
er.com/baynews/
baynews.nsf/id/A
DSF8F-Bayer-
and-Monsanto-to-
Create-a-Global-
Leader-in-
Agriculture 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
1 
3. Press note Press statement issued by the 
European Commission on the 
granting of merger clearance 
for the Closing of the 
acquisition of Monsanto 
Company by Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft.  
 
http://europa.eu/r
apid/press-
release_IP-18-
2282_en.htm 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
1 
4. Newspaper Article published by Manager http://www.mana 2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirec
t Data 
Source 
(2) 
article Magazin in German regarding 
the chronology and 
retrospective of the acquisition 
of Monsanto Company by 
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 
 
ger-
magazin.de/unter
nehmen/industrie
/bayer-
kapitalerhoehung
-soll-
uebernahme-von-
monsanto-
finanzieren-
helfen-a-
1210987.html 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
5. Newspaper 
article 
Article published by Deutsche 
Welle in German regarding the 
acquisition details and Closing 
conditions set by the US cartel 
authorities. 
 
https://www.dw.c
om/de/bayer-
monsanto-deal-
ist-fast-perfekt/a-
43984347 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
2 
6.  Newspaper 
article 
Article published by 
Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung in German citing an 
interview with Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft’s 
Management Board Member 
for Agricultural Business Liam 
Conden on the acquisition in 
general and Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft’s company 
http://www.faz.n
et/aktuell/wirtsch
aft/unternehmen/
der-bayer-
agrarvorstand-
im-interview-
nach-der-
uebernahme-von-
monsanto-
14435388.html#vo
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirec
t Data 
Source 
(2) 
culture. 
 
id 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
7.  Newspaper 
article  
Aricle published by Manager 
Magazin in German citing an 
interview with Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft’s Chief 
Executive Officer Werner 
Baumann regarding the Due 
Diligence and the acquisition 
of Monsanto Company in 
general.  
 
http://www.mana
ger-
magazin.de/unter
nehmen/industrie
/interview-mit-
bayer-chef-
baumann-nach-
dem-monsanto-
deal-a-
1112390.html 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
2 
 
5.3.1.5. Case Study 5 – Banco Santander/Banco PopularEspaña S.A. 
Case Biography562 
The acquisition which is described here as Case Study 5 is a deal of 
extraordinary nature: Early in June 2017, the Spanish bank Banco Santander 
announced to acquire its domestic Spanish rival Banco Popular España S.A., after 
                                                     
562 All information depicted in this Case Biography have been derived from the 
Information and Documents, depicted below. This general reference serves in lieu 
of specific references to each data point, which forms a part of the analysis of this 
Case Study 5. 
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less than 24 hours of inspection and negotiation and for a purchase price of only 
EUR 1.  
Banco Popular España S.A.had been significantly struggling in connection 
with the economic crisis on the Iberian Peninsula. In 2017, the situation worsened 
and liquidity problems arouse, after the bank’s customers had withdrawn almost 
EUR 2 billion from their bank accounts, apparently in fear that they might not be 
able to access their savings, if the bank further struggled. As a reaction to stabilize 
the European financial markets, the European Single Resolution Board – an 
institution that had been installed in order to concentrate all competencies for 
decisions related to the financial and structural support for banking institutions 
and thereby connected to the European Rescue Fund - had inititated an auction 
process to sell the shares in Banco Popular España S.A..  
In an overnight session of 06 June 2017, Banco Santander’s Chief Executive 
Officer Ana Botín and her team had assessed the situation and then prepared a 
bid, which was handed in to the European Single Resolution Board early on 07 
June 2017. Still prior to the opening of the financial markets on that day, the 
European Single Resolution Board and Santander jointly announced that 
Santander would be permitted to acquire Banco Popular España S.A. under the 
conditions and construction outlined in their bid.  
The construction of the acquisition and plans on intergrating Banco Popular 
España S.A.’s business into Banco Santander, was planned to take place without 
the request for any state guarantees and Santander nevertheless expected to gain 
synergies and strengthen its market position in the domestic Spanish market, as 
well as in Portugal, with a specific focus on Small and Medium Sized Entitites, 
which had formed a significant part of Banco Popular España S.A.’s customer 
basis.  
Ana Botín stated that it was a “good deal”, that Banco Popular España 
S.A.was a “good strategic fit” and that the acquisition was “good for Spain and 
good for Europe”. Moreover, emphasis was made to the fact that all of 
Santander’s previously made targets, such as dividend payments, and others, 
would be met and not deteriorated by the acquisition. Also, Banco Santander’s 
management stated that it did consider the risks associated with the deal to be 
“manageable”. 
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Even Ana Botin had previously stated that Banco Santander’s mid-term 
strategy would be to grow organically. For the integration of the acquired rival, 
the plan was now made to retract focus on the Spanish domestic market and to 
sell circa 50% of Banco Popular España S.A.’s property soon after the acquisition.  
Ana Botín became Chief Executive Officer of Banco Santander in September 
2014, as successor of her father, who had been in the role of Banco Santander’s 
Chief Executive Officer until he died.  
On 08 August 2017, the European Commission approved the acquisition of 
Banco Popular España S.A. based on the conclusion that the transaction would 
not raise competition concerns in the European Economic Area.  
 
Table 8: Case Study 5 - Analysed documents and information  
 
# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
1. Press relese Press release issued by the 
European Commission on the 
approval of the acquisition of 
Banco Popular España S.A. by 
Banco Santander from a 
European competition law 
perspective.  
 
http://europa.eu
/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-
2421_en.htm 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
1 
2. Press release Press release issued by Banco 
Santander dated 07 June 2017 
regarding its acquisition of the 
shares in Banco Popular 
España S.A. including an 
overview of the advantages to 
be expected from the deal and 
citations of Banco Santander’s 
Chief Executive Officer Ana 
https://www.sa
ntander.com/csg
s/Satellite/CFW
CSancomQP01/e
n_GB/Corporate
/Press-
room/Santander
-
News/2017/06/0
1 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
Botín.  
 
7/Santander-
acquires-
Popular--
becoming-the-
leading-bank-in-
Spain.html 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
3. Shareholders 
presentation 
Presentation prepared to 
inform shareholders of Banco 
Santander about the details 
and outlook of the acquisition 
of Banco Popular España S.A. 
 
https://www.sa
ntander.com/csg
s/Satellite/CFW
CSancomQP01/e
n_GB/Corporate
/Press-
room/Banco-
Popular-
acquisition.html 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
1 
4. Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
by Financial Times in English 
regarding the acquisition of 
Banco Popular España S.A. by 
Banco Santander including 
citation of the latter’s Chief 
Executive Officer Ana Botín.  
 
https://www.ft.c
om/content/4cf8
a400-4b4b-11e7-
a3f4-
c742b9791d43 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
2 
5.  Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
by Financial Times in English 
https://www.ft.c
om/content/31bc
2 
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# Document/ 
information 
format 
Content description (=data) Source Direct 
(1)/ 
Indirect 
Data 
Source 
(2) 
regarding the chronology of 
events in the acquisition of 
Banco Popular España S.A. by 
Banco Santander. 
018a-4b8e-11e7-
919a-
1e14ce4af89b 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
6. Newspaper 
article 
Newspaper article published 
by Thomson Reuters in 
English regarding chronology 
and overview of main points 
of the acquisition of Banco 
Popular España S.A.by Banco 
Santander. 
 
https://www.reu
ters.com/article/
us-popular-m-a-
santander-
idUSKBN18Y0I
U 
Last check: 25 
July 2018 
 
2 
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5.3.2. Categorization of data per each Case Study 
In order to process the data points included in the Case Biographies, at first, 
a categorization of such data is conducted, including categories, which have been 
inductively derived from the Case Biographies as well as categories, which are 
deductively mounted to the Case Biographies and which result from the 
analytical review of the theories conducted above in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
As such, the categorization for each Case Study does contain inductive 
elements, as well as deductive elements and thereby allows for a valid and 
thourough interpretation of the data alongside those categories below in Chapter 
5.4. As visible in the summary tables below, the information contained in each 
Case Biography is assigned to either a deductive category or assessed for 
potential inductive categories it might contain.  
 
Table 9: Categorization of Data - Case Study 1:  
 
# Category name Category description Case Biography 
material 
assigned to this 
Category 
(numbers refer to 
enumeration in table 
showing analysed 
information above) 
Deductive Categories 
1. Corporate Transaction 
Lifecycle  
Category collects data 
concerning the different 
phases of a Corporate 
Transaction  
 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 
9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 
16 
2. Management Strategy Category collects data 
concerning the strategic 
approach of the participating 
companies’ Managers 
  
1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
12, 13, 15, 17 
3. Individual Behaviour Category collects data 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
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of Manager concerning individual 
behaviour and decision-
making of individuals, who act 
as Managers of one of the 
Participants during the 
Corporate Transaction  
 
12, 13, 15, 17 
4. Individual interaction 
between Manager and 
Shareholder(s) 
(Principal - Agent) 
 
Category collects data 
concerning the interaction 
between the respective 
Manager of one of the 
participants and his 
Shareholder(s) 
 
1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 13 
5. Information 
availability for 
Manager and 
Shareholder(s)  
Category collects data 
concerning the availability of 
relevant information about the 
Corporate Transaction for the 
respective Manager and his 
Shareholder(s) 
1, 2 
Inductive Category(ies) 
6. Context of the 
Corporate Transaction 
Category collects relevant 
information about the context, 
in which the Corporate 
Transaction was conducted 
1, 2, 13, 14 
 
 
Table 10: Categoriation of Data - Case Study 2: 
 
# Category name Category description Case Biography 
material 
assigned to this 
Category 
Deductive Categories 
1. Corporate Transaction 
Lifecycle  
Category collects data 
concerning the different 
1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,  
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phases of a Corporate 
Transaction  
 
2. Management Strategy Category collects data 
concerning the strategic 
approach of the participating 
companies’ Managers 
  
2, 3, 5, 6, 8 
3. Individual Behaviour 
of Manager 
Category collects data 
concerning individual 
behaviour and decision-
making of individuals, who act 
as Managers of one of the 
Participants during the 
Corporate Transaction  
 
2, 3, 5, 6 
4. Individual interaction 
between Manager and 
Shareholder(s) 
(Principal - Agent) 
 
Category collects data 
concerning the interaction 
between the respective 
Manager of one of the 
participants and his 
Shareholder(s) 
 
2 
5. Information 
availability for 
Manager and 
Shareholder(s)  
Category collects data 
concerning the availability of 
relevant information about the 
Corporate Transaction for the 
respective Manager and his 
Shareholder(s) 
2 
Inductive Category(ies) 
6. Context of the 
Corporate Transaction 
Category collects data 
concerning the context in 
which the Corporate 
Transaction took place  
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
 
 
279 
EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS – ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF MANAGERS 
IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS IN PRACTICE 
 
Table 11: Categorization of Data - Case Study 3: 
 
# Category name Category description Case Biography 
material 
assigned to this 
Category 
Deductive Categories 
1. Corporate Transaction 
Lifecycle  
Category collects data 
concerning the different 
phases of a Corporate 
Transaction  
 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 
2. Management Strategy Category collects data 
concerning the strategic 
approach of the participating 
companies’ Managers 
  
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 
3. Individual Behaviour 
of Manager 
Category collects data 
concerning individual 
behaviour and decision-
making of individuals, who act 
as Managers of one of the 
Participants during the 
Corporate Transaction  
 
4, 6, 7, 8, 10 
4. Individual interaction 
between Manager and 
Shareholder(s) 
(Principal - Agent) 
 
Category collects data 
concerning the interaction 
between the respective 
Manager of one of the 
participants and his 
Shareholder(s) 
 
1, 2, 5 
5. Information 
availability for 
Manager and 
Shareholder(s)  
Category collects data 
concerning the availability of 
relevant information about the 
Corporate Transaction for the 
1, 2, 5 
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respective Manager and his 
Shareholder(s) 
 
Inductive Category(ies) 
6. Context of the 
Transaction  
Category collects data 
concerning the context in 
which the Corporate 
Transaction took place  
 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 
 
 
Table 12: Categorization of Data - Case Study 4: 
 
# Category name Category description Case Biography 
material 
assigned to this 
Category 
Deductive Categories 
1. Corporate Transaction 
Lifecycle  
Category collects data 
concerning the different 
phases of a Corporate 
Transaction  
 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
2. Management Strategy Category collects data 
concerning the strategic 
approach of the participating 
companies’ Managers 
  
1, 6, 7 
3. Individual Behaviour 
of Manager 
Category collects data 
concerning individual 
behaviour and decision-
making of individuals, who act 
as Managers of one of the 
Participants during the 
Corporate Transaction  
4, 5, 6, 7 
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4. Individual interaction 
between Manager and 
Shareholder(s) 
(Principal - Agent) 
 
Category collects data 
concerning the interaction 
between the respective 
Manager of one of the 
participants and his 
Shareholder(s) 
 
-  
5. Information 
availability for 
Manager and 
Shareholder(s)  
Category collects data 
concerning the availability of 
relevant information about the 
Corporate Transaction for the 
respective Manager and his 
Shareholder(s) 
 
-  
Inductive Category(ies) 
6. Context of the 
Corporate Transaction 
Category collects data 
concerning the context in 
which the Corporate 
Transaction took place 
 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
 
 
Table 13: Categorization of Data - Case Study 5: 
 
# Category name Category description Case Biography 
material 
assigned to this 
Category 
Deductive Categories 
1. Corporate Transaction 
Lifecycle  
Category collects data 
concerning the different 
phases of a Corporate 
Transaction  
 
1, 2, 4, 5, 6 
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2. Management Strategy Category collects data 
concerning the strategic 
approach of the participating 
companies’ Managers 
  
4, 5, 6 
3. Individual Behaviour 
of Manager 
Category collects data 
concerning individual 
behaviour and decision-
making of individuals, who act 
as Managers of one of the 
Participants during the 
Corporate Transaction  
 
4, 5, 6 
4. Individual interaction 
between Manager and 
Shareholder(s) 
(Principal - Agent) 
 
Category collects data 
concerning the interaction 
between the respective 
Manager of one of the 
participants and his 
Shareholder(s) 
 
-  
5. Information 
availability for 
Manager and 
Shareholder(s)  
Category collects data 
concerning the availability of 
relevant information about the 
Corporate Transaction for the 
respective Manager and his 
Shareholder(s) 
 
-  
Inductive Category 
6. Context of the 
Corporate Transaction  
Category collects data 
concerning the context in 
which the Corporate 
Transaction took place 
 
1, 3, 4, 5, 6 
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5.3.3. Coding of data per each Case Study 
Based on the categorization of the data as displayed above, the specific data 
points have then been coded, in order to allow for a structured analysis and 
interpretation. In detail, such coding was conducted by way of assignment of 
specific text passages of press releases and articles, citation phrases and clauses 
and formulations made in the transactional agreements to the inductive and 
deductive data categories.  
The coding was made in written form and with usage of a colour code 
system to review and work through the material of the Case Biographies.  
As a summary, this preparatory step towards a structured data analysis 
revealed the following findings:  
(1) Each document collected per Case Study did reveal certain data 
points that were open for coding alongside the categories; 
(2) Most of the documents did not contain data points to be coded for 
each category, but rather agglomerated data for one or only few data 
categories; 
(3) Those passages of documents, which were not open for coding did 
contain only filling phrases or other items without information 
content; and  
(4) The process of coding the data did reveal an uneven allocation of 
data points per the category system, thus, at least seven data points 
per each category were identified. 
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5.4. DATA ANALYSIS 
5.4.1. Data Interpretation  
The following interpretation of the data collected, will be conducted in a 
two-fold approach: The data collected, categorized and coded per each Case 
Study will be interpreted alongside the principles of qualitative data analysis 
developed by Mayring and combined with a interpretation of the data in their 
respective context according to the parameters of the “Grounded Theory”.563  
This does include in particular an explicating analysis of specific data 
points, such as descriptions, citations or contract clauses, for example, by way of 
agglomerating such data points with supplementary data from the same category 
and/or coding. Whereas this method allows for a detailed and deep analysis of 
particular data points, the “Grounded Theory” will provide for an interconnected 
interpretation of the data, close to its respective semantic content.  
Moreover, the applicable legal framework, which has been described above 
as part of the theoretical fundament of this work,564 will be considered as the 
playing field of the respective Case Biographies and will thereby serve as one 
central aspect of each Case Study’s context. In particular, the above assessment in 
the theoretical parts of this work have led to the conclusion that the phases of 
“Proper Inspection” and “Defining Parameters”, i.e. due diligence information 
collection and the negotiation of the relevant transactional agreements, and the 
European legislative surroundings of those phases, are the main stages of 
individual decision-making of Managers in Corporate Transaction and therefore 
of high relevance for the analysis and interpretation of the data collected per each 
Case Study.  
The above made assessment of the theoretical fundament regarding 
Economic theories and models565 will be further considered later to allow for the 
Comparative Analysis of theoretical approaches and real-life data, which will 
                                                     
563 Cf. Above, Chapter 5.2.2. 
564 Cf. above, Chapter 3.  
565 Cf. above, Chapter 4.  
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then lead the path towards the generation of reliable assumptions, which will 
answer the Research Question566.   
Moreover, the internal and external validty of the data interpretation will be 
discussed further below.567  
 
5.4.1.1. Case Study 1  
The sequence of events in the acquisition of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone 
Airtouch plc568 as visible from the collected data and the categorization569 and 
coding570 thereof, reveals several aspects, which connect to the above made 
analysis of theories and principals of potential relevance.  
Overall, a considerable amount of the data available regarding this Case 
Study 1 can be attributed to the individual Management behaviour and decision-
making of the Target Company’s Chief Executive Officer Klaus Esser and to the 
overall chronology of the acquisition.  
Most of the data available regarding individual Management behaviour and 
decision-making is attributable to the phases of information collection and 
negotiation of the basic parameters of the Corporate Transaction, meaning the 
general deal phases of “Proper Inspection” and “Defining Paramters”. Moreover, 
the available data points support the assessment that here, the Target Company’s 
influence and managerial behaviour within its applicable legal framework is of 
central relevance for the shape and outcome of the deal. Specific analysis will 
therefore be made with regard to the Target Company’s legal obligations and 
rights.  
  
                                                     
566 Cf. above, Chapter 2.4. 
567 Cf. below, Chapter 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. 
568 Cf. above, Case Biography in Chapter 5.3.1.1. 
569 Cf. above, Chapter 5.3.2. 
570 Cf. above, Chapter 5.3.3. 
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Autocratic Management Style 
As the collected data reveals,571 the organisational structure within the 
Target Company was set up in a way that channelled all major decisions to be 
solely taken by the CEO himself. Even though Klaus Esser was reportedly not 
present in most of the direct face-to-face meetings and negotiations between 
Vodafone Airtouch plc and Mannesmann AG, he did conduct the decisive 
meeting with Vodafone Airtouch plc’s CEO Chris Gent on 03 February 2000, 
where the general decision was finally made that Mannesmann AG would no 
longer fight against the acquisition by Vodafone Airtouch plc, but rather join 
forces to work on a reliable compromise agreement for both companies.   
Also during previous meetings with other companies, which were 
approached by Mannesmann AG as potential Joint Venture partners, the CEO 
Klaus Esser was reported to always take all relevant decisions himself and on 
several instances also decided at short notice to cancel important meetings.  
Moreover, also during the intense marketing campaign by which 
Mannesmann AG tried to convince its shareholders not to accept the share 
purchase offer made by Vodafone Airtouch plc, it was reportedly in most cases 
Klaus Esser himself, who led the meetings and discussions with key shareholders 
or press representatives.  
 
Status Quo Bias  
Being the Chief Executive Officer of the Target Company, Klaus Esser was 
in a position of significant influence to the participants in the Corporate 
Transaction, as well as towards other stakeholders, including the media. Several 
explicit statement he made during the progressing of the deal show that he was 
not at all in favour of the acquisition of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone Airtouch 
plc.  
                                                     
571 Cf. above, Chapter 5.3.1.1, also with specific listing and reference to the data 
sources, which here serve as a basis for the data interpretation conducted in the 
entire Chapter 5.4.1.1. This reference will be in lieu of specific references of the 
very same Chapter and data source basis for all individual data points referenced 
here in this Chapter 5.4.1.1.  
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On the contrary, based on the acquisition of the UK-based 
telecommunications company Orange and the progressing talks about strategic 
partnerships with Vivendi in France and Bertelsmann Media in Germany, the 
overall strategy of Mannesmann AG’s management can be rather interpreted to 
be an expansive growth strategy, focussing on dominance in strategic 
partnerships and on increasingly strong market presence and innovation 
leadership throughout the European telecommunications market.  
This strategy was based on the enduring legal independence of 
Mannesmann AG and its subordinated group companies. Klaus Esser was quoted 
by several newspapers to have rejected Vodafone Airtouch plc’s offer for an 
acquisition of the shares in Mannesmann AG with the statement that such offer 
was “completely inappropriate”. Even when Vodafone Airtouch plc did further 
increase its monetary offer per share, he held and further articulated this opinion.  
Moreover, the available data set reveals that Mannesmann AG’s 
management had established and fostered the existence of a company-internal 
project named “Project Friedland” already long prior to the takeover attempt by 
Vodafone Airtouch plc. The central objective of “Project Friedland” was to 
identify possibilities to strengthen Mannesmann AG’s status as an independent 
legal entity and to take appropriate proactive measures to prevent any possible 
future takeover attempt from another company.  
The synopsis of the above mentioned aspects strongly indicate the existence 
of a Status Quo Bias at Mannesmann AG’s management, and namely its CEO 
Klaus Esser.  The current corporate status of legal independence was aimed to be 
preserved at substantial costs, same as the overall strategic approach within the 
company.  
And even in the light of the existence of a real and apparent alternative, 
being the acquisition by Vodafone Airtouch plc, Klaus Esser did apparently only 
change his view and gave up managerial resistance in the light of an attractive 
incentive, namely a bonus payment of Deutsche Mark 15,000,000 in case of a 
supportive behaviour throughout the progressing of the transaction.  
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Overconfidence 
Mannesmann’s Chief Executive Officer Klaus Esser stated that the offer 
made by Vodafone for an acquisition of shares in Mannesmann was “completely 
inappropriate” and therefore should be rejected by the shareholders.572 He was 
strongly convinced that a stand-alone future would be the most benefitial setup 
for Mannesmann AG going forward.  This aspect does not only indicate the 
existence of a Status Quo Bias, but it might also well give room to suspect a 
certain level of Overconfidence at the CEO’s position.  
In the light of Vodafone Airtouch plc’s attempt to acquire shares in 
Mannesmann AG, Klaus Esser is also cited to have made the statement that such 
offer would only be acceptable for Mannesmann AG, if Vodafone Airtouch plc 
was prepared to give up its own telecommunications market activities in the UK. 
Only then, Mannesmann AG’s own subsidiary Orange could continue to strongly 
grow into the British telecommunications market and thereby the acquisition 
offer would only become acceptable.  
As Vodafone Airtouch plc is incorporated as a UK company, having its 
corporate origins and strongest market presence in the UK at the time of the 
acquisition, such a proclamation made by Klaus Esser must be interpreted either 
as a substantial overrating of Mannesmann AG’s own importance in the 
telecommunications market and in the balancing of powers in this particular 
transaction, or as a tactical statement in order to make the takeover attempt by 
Vodafone Airtouch plc appear even more negative and inappropriate.   
Moreover, as described above, the data set also includes indication that 
Mannesmann AG’s internal organisation was structured in a hierarchic, top-down 
approach, allowing for an autocratic management and decision-making style of 
its CEO. During the above analysis of the theoretical fundament of Behavioural 
Economics and Management styles, strong arguments were found to expect an 
Autocratic Management Style and the individual bias of a Manager’s 
Overconfidence to often occur in parallel and foster each other.573 In conjunction 
with the other factors above, which support the assumption of Overconfidence 
here, the existence of such cannot be substantially excluded.  
                                                     
572 Cf. above, Chapter 5.3.1.1. 
573 Cf. above, Chapter 4.5.  
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Principal-Agent-scenario 
The data set extracted from the available documents and information also 
reveals certain aspects of relevance with regard to the Principal-Agent-Modell:  
 Klaus Esser acted as CEO of Mannesmann AG in clear rejection of the 
attempted acquisition of the company by Vodafone Airtouch plc and often 
articulated that he perceived this takeover to lead into a less benefitial and more 
risky future for Mannesmann AG. His position was clearly visible from several 
actions and statements.  
However, one of Mannesmann AG’s largest shareholders, the Chinese 
investment company Hutchinson Whampoa, did not always support its 
company’s rejection of the offer, but was rather open to accept it and to sell its 
shares to Vodafone Airtouch plc after some time. In order to achieve this, 
Hutchinson Whampoa needed Mannesmann AG’s management to give up its 
resistance and to rather contribute to the negotiation of a benefitial set of 
transactional agreements. Therefore, a representative of Hutchinson Whampoa 
offered a bonus payment to Klaus Esser in exchange for his support and 
constructive behaviour during the acquisition. Such bonus payment being offered 
amounted to reportedly Deutsche Mark 15,000,000 and was supplemented by a 
second payment in a similar amount at a later point in time. Here, the Hutchinson 
Whampoa, in its position as principal vis-á-vis its own company’s management, 
made use of a direct incentive in order to achieve an alignment of its own 
interests with those of its agent. As a consequence of this incentive, Klaus Esser 
gave up his resistance against the upcoming takeover and supported the 
successful conduct of the transaction.  
As another aspect worth analysing with a view to elements of a Principal-
Agent scenario, is the relationship between Supervisory Board, Management and 
shareholders of Mannesmann AG: As described above, one of the Company’s 
largest shareholders did incentify the Management to act in its interest by 
promising a significant bonus payment.  
Already prior to this, the Supervisory Board had set out an incentive in 
order to ensure the CEO’s full and enduring dedication to the Company, also 
after a potential takeover by Vodafone Airtouch plc. In particular, the 
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Supervisory Board had resolved that the Company’s CEO Klaus Esser should be 
life-long entitled to have a corporate office, including his own secretary and a 
private driver. Why did the Supervisory Board do so? The analysed documents 
give rise to the interpretation that the Supervisory Board intended to act in the 
Company’s own interests and to ensure the ongoing full support of its CEO by 
setting an effective incentive. In the aftermath, Klaus Esser instrumentalized this 
promise and made the Supervisory Board agree to “buy back” this promise of 
enduring services against the payment of Deutsche Mark 1,000,000. Irrespective of 
this, the incentive itself has to be considered to be only partially successful. 
Mannesmann AG was consumed by and integrated into the corporate group 
structure of Vodafone Airtouch plc. Thereby the interests of the Company itself 
could no longer be identified or separated from the Purchasing Company’s own 
interests.  
Another element that might potentially be explained on the basis of the 
Principal-Agent-Model is the behaviour and resolutions made by Mannesmann 
AG’s Supervisory Board: The board did agree to make the bonus payment to 
Klaus Esser, which had been promised by the Company’s shareholder 
Hutchinson Whampoa. However, the Supervisory did approve this bonus 
payment to be made by the Company itself – and not by the shareholder for his 
own account. More so, the Supervisory Board did also approve additional bonus 
payments in the amount of altogether more than Deutsche Mark 30,000,000 to (i) 
the management team around the CEO as “non-compensatory appreciation 
payments” – same description as was also used to name the payments made to 
the CEO -  and also to (ii) members of the Supervisory Board.  
Those resolutions were passed by the Supervisory Board in a situation, in 
which the acquisition of their company by Vodafone Airtouch plc was already 
agreed in principle. The payments pere named to be pure “non-compensatory 
appreciation payments”. An element of incentivation or underlying motivation to 
align interests or nudge a particular behaviour of the payments’ recipients, cannot 
be detected therein at all. Moreover, the Supervisory Board did distribute 
Company-owned money, but at least for those payments received by Supervisory 
Board members, the board did appear to act mainly in its own members’ personal 
interest and not mainly in order to further pursue or foster the Company’s 
statutorial objective. As this constellation was later perceived to be a potential 
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breach of trust and misusage of company-owned assets, the Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf and the Federal High Court of Justice did closely assess the 
circumstances under which those payments were made from a legal perspective, 
both corporate law and criminal law.574 In the light of the theoretical aspects of the 
Principal-Agent-Model, the behaviour of the Supervisory Board of Mannesmann 
AG with regard to the resolutions on bonus payments to be made by the 
Company to board members and to the Company’s management, cannot be 
considered to be ultimately of incentivizing nature, but rather of disadvantage to 
the Company’s financial integrity.  
 
Relevance of legal framework for managerial decisions 
The Corporate Transaction displayed here as Case Study 1 was structurally 
determined by the behaviour of the Purchasing Company and mainly by the 
actions and statements made by the Target Company’s Management. Especially 
after the first announcement of the takeover offer by the Purchasing Company 
and the phase of “Defining Parameters”, the Target Company’s Management 
actively pursued the goal to prevent the acquisition from happening.  
This was done with a constant referring and public assurance of acting 
solely in the interests of the Target Company, which was considered by its 
Management to be better off alone as an independent legal entity.  
The Target Company’s Management did even initiate negotiations with 
third parties, who might take the role of a “white knight” and thereby defend the 
Target Company against the unwanted takeover.  
This behaviour of the Management of a Stock Corporation incorporated 
under German law and being listed on the German stock market, is relevant 
especially in the light of sec. 93 para. 1 AktG.  
As described above in Chapter 3.2.4 and Chapter 3.4.3, the Management of 
the Target Company is entitled to take actions to prevent the acquisition, as long 
as those are adequate and compliant with applicable laws. Moreover, the 
Management is even legally entitled to take decisions, which inherit a significant 
economic risk for the Company, as long as those are conducted on a proper 
                                                     
574 Cf. documents and references above in Chapter 5.3.1.1. 
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information basis. Even though the above assessment of specific aspects and 
managerial behaviour in the context of decision-making does support the 
assumption of certain biases and other influences to individual Management 
decision-making, these data points do not give rise to the conclusion that the 
actions and decisions taken were not in compliance with the applicable legal 
framework thereto.  
As a matter of fact, the compliance of the specific decisions made by the 
Management of the Target Company has been subject to the court proceedings 
and decisions made by the Regional Court of Düsseldorf and the Federal High 
Court of Justice, both depicting the specific decision-making behaviour in detail 
in the respective judgements, but thus arguing in favour of compliance with 
applicable takeover laws and civil and corporate law requirements as applicable 
to the respective Corporate Transaction at hand.  
 
5.4.1.2. Case Study 2 
The data points derived from the information and documents regarding 
Case Study 2,575 also give reason to assume the existence of certain influence 
factors to the decision-making of individual managers, who have been involved 
into this Corporate Transaction.  
 
Overconfidence 
 First, specific citations of statements made by the individuals, who acted 
as Managers on the side of the Purchasing consortium, support the assumption 
that their decision-making behaviour was biased by Overconfidence. In 
particular, the former Chief Executive Officer of the purchasing consortium’s 
member Royal Bank of Scotland made the statement that “at no stage did any 
board member propose that we should not proceed”.576 Board members later 
described the situation of decision-making in favour of proceeding with the deal 
as “group-think” and the deal itself to be named as a “trophy deal”.  
                                                     
575 Cf. Above, Chapter 5.3.1.2. 
576 Cf. above, Chapter 5.3.1.2. and the information and documents referenced 
therein as a basis for the Case Biography and the data collection.  
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In connection with the fact that the transactional negotiations took place 
without having conducted an in-deep Due Diligence and information collection 
regarding the Target Company before, it is likely that the decision-makers were 
influenced by an element of Overconfidence in their own negotiation and 
management skills, which would ensure that the Corporate Transaction itself and 
the later integration and management of the Target Company would turn out to 
be benefitial for the Purchasing Company.  
However, even though such factors give reason to believe in the existence of 
Overconfidence as an influencing factor, there is no overly strong data point to 
make this conclusion unambiguous. A certain level of uncertainty thereto 
remains.  
 
Availability Bias  
Another particularity of the acquisition of ABN Amro Holding N.V. by RFS 
Holdings B.V. was the fact that the purchasing RFS Holdings B.V. did not conduct 
a deep and all-embracing Due Diligence of the Target Company, but instead 
proceeded further with the negotiation of the deal on the basis of very limited and 
rudimentary information only.  
The analysis of the acquisition, which was conducted by the Financial 
Services Authority Board later in the light of the fall of Royal Bank of Scotland 
during the financial crisis around the years 2008 and 2009, did reveal that the 
decision-makers on the side of the Purchasing Company based their decision on 
the little information, which was available at first hand during the phase of 
inspecting the Target Company.  
Even though the Purchasing Company’s management did also involve 
external advisors for the conduct of the Corporate Transaction, those advisers 
were apparently not successfully emphasizing the risks associated with relying 
only on the information, which was easily available, instead of questioning and 
conducting a deep Due Diligence. One contributing factor to this lack of critical 
advice and cautious behaviour on the side of the external advisors could be the 
fact that those were incentivized to support the successful Closing of the 
Corporate Transaction with the promise of a significant success fee, i.e. a payment 
to be received only upon successful Closing of the deal.  
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As depicted above with regard to the specific elements of the Principal-
Agent-Model, incentives can serve as helpful tool to ensure the reaching of certain 
goals. However, here, the achievement of a Closing of the deal appears to have 
been traded off or facilitated by a lack of diligence in the inspection phase of the 
deal. In conjunction with the above made citations of board members, who did 
not at all question, if the deal would happen or not, the decision-makers and their 
advisors were biased by the availability of a certain limited level of information 
about the Target Company and did not question the sufficiency thereof.  
 
Execution of Management strategy 
Even though the acquisition of ABN Amro Holdings N.V. was conducted 
by the purchasing consortium did overall take from February until July 2007, the 
fact that the decision to pursue and execute the acquisition was taken on a very 
limited information basis only and that Management board members of the 
Purchasing Company stated that there was an overall wish and urge to make this 
transaction happen, support the assumption that the overall Management 
Strategy and the particular Management Style of the involved individual 
decision-makers was neglected in the situation of the specific acquisition option, 
and the acquisition was merely urged and pressed towards its Closing.  
One contributing factor could be the existence of a second interested bidder 
for the same target – Barclays bank was in parallel negotiations to purchase ABN 
Amro Holdings N.V.. This might have furthered the impression of RFS Holding 
B.V.’s management that the deal would be at risk if any time was spent on 
additional information collection or other preparatory measures.  
 
Information availability – transactional context 
 One major particularity of the Corporate Transaction depicted as Case 
Study 2 is the limited level of available information, which served as a basis for 
the Purchasing Company’s decision-making to acquire the Target Company. 
Whereas the individual factors that contributed to the acting Managers’ accepting 
this circumstance as a given fact, are likely to be found in the fields of the above 
described Availability Bias and a certain level of Overconfidence, the 
transactional context appears to be of relevance here as well.  
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Why was the information basis so limited? Why did the Selling Company 
not incentify the Target Company and/or its own Management to disclose even 
more data to the potential Purchasing Company? The answer to this might be the 
fact that there were two competing bidders interested in acquiring the Target 
Company at the same time. Whereas Barclays Bank was in negotiations 
concerning the acquisition of ABN Amro Holdings N.V. already for some time, 
RFS Holdings B.V. stepped in as a second interested party only at a later point in 
time.  
Nonetheless, the Purchasing Company’s Management would have been 
supposed do not take any uncalculated risks and rather find a suitable 
compromise between a timely conduct of the information collection and bidding 
process on the one hand and a proper risk mitigation and detailed assessment of 
the Target Company on the other hand. Apparently, this was not the case.  
In a nutshell, the decisions made by the individual Managing Directors of 
the Purchasing Company in this Case Study 2 are likely to be substantially 
influenced by the occurrence of the Availability Bias, most likely in conjunction 
with Overconfidence of some of the acting individuals. In addition thereto, the 
lack of information collected and the therewith related high economic risk for the 
Purchasing Company shows that general approach to manage and mitigate risks 
by appropriate Project Management approaches and thereto related managerial 
decisions were not taken here, but the Closing of the Corporate Transaction was 
rather pursued by all means, lacking a rational decision-making process and by 
exluding senseful external advice by giving inappropriate incentives.  
 
5.4.1.3. Case Study 3 
The acquisition of Chrysler Corporation by Daimler-Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft serves as third Case Study on the search for empirical evidence 
in the light of the overall Research Question. Here again, the data derived from 
the documents and information available does open up for an interpretation in 
the light of the theories and models displayed above in Chapter 4 of this work.  
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Autocratic Management Style  
As a first aspect to be derived from the data set regarding Case Study 3,577 
several data points concern the overall management style of the Purchasing 
Company’s Chief Executive Officer, Jürgen Schrempp. Data related to the 
Purchasing Company’s history of events in the years prior to the acquisition of 
Chrysler Corporation in 1998 depicts that Jürgen Schrempp had an overarching 
objective of forming a global player in the automotive market, being present and 
first to market with innovations in various different business segments, such as 
luxury cars, mid-level commodity cars, trains, trucks, schoolbuses and other 
vehicle classes.  
In a newspaper article, Jürgen Schrempp was depicted as a central figure in 
the entire world of Daimler-Benz AG, colleagues and subordinated employees are 
quoted to have named Jürgen Schrempp unofficially as “Rambo”. This 
complements further to the perception of him acting like the only strong man in 
the Company and having organized internal reporting lines and decision-making 
structures all to lead towards him as a central figure in the entity.  
 
Overconfidence  
The data points derived from the available information and documents 
about the Case give robust evidence to the existence of an individual bias, namely 
Overconfidence, in the person of Daimler-Benz AG’s Chief Executive Officer 
Jürgen Schrempp. In an interview, he made the statement that “Daimler needs me 
more than I need Daimler”, showing and proclamating that he believes, or at least 
wants to transport the external image that he is the decisive success factor for 
Daimler-Benz AG and that the company is dependent on him as a person, not 
only on someone in his position. 
Moreover, he frequently described himself as a personality like a chess-
player, always considering the next steps and never to be beaten or outplayed. 
His skillset, which he perceived to be sufficient for the successful management of 
                                                     
577 Cf. above, Chapter 5.3.1.3.  
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a global automotive company, proved retrospectively to be rather not appropriate 
to objectively and rationally value and consider the risks and opportunities at 
hand.  
 
Status Quo Bias 
Data points identified regarding the setup and internal corporate culture at 
Chrysler Corporation give rise to the assumption that the majority of decision-
makers and employees in the Company was critical towards the changes and 
transformatory process that was initiated due to the acquisition by Daimler-Benz 
AG.  
The apparent cultural differences between the US-american mid-level 
commodity car manufacturer and the German high-end automotive manufacturer 
of luxury brand cars with a three-digit number of years as cutting-the-edge 
innovation track record, lead to an atmosphere of rejection of the acquisition at 
Chrysler Corporation. This picture as visible from the data collected, indicates the 
existence of  Status Quo Bias on the level of the key managers and influencers 
within the Chrysler Corporation’s organisation. Not during the conduct of the 
Corporate Transaction, but in the aftermath of such, during the years of post-
merger integration attemps, this influence to managerial decisions taken in the 
organisation of the Target Company can be clearly identified.  
  
Hindsight Bias  
Speaking of the aftermath of the actual Corporate Transaction, additional 
data points give rise to the assumption of a Hindsight Bias as one parameter that 
influenced the decisions taken by Daimler-Benz AG’s CEO Jürgen Schrempp: 
Even though the acquisition of Chrysler Corporation appeared to be a risk to 
Daimler-Benz AG’s actual corporate strategy, Jürgen Schrempp strongly pursued 
and promoted the idea of a “global scale car manufacturer”.  Even though the 
acquisition of Chrysler Corporation turned out to be a strongly disadvantageous 
decision for Daimler-Benz AG, leading into years of Company’s recession, 
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negative financial developments, which made cost-cutting and lay-offs of 
employees inevitable on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. However, in an 
interview given years after the acquisition, Jürgen Schrempp made the statement 
that the negative effects towards the deal participants were not a surprise, but 
that it was instead the expectations, which were in his view largely created by the 
media and public sources, had been unrealistic from the very beginning, 
expecting too much growth and too little challenges for the integration of 
Chrysler Corporation into Daimler-Benz AG.  
These statements reveal a position and mindset, even if only promoted as 
an excuse for his own failure, which contradicts the public announcements made 
by Jürgen Schrempp earlier, when the acquisition was announced. “Marriage in 
heaven” and a “merger of equals” were the terms by which he intitially described 
the deal and which were apparently not designed to lower investors’ and the 
public’s expectations in the mid-term success of the transaction.   
This does not constitute a “classical” Hindisght Bias, where past events 
would retrospectively shine with more glory, but the specific characteristic here is 
more an adjustment of aspects in remembrance to a more comfortable position in 
present. 
 
Principal-Agent-Constellation 
The acquisition of Chrysler Corporation by Daimler-Benz AG does also 
reveal several aspects of interest in the light of a Principal-Agent-Model.  
One first aspect thereto is the relationship between the Purchasing 
Company and the Target Company. Initially, the acquisition was announced and 
promoted to be a “merger of equals”, a combination of two enterprises, which 
were equally strong and would therefore also have equal participation in the new 
corporate setup after the acquisition. However, the Business Combination 
Agreement, which had been signed between the deal participants, reveals a clear 
structure and to-be organisation post-Closing in favour of the Purchasing 
Company. The integration of Chrysler Corporation into Daimler-Benz AG’s 
corporate structure and business portfolio was envisaged as a staged approach. 
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Reporting lines and the allocation of responsibilities between the Companies in 
internal committees and decision-making functions were to change towards a 
clear dominance of Daimler-Benz AG in all aspects. Nevertheless, Daimler-Benz 
AG’s management, acting as principal towards its agents, the mid-level managers 
at Chrysler Corporation did not in all aspects achieve its goal of a unified 
corporate culture and an alignment of company objectives. The later failure of the 
acquisition and subsequent divestiture of Daimler-Benz AG from the remains of 
Chrysler Corporation was reported by experts and former executives to be mainly 
caused by a lack of integration of the two companies into each other after the 
Closing of the transaction.  
In a nutshell, Daimler-Benz AG did act as principal vis-á-vis Chrysler 
Corporation’s individual management, but struggled to manage the alignment of 
interests and the creation of a unified corporate culture in a successful way.  
Another aspect of relevance in the light of the Principal-Agent-Model is the 
relationship between Daimler-Benz AG’s CEO Jürgen Schrempp and the 
Company’s shareholder Kirk Kerkorian. In connection with the statements made 
by the CEO in interviews after the Closing of the deal with regards to the down-
playing of expectations, which allegedly had been created by the media, 
Kerkorian accused Jürgen Schrempp to have betrayed the Company’s 
shareholders about the true nature and economic risks associated with the 
Transaction. He filed a lawsuit against Jürgen Schrempp in that regard. From the 
perspective of relationship-management between principal and agent, 
Kerkorian’s accusations can be interpreted in a way of severe non-alignment of 
the interests between him and his agent. More so, he did activate the existing 
sanctions regime to receive a compensation for the damages he told to have 
suffered because of the agent’s activities. In the light of the above made 
conclusions about the personal Management Style and potentially existing biases 
in the personal sphere of Jürgen Schrempp, the apparent deviation of his own 
behaviour and decision-making from the interests of his principal contribute 
further to the assumption that the style, by which Jürgen Schrempp did manage 
Daimler-Benz AG was in various aspects to be considered as autocratic.  
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Legal framework 
With a view to the applicable legal framework of this Case Study 3, German 
corporate law, in particular regarding the Purchasing Company being a listed 
Stock Corporation, is of relevance. In particular, the question of scope of 
responsibility and decision-making competencies of the Chief Executive Officer 
are to be highlighted here. According to sec. 93 para. 1 AktG and thereby 
incorporated so-called Business Judgement Rule578, the acceptance of economic 
risks for the Company was to be conducted on an appropriate information basis.  
Moreover, decisions of fundamental strategic importance for the Company 
were reserved to be solely taken by the Company’s shareholders. Here, it was 
mainly Daimler-Benz AG’s CEO driving and shaping the corporate strategic of 
global expansion, as the available data reveals. The Company’s shareholders were 
only involved to the absolute minimum, but did not play a constructive or 
directory role. Here, one of the central aspects of the relationship between 
Management and shareholders in a listed stock corporation becomes visible: Due 
to the typically high number of shareholders and the scope of their participation 
rights in the Company, the Management can grow into a much stronger position 
also with regard to the strategic positioning of the Company. In comparison to 
that, the setup in the GmbH, where the number of shareholders is typically much 
more limited, does generally restrict the Management much more to the conduct 
of the daily business and allows for a strong and consequent execution of the 
shareholders’ rights and competencies. In essence, the general legal framework of 
a Stock Corporation allows the Management to grow much stronger than it can be 
in the GmbH.  
 
5.4.1.4. Case Study 4 
The data points collected579 regarding acquisition of the US-based Monsanto 
Company by Bayer AG indicate the existence of certain influencing factors 
                                                     
578 Cf. above, Chapter 3.2.4 and Chapter 3.4.2. 
579 Cf. above, Chapter 5.3.1.4 – this reference to the information and documents 
collected and assessed as a basis for the data, which is now interpreted in this 
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towards the decision-making of the Management in relation to the above assessed 
theories and models.  Next to aspects related to the Principal-Agent-Model, also 
indications for a partial Overconfidence Bias, as well as an inclination towards a 
potential future Status Quo Bias have been identified.  
 
Principal-Agent-Model 
The acquisition of Monsanto Company was only approved by the 
competent cartel and antitrust authorities against the execution of certain 
restrictions for the Purchasing Company. This includes the sale of certain 
business units and group companies of the Purchasing Company, in order to 
avoid a dominant or even monopolistic position of the Purchasing Company in 
certain markets or market segments. The overall economic volume of the business 
units, which Bayer AG is obliged to sell in order to execute the acquisition of 
Monsanto Company amounts to approximately USD Billion 9. 
Here, it appears to be at least questionable if a sale of business units of this 
size and economic relevance is still covered by the overall interests of the 
Purchasing Company itself and its shareholders, or whether a discrepancy 
between the shareholders’ interest in a flourishing, profitable and economically 
diverse Company and the Management’s aim to proceed with the Closing of the 
acquisition of Monsanto Company is to be presumed.  
As the acquisition is at the time of this work still under progress towards 
Closing, this question has to be left open. However, an analysis of the transaction 
in the light of the particular aspects of the Principal-Agent-Model is likely to 
produce interesting results, if conducted in the future after the full Closing of the 
deal and all its conditions.  
  
                                                                                                                                                  
Chapter 5.4.1.4 serves as a general reference instead of particular references for 
each single data point.  
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Overconfidence – timing & US cartel authorities 
 Another aspect of relevance in the light of the Economic theories and 
models described above is the likelihood of a certain level of Overconfidence of 
the Management of the Purchasing Company with regards to the overall timeline 
of the acquisition and the impact that the requirements set out by the US cartel 
authorities would pose to the overall transaction.  
Statements made by Bayer AG’s Chief Executive Officer Werner Baumann, 
as well as the Company’s responsible Executive for Crop Sciences, Liam Conden, 
give rise to the assumption that the time-consuming negotiations with the US 
cartel authorities were not considered or expected to occur in that particular 
nature. The overall timing of the transaction’s Closing had to be postponed 
because of this aspect. The data points are not strong enough to fully evidence the 
existence of an Overconfidence Bias for those two managers and/or their teams, 
but the nature of such delay as being unexpected, does at least give room to this 
general consideration in that regard.   
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5.4.1.5. Case Study 5 
The particular nature of the acquisition of Banco Popular España S.A.by 
Banco Santander in 2017580 contains indiciators for the existence of certain 
particularities with regards to the theoretical fundament depicted above. Here, 
the Purchasing Company’s Management style appears to be of specific interest.  
 
Management style 
Banco Santander’s Chief Executive Officer Ana Botín was strongly involved 
in the various aspects of the acquisition of her Company’s domestic rival Banco 
Popular España S.A. and her statements reveal a clear conviction that the 
acquisition would turn out to be benefitial for the Purchasing Company. More so, 
Botìn also stated that “the dedal is good for Spain and good for Europe” and 
thereby created a supplementary dimension of aligned interests and benefits 
beyond the direct interests and benefits of the Company. Moreover, she described 
the acquisition as a “very good strategic fit” for Banco Santander. Nevertheless, 
the acquisition was reported to contrast Banco Santander’s actual strategic 
approach at that time, which was to focus merely on the international growth of 
the Company and not mainly on the domestic Spanish market.  
This gives reason to conclude that the Company’s CEO did pursue a 
strategic mission for the Company, while at the same time being open and flexible 
to adapt to new developments and the potential strategic advantages associated 
therewith. 
Ana Botìn’s management style is reported to be hierarchic and the internal 
organisational structure of Banco Santander at the time of the acquisition was said 
to be top-down and structured alongside the objective of full information and 
competencies of Ana Botìn as CEO of the Company. This gives rise to the 
                                                     
580 Cf. above, Chpater 5.3.1.5 – this reference to the information and documents 
collected and assessed as a basis for the data, which is now interpreted in this 
Chapter 5.4.1.4 serves as a general reference instead of particular references for 
each single data point. 
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assumption that her Management Style was autocratic and did include only few 
to no elements of democratic consent with other managers within the Company’s 
structure.  
Moreover, the fact that the fundamental decision to acquire Banco Popular 
España S.A. was made at Banco Popular’s senior management in less than 24 
hours, shows a strong disposition for risk-friendly decision-making, at least in 
this particular situation. This assumption is also supported by the fact that Banco 
Santander’s CEO decided not to ask for any state-guarantees in the light of the 
acquisition, even though the Target Company was in a state of severe economic 
deterioration at that time.  
 
5.4.2. Internal validity of data interpretation (Data Quality Control) 
Does the data collected for each Case Study constitute a plausible basis for 
the interpretation and conclusions made?581  
The data was collected from real-life events and the information and 
documents available thereto.582 The Case Studies had been selected according to 
certain specific parameters identified upfront.583 This selection process and also 
the Research Methodolgy, which has been applied, resulted in a generation of 
data from various different source types. Systematic biases of the information 
basis for the data collection are thereby minimized.  
Therefore, the data sets available for the interpretation of each Case Study 
can be well-considered to be of high quality and reasonable diversity regarding 
its origins and the therewith connected risks of subjective influences to the 
selection.  
Another indirect plausibility check for the data is the existence of not only 
one but five Case Studies and the application of the same data collection approach 
                                                     
581 Cf. also Bortz/Döring, p. 334 et seq. for an overview of the internal validity of 
data, its assessment and definition.  
582 Cf. above, Chapter 5.2.1 and Chapter 5.2.3.  
583 Cf. above, Chapter 5.2.1. 
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in all those cases. The data sets generated for the different Case Studies appear to 
be of similar nature and type.  
Based on these arguments, the data can be considered to be of sufficient 
internal validity.  
  
5.4.3. External validity of data interpretation  
Are the specific elements of interpretation and the conclusions made for the 
Case Studies of general validity and therefore open to be generalized beyond the 
scope of the specific Case Studies?584 
The interpretation made above and the conclusions derived from the 
analysis of the available data include various different aspects of individual 
behaviour and decision-making. The data points, which serve as a basis for the 
interpretation were derived from Case Studies of very ambivalent and different 
nature and each relate to specific elements of relevance therein. However, the 
basis for the data points were only five Case Studies, which is a limited quantity, 
considering the huge variety of possible constellations for managerial decision-
making in Corporate Transactions. Therefore, an overall generalization of the 
interpretation will be factually limited to cases and real-life constellations with 
comparable circumstances for the individual decision-making.  
However, the interpretation of the data derived from real-life cases is only 
one substantial element that leads towards the conclusions made in Chapter 5.5 of 
this work. As a fundamental precondition thereto, the analysis and discussion of 
the legal framework and of relevant theories and models made in the previous 
Chapters 3 and 4 contribute to the quality and content of the interpretation and 
the conclusions as well. The data interpretation was conducted within the 
perspective delivered by the theoretical fundament. This structurally enhances 
the external validity of the interpretation made, as it does not solely originate 
from the data points, but is made in a theoretical context that has itself evolved 
                                                     
584 Cf. also Bortz/Döring, p. 335 et seq. for an overview of the external validity of 
data, its assessment and definition. 
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and been developed based on the interpretation and analysis of numerous case 
studies and experiments as well.  
Therefore, the external validity of the interpretation conducted in Chapter 
5.4.1 and the conclusions to be made in the following Chapter 5.5. are considered 
to be externally valid, within the limits of scenarios of comparable nature.  
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5.5. CONCLUSION RESEARCH FRAGMENT 3 
Concluding on the above made identification and interpretation of the data 
for each Case Study, both elements of the theoretical fundament, (i) the legal 
framework applicable to these Case Studies, as well as (ii) the Economic theories 
and models regarding factors of potential influence for individual Manager’s 
decision-making, are proven to be of relevance in practice.   
 
 
Research Fragment 3:  
 
Are the theoretical findings made in Research Fragment 1 and Research Fragment 2 to be 
found in reality?  
 
 
 
In particular, the above made data interpretation allows for the following 
conclusions:  
 
1. Individual behaviour and decision-making of managers in Corporate 
Transactions is not always rational, but influenced by subjective factors.  
 
2. The subjective factors, which might be of influence to the decision-making 
of Managers in Corporate Transactions are likely to occur not as a singular 
aspect, but as an agglomeration of different aspects, some of which might 
even be connected with each other.  
 
3. The existence of an autocratic Management Style is likely to be 
interconnected with the existence of Overconfidence of the respective 
Manager 
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4. The occurrence of a Hindsight Bias and its influence to the decision-making 
of a Manager going forward might be triggered or intensified by criticism 
addressed by third parties in the light of past activities and decisions taken 
by a Manager. The Hindsight Bias might then be the individual’s reaction to 
disqualify the criticism by negating its actual cause.  
 
5. The shareholding structure in Stock Corporations is likely to be an element 
of contributing nature towards the evolution of an autocratic Management 
Style and overly confident behaviour of the Company’s senior 
Management, whereas the shareholding structure in a Limited Liability 
Company is more likely to ensure constant respect to the allocation of 
competencies and responsibilities between shareholders and management.  
 
6. The nature and intensity of heuristics and biases, which influence the 
decision-making of Managers in Corporate Transactions depends on the 
external circumstances of the transactional situation, the role of the 
respective company therein and the relationship between the Manager and 
the Company’s shareholders acting as principal towards the Manager.  
 
7. The existence of information asymmetries between a Manager and his 
respective principals (as the case may be, this can be either the Supervisory 
Board or the shareholders) is likely to lead towards a deviation of interests 
between principal and agent. This deviation can be even more intense in 
case of an autocratic Management Style of the respective managerial 
decision-maker.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
The above analysis was made in a three-fold structure, alongside the 
particularly defined Research Fragments. Starting point was the Research 
Question, formulated above in Chapter 2.4 as follows:  
 
Which factors and motivations influence the decision-making behaviour of 
managers in cross-border corporate transactions, within the existing legal 
framework from a German and European law perspective? 
 
The path towards answering this Research Question did commence with 
the description and analysis of the existing legal framework to managerial 
behaviour in the light of the general circumstances of applicable corporate laws 
and the specific requirements and the legal scope existing for Corporate 
Transactions in particular. After that, an analysis of the theories and models 
concerning human decision-making behaviour was given, including specific 
considerations and aspects with regards to Corporate Transactions and the 
particular nature of decisions to be taken by Managers therein.  
The aspect of particular interest and focus here was not only each theory 
and model in itself, but also foremost the combination and the potential 
conjunctions and connections between those different theories and models, again 
with a view specifically to Management decision-making behaviour in M&A.  
After that, as a third element to complement the answer to the Research 
Question, an analysis of empirical data was conducted, such being a qualitative 
analysis of real-life Corporate Transactions.  
This empirical analysis revealed that indeed certain aspects of the theories 
and models, which had been identified in the earlier theoretical parts of this work, 
were to be traced and evidenced in reality. More so, also the connections between 
those theories and models, which were assumed to be of particular importance in 
order to come to an encompassing and broad understanding of Managers’ 
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decision-making behaviour in real-life Corporate Transactions, were proven and 
found to be existing in reality.  
In particular, the following conclusions can be made, based on both, the 
theoretical fundament, as well as the empirical data analysis made in the 
foregoing:  
The analysis of the legal framework of management behaviour in Corporate 
Transaction has revealed certain areas and phases of a Corporate Transaction, 
where decision-making of the Management is legally permitted and necessary for 
the progress of the Corporate Transaction. Those phases are namely  
 
(1) the phase of “Proper Inspection” of the Transaction Target 
Company, in which the Management of all three participants are in 
a position to subjectively influence the further transactional 
process with high impact and  
(2) the phase of “Defining Parameters”, in which mostly the 
Management of Seller and Purchaser can influence the form and 
fate of the Corporate Transaction by their own actions and 
decisions.  
 
After this, the analysis of the economic framework of Managers’ decision-
making has lead to the theoretical conclusion that Management decisions, which 
are taken in the course of a Corporate Transaction, can be influenced by subjective 
factors, such as  
 
(1) the individual strategy and style of the Manager, who is involved 
in the Corporate Transaction either on the side of the Seller, 
Purchaser or Target Company, and 
(2) heuristics and/or biases, which influence the decision-making 
process of the individual, who manages, but also  
(3) the relationship between the manager and his/her shareholder as a 
principal by nature of the equity holding structure in the legal 
entity. 
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CONCLUSION 
The empirical data analysis of qualitative nature, which was conducted in 
Chapter 5 on the basis of those theoretical conclusions, then gave way to the 
following specific conclusions, such being of integrative nature towards the above 
theoretical findings: 
 
(1) Individual behaviour and decision-making of managers in Corporate 
Transactions is not always rational, but influenced by subjective factors.  
 
(2) The subjective factors, which might be of influence to the decision-making 
of Managers in Corporate Transactions are likely to occur not as a singular 
aspect, but as an agglomeration of different aspects, some of which might 
even be connected with each other.  
 
(3) The existence of an autocratic Management Style is likely to be 
interconnected with the existence of Overconfidence of the respective 
Manager 
 
(4) The occurrence of a Hindsight Bias and its influence to the decision-
making of a Manager going forward might be triggered or intensified by 
criticism addressed by third parties in the light of past activities and 
decisions taken by a Manager. The Hindsight Bias might then be the 
individual’s reaction to disqualify the criticism by negating its actual 
cause.  
 
(5) The shareholding structure in Stock Corporations is likely to be an 
element of contributing nature towards the evolution of an autocratic 
Management Style and overly confident behaviour of the Company’s 
senior Management, whereas the shareholding structure in a Limited 
Liability Company is more likely to ensure constant respect to the 
allocation of competencies and responsibilities between shareholders and 
management.  
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(6) The nature and intensity of heuristics and biases, which influence the 
decision-making of Managers in Corporate Transactions depends on the 
external circumstances of the transactional situation, the role of the 
respective company therein and the relationship between the Manager 
and the Company’s shareholders acting as principal towards the Manager.  
 
(7) The existence of information asymmetries between a Manager and his 
respective principals (as the case may be, this can be either the 
Supervisory Board or the shareholders) is likely to lead towards a 
deviation of interests between principal and agent. This deviation can be 
even more intense in case of an autocratic Management Style of the 
respective managerial decision-maker. 
 
Those specific conclusions and analyses appear to reveal the fact that, indeed, 
the theories and theoretical fundament, which had been described and introduced 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this work, does match with reality, as analysed in 
Chapter 5. Thereby, the above can be considered as an encompassing and 
substantial answer to the Research Question. Theoretical assessments and 
empirical data analysis reveal to be of supplemental nature here and the legal 
framework and Economic theories and models can be considered to be no 
antithesis, but rather complementary towards a comprehensive understanding of 
the processes, drivers and considerations, which occur during Corporate 
Transactions.  
As an outlook to further scientific activities with regards to the Research 
Question and the answer given thereto, further analysis can be helpful to further 
specify and substantiate the conclusions made above. Moreover, as the above 
analysis does strongly rely on the applicable legal framework as a fundamental 
cornerstone to the assessments made, any changes in such legal framework could 
necessitate a further analysis and potential adjustment, if such changes turn out to 
be of relevance for the theoretical conclusions made in the foregoing.   
 
 
* * * * *
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